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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF RELIGION

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IF WE had wished, a hundred years ago, to find a source of what we should now call insights into the psychological understanding of religion, we should have been led into many strange paths and blind alleys.

We might have tried the academically respectable source usually known as "mental philosophy." There, amid the abstract entities of intellect, will, and emotion we should have found ourselves floating far from anything which in our experience was related to religion in the lives of people.

Had we gone to the theologians and philosophers of religion—the philosophical theologians and the theological philosophers—we should have discovered a great to-do about monism and dualism, about spirit and matter. Since we should have had a religious interest anyhow, we should probably have adopted their prevailing idealism against the rising materialism and empiricism. But we should not have received much insight into the way religion actually functions in human life. Before we were aware of what was happening, our question would have shifted to the objective truth of religious beliefs and the validity of religious experience—instead of sticking with an understanding of what the experience is and means and how it comes about.

We might have learned more if we had gone to some of the less systematic thinkers, but more acute observers of individual people, such as Horace Bushnell or Ralph Waldo Emerson or Lyman Beecher. After all, they were preachers. As such they were so well convinced of both the truth and validity of religious experience that they could afford to take a few things for granted; hence they paid attention to some matters which the philosophers felt were too concrete to warrant their idealistic attention. If we had the good fortune to stumble on some of the works of Jonathan Edwards in which he did some rather acute dissections of personality, or to meet the preacher of the 1830's who said that he always assumed that the problem presented was not the real problem until it was proved otherwise—then we might have been closer to what we were seeking. But our

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findings would have proved so unsystematic that we should probably have got from them no more than some good leads.

We could, of course, have turned back into history with some profit. Perhaps first to the Roman Catholic and Anglican books on moral theology, on ascetical theology, and even to the penitentials. We should have found them full of insights into motivation. Our conviction that neither religious intensity nor breadth of religious perspective is an infallible sign of sound religion would have been reinforced. But we should have foundered, nevertheless, on rocks of formalism, of abstraction, and of preoccupation with punishment and blame. We should have seen abstract religious problems rather than real people experiencing religion.

Perhaps, if we had been godlike in our wisdom, we might have sought out some missionaries who were being forced to think through the meaning of their religion, through coming in contact with strange and foreign cultures and religions. Here on this continent we might well have marveled if we had read accounts by missionaries of the culture and religion of the Plains Indians, and then had contrasted those with accounts of the culture and religion of the Indians of the Southwest.¹ What was happening to the people of the Plains when they assumed the necessity of ecstatic experiences, the normality of visions and hallucinations after extended fasts, the partial relationship of alcoholic inebriety and religious ecstasy? In contrast, what was going on inside the people of the Southwest with their endless rituals, their cultivation of emotional plateaus, and their rejection of ecstasy? We might have had to think through the answers to these questions for ourselves; but we should certainly have been dealing with questions of the psychological understanding of religion.

Even if we had gone, a hundred years ago, to all of the available sources, our pickings would still have been very meagre. We should not so much have found the wrong answers as we should have been diverted into asking the wrong—from the psychological point of view—questions. In mental philosophy our questions would have been too abstract to touch real people. In philosophical theology we should have been led to feel that a nonmetaphysical interest, or an interest with other than a metaphysical aim, was the same as an antimetaphysical interest; and we should simply have become theologians or philosophers. If we had gone to the farsighted preachers, we should have been a bit closer to psychological questions concerning people, but we should probably have been saddled with a narrow concept of and preoccupation with "normality," and possibly with a vulnerable moralism. With moral and ascetical theology we should have been led to feel that the important question always is: Is it right or wrong? How it operates would have assumed such minor and subsidiary significance

¹ See Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, Houghton Mifflin, 1934.

as to deserve no more than passing mention. And even if we had followed the missionaries, our question would have become: How can we get these people to accept Christianity? We should have left behind questions as to the meaning of their own religion to people in other cultures.

We must face the fact, therefore, that the psychological understanding of religion, as any of us would conceive it today, is of relatively recent origin. I have sympathy with those among the theologians who find in the history of Christianity perception into important truths whose origin the modern refuses to acknowledge. I am also sympathetic to those who find, for example, in the writings of John Calvin deep flashes of what today we should call psychological insight into the way religion operates in human life. And yet these do not mean that Calvin or the others are interested, in the way we are, in the serious study of the psychological meaning and function of religion.

Credit must be given, in view of these facts, to the rise of natural science and of empiricism for those indispensable conditions without which study of the psychological understanding of religion would have been impossible. This is not to get ourselves enmeshed in the theological and philosophical issues centring around truth and objectivity. By being psychologists we cannot escape those issues. But, regardless of the stand we take in relation to them, we must see the study of the psychological understanding of religion as important. Within the empirical field, therefore, empiricism has won its point. The psychological understanding of religion is important. Just how important it is in relation to the philosophical and theological questions about religion is not itself a psychological question.

The Beginnings

During the latter part of the nineteenth century, and culminating in the twentieth, scientific method not only came into wide use but for the first time in history it seriously influenced human thought in general. It presented such vistas of possibility that the very meaning of "empirical" became different from what it had been before. Empiricism, as the philosophy giving exclusive exaltation to the empirical, became for the first time a non-Stoical possibility in history. This was the time when realism began to combat romanticism in literature, when naturalism got a toe hold on idealism in philosophy, when modernism began to fight fundamentalism and revivalism in theology, when impressionism battled neoclassicism in art—and when in various ways the empirical approach was set to solving the social and political and economic problems of society through such diverse means as the founding of sociology, the rise of Marxism, the growth of the social applications of Christian teaching, and the like. We know also how much all these and similar movements came into being as reactions against

previous movements, and had therefore a pendulum character which could not permanently be sustained in their original motion. At any rate, it was in such a context that modern psychology arose, and in which the study of the psychological understanding of religion had its beginnings.

Wilhelm Wundt is usually considered the founder of "experimental psychology" and is therefore the father of modern psychology.² For by taking psychology into the laboratory he freed it from being a handmaiden to purely idealistic or rationalistic philosophy, where it had been since the days of Thomas Aquinas and indeed of the Greek philosophers. It is not intended here to attempt any history of the rise of modern psychology in general. But we may recall that psychology developed largely according to the lead given by Wundt, in the attempt to apply the methods of the physical and biological sciences to mental phenomena. Much of the work along these lines may be evaluated as fruitful, even though not much of it is relevant to an understanding of personality psychology.

Even in Wundt himself, however, there were tendencies and interests broader than those of the laboratory. Wundt wrote both on moral problems and on primitive social psychology.³ With the American material chiefly in the forefront of our thinking, we may forget that it was in this country alone that laboratory methods were carried to extremes in psychology, and that in Great Britain and on the Continent broader questions were asked at all times. In France some social psychologists, notably Émile Durkheim, were interested in the psychology of religious origins.⁴ These Continental workers were half empiricists, half rationalists, and what emerged from their work seems to us today to be largely speculative in character. They did not ask, for the most part, the questions which we should now consider to be the dynamic questions.

Before moving to America, we might do well to mention *The Golden Bough* and what it symbolizes.⁵ Material had been piling up for a long time which would have made possible some study of comparative cultures, and indeed modern cultural anthropology got started before this book was published. But Frazer was the first to capture public imagination by setting forth the breadth and variety of the comparative cultural material. Potentially, cultural anthropology has as much significance for demonstrating and disclosing the operating dynamics of religion as does psychological study within our own culture. But because Frazer was not a firsthand observer, because his method was nonintegrative, and because it involved only the comparison of similarities and differences whose criterion was superficial rather than in terms of what any particular action or custom meant to the

² See Wilhelm Wundt, *Principles of Physiological Psychology*, (translation), Macmillan, 1902.

³ See Wilhelm Wundt, *Facts of the Moral Life*, (translation), Macmillan, 1902; and *Elements of Folk Psychology*, (translation), Macmillan, 1916.

⁴ Émile Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, (translation), Macmillan, 1915.

⁵ James G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion*, Macmillan, 1915.

peoples themselves, it probably gave some bad leads to the psychological understanding of religion. But Frazer had performed a public relations function of real importance.

We have seen how, in Europe and Britain, the first modern study of religion from the psychological point of view was preoccupied with primitivity. In America the essential fact was similar—but primitivity of a sort was at our back door. Some of the American phenomena of revivalism, for instance, which could be seen with the naked eye, were similar to what the European academicians, with their more rigid code of what was and what was not a subject of respectable study, could find only through study in books. When William James gave his Gifford Lectures on *The Varieties of Religious Experience* in Edinburgh, I feel sure that, over and above his knowledge and charm and style, an astonishing thing to his hearers must have been the quality of firsthand contact which he seemed to have in relation to the data under discussion.⁶ Scotland certainly had unusual religious movements, but these were there set apart from a rather rigid ecclesiastical norm. Scotland, in other words, was not a frontier. America was. James got most of his case histories from books. But at that time only an American could have used case histories at all.

A more direct way to come at the point is to say that the psychological study of religion has generally applied itself to phenomena which have been prominent in the particular cultural pattern but which have begun to lose their hold. In Europe this meant a study of primitivity and of origins. In America it meant study of revivalism, of bizarre forms of mysticism, and of adolescent sudden conversion experiences. This was in line with the general trend toward reductionism in all the sciences of that time. Biblical criticism, for example, got away with Old Testament analysis before it could do so with New Testament study. Man's naturally strong suspicion that analysis of a thing changes and depreciates its meaning was augmented by the philosophical attempts to do just that. Small wonder if the psychologists of religion sought slightly safer ground by choosing for investigation those phenomena which did not clash openly with generally accepted *mores*, or with *mores* of the respectable group whose approval they sought.

In America, G. Stanley Hall, in connection with his studies on adolescence, published an article on religious conversion in adolescence as early as 1881. During the remaining years of the nineteenth century attention was devoted to the same subject in articles by other psychologists including William H. Burnham, A. H. Daniels, and E. H. Lancaster. The observations were general, however, and of limited extent until the full-length work of Edwin D. Starbuck.⁷

His book is the first full-length treatise in the American tradition, and

⁶ William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, Longmans, 1903.

⁷ Edwin D. Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion*, London, 1899, New York, 1903.

it is not unimportant that it was first published in London and only later in America. Its analysis of the phenomena of conversion threatened patterns which, while not dominant in America, were still prevalent here. In Britain such patterns, while not absent, had comparatively little "respectable" support; hence were not the same threat as in America. Starbuck associated conversions of the sudden type with adolescence, and he tended rather uncritically to view adolescence as a psychobiological fact requiring little or no social or cultural explanation. The important positive point which emerged from his work was that even the most bizarre-appearing religious behavior has causes and meanings which are susceptible to being traced. He qualified the point incorrectly by drawing a sharp line between religious and "abnormal" phenomena, refusing to concede a religious label to the latter. His main point stood nevertheless. It may also be noted that he was content to present his data and findings and to draw limited generalizations from them. He did not feel the necessity of going on to apologetics or polemics and asserting that therefore all religious phenomena were or were not true or good.

Despite the fact that Starbuck was the first to present an extended study of religion from the psychological point of view, William James was undoubtedly the most influential among the pioneers. Seen in the perspective of the present, at least the following were among the major contributions of James' work in the psychological understanding of religion. First, he created enthusiasm for and interest in the subject, a matter of no small importance. Second, he used empirical material, but put it in a framework which made it clear that psychology was not sufficient by itself. Third, he gave impetus to a new vantage point for evaluating religious beliefs not so much in terms of their truth as in terms of their operational significance in human life, *i.e.*, whether they were "healthy" or not. Fourth, he turned attention to more contemporary empirical methods in studying religion, to observable phenomena, and not merely to documentary accounts of primitivity. Fifth, to some extent he applied his study even to those types of religious functions which were "fashionable," and not merely to those which were of the recent past. Sixth, he helped greatly to overcome the distrust of psychological study of religion as such by demonstrating that his own study had not made him lose interest in religion in a personal sense.

It is not easy to know how to assess the contribution of J. H. Leuba in the beginnings of this study in America. By the mid-nineties he was publishing articles on the psychology of religion, and he was partly responsible for the early concentration of interest in sudden conversion phenomena. He does not seem to have done firsthand observation; and, unlike James, his general attitude to religion has been anti rather than pro. Indeed, Leuba was the earliest and most obvious reductionist among the psycholo-

gists of religion. Because of his scholarship, his works had to be taken seriously. But no one liked them except those whose attitudes also demanded a dethronement of all gods. Since this was the clear, and eventually the stated, purpose of Leuba's work, it is doubtful how much he may be considered interested in a psychological *understanding* of religion. His chief contribution has been as a stimulator of more positive thinkers.⁸

E. S. Ames, basically a philosopher rather than a psychologist, performed an important service by showing how influential sociological factors are in determining the form which psychological patterns shall take.⁹ But since his main interest was in empirical naturalism, he contributed toward the idea of reductionism which had become tied up in a special way with the "psychology of religion."

Irving King, the first of the religious educators except George A. Coe to turn to the psychology of religion, attempted to use the new tool to discover how religion actually develops in people.¹⁰ He turned his attention to many aspects of religion, even to the significance for it of the emerging psychotherapeutic movement. His main contribution is in suggesting that the psychological study of religion has significance for Christian nurture.

The first British book in the field seems to have been that by G. M. Stratton.¹¹ This study was based on books, and was an attempt to build a psychology of religion through comparative book study of common and different elements in various religions. The elements compared were too isolated to yield data for a far-reaching psychological understanding of religion.

George A. Coe belongs very nearly at the head of the list of pioneers. The work of no one else but James has stood the test of time so well as that of Coe. Although his major book in this field was not published until 1916, he had published various articles before that, and from the beginning all his writings possessed a strong psychological orientation.¹² Although Coe was a religious educator, and later permitted his interest in the psychology of religion to languish in favor of religious education, he was in many ways more of a psychologist in our modern sense than was any previous writer in the field. Despite his monumental work on psychology, William James was essentially a philosopher. So were Ames, Stratton, and Leuba. Starbuck was a psychologist, but in a sense we should now consider narrow. It is not strange, then, that Coe, with personality psychology at the forefront of his attention, and with fine scholarship in theology and religious education,

⁸ His best book is *Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, Harcourt, 1925.

⁹ E. S. Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, Houghton, 1910.

¹⁰ Irving King, *The Development of Religion*, New York, 1910.

¹¹ G. M. Stratton, *Psychology of the Religious Life*, Macmillan, 1911.

¹² George A. Coe, *The Psychology of Religion*, University of Chicago Press, 1916, is his major work. As early as 1902 he had published *The Religion of a Mature Mind*, Revell.

should have written on the psychology of religion in a way which has stood up for thirty years.

One additional pioneer must be mentioned, J. B. Pratt. Although his full-length work in this field did not appear until 1920,¹³ he had published a previous book in 1907¹⁴ and numerous articles in between. Pratt is rambling, discursive, chatty, intelligent, and an armchair worker. He knew the difference between psychology and theology, and made a real attempt to discuss only the questions to which psychology was relevant. But all his efforts were directed to essentially philosophic and theological questions, even though he discussed only those aspects of them to which psychology had a contribution to make. For these reasons Pratt has always been a favorite among philosophers and theologians, gaining more attention in a sense than he has rightfully deserved. He apparently failed to see the implications of the coming dynamic psychology; yet he mentions Freud, shows that he has read him though without comprehending the revolutionary character of Freud's work. One cannot but respect Pratt's good sense, scholarship, and genial insight; but he is a philosopher's psychologist and not a pastor's or a psychologist's.

Imitators of the Pioneers

When pioneers have staked out large claims and put in the stakes in a certain way, it is natural that for years afterwards they will have imitators who try to stake claims in exactly the same way. The psychology of religion has been no exception.

G. B. Cutten collected a lot of data but treated them only popularly.¹⁵ Elmer T. Clark thirty years later redid Starbuck's study with substantially the same methods.¹⁶ A rash of works in the 1920's, when psychologistic thinking was popular, were generally mere imitations of the work of the pioneers in the psychology of religion. That of R. H. Thouless was the first general text in Great Britain.¹⁷ Others which have failed to make a distinctive mark were by W. B. Selbie,¹⁸ Frank S. Hickman,¹⁹ C. C. Josey,²⁰ J. C. Flower,²¹ and F. L. Strickland.²²

During the past year Paul E. Johnson has published a general volume, the first new text since the twenties.²³ In its general outline, list of subjects considered, and in several other features, it must be classed as an imitator

¹³ James B. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, Macmillan, 1920.

¹⁴ James B. Pratt, *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, Macmillan, 1907.

¹⁵ G. B. Cutten, *The Psychological Phenomena of Christianity*, Scribner, 1908.

¹⁶ E. T. Clark, *The Psychology of Religious Awakening*, Macmillan, 1929.

¹⁷ R. H. Thouless, *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, Macmillan, 1923.

¹⁸ W. B. Selbie, *The Psychology of Religion*, Oxford, 1924.

¹⁹ Frank S. Hickman, *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, Abingdon, 1926.

²⁰ C. C. Josey, *The Psychology of Religion*, Macmillan, 1927.

²¹ J. C. Flower, *An Approach to the Psychology of Religion*, Harcourt, 1927.

²² F. L. Strickland, *Psychology of Religious Experience*, Abingdon, 1924.

²³ Paul E. Johnson, *Psychology of Religion*, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1945.

of the pioneers. In certain other respects, notably Johnson's belief that dynamic or therapeutic psychology has created new bases for the psychological understanding of religion, it belongs in a different group, and leads in the same direction as does this present article.

E. S. Conklin must, regretfully, be placed in the imitators' category.²⁴ While more interested than most others in demonstrating the psychology of religion as a legitimate interest and branch of psychological study in general, and being himself a psychologist, his treatment is nevertheless lacking in any basic originality and is without the acuteness of some earlier works, like Coe's.

It is worth noting, while on the subject of the imitators, that almost the only way to have a piece of research or writing classified as "psychology of religion" for the past twenty-five years has been to put those words in the title. This is further borne out by a count I made a year or two ago of courses on the psychology of religion in theological schools. Nearly all the seminaries had one course invariably titled the psychology of religion or a rough approximation thereof; and almost no seminaries had additional courses in the field. This underscores the brilliance of the mark left by the pioneers upon the theological world, but it suggests further that the illumination apparently produced much blindness. Few followers thought seriously of altering the basic orientation. Thus, in an important sense, the field currently known as the "psychology of religion" has itself become an imitator. New work, new viewpoints, and new insights—of which there have been a number—have been called by other names, even though they belong clearly in the stream of tradition founded by James, Starbuck, Pratt, Leuba, Ames, and Coe.

The Philosophical Stream

If we glance over the list of persons who are pioneers in the study of the psychology of religion, we note that none made this field his major interest. Some were or became philosophers; others, religious educators; others, general psychologists. In no other field of theological study has such a situation occurred, and there must be reasons. The obvious ones are these. No institution of learning has ever enabled a man to devote his full time to it. The recent resurgence of interest in theology has given its study such prestige in religious circles that the theological *mores* now include all religious analysis, even of a psychological nature, under the technical category of theology. Religious study has been under a cloud in scientific circles until recently, and psychologists who had an interest in religion wanted to make sure that they devoted only a part of their attention to religion in order to maintain their respectability.

There are, however, deeper reasons for the failure of the psychology

²⁴ E. S. Conklin, *The Psychology of Religious Adjustment*, Macmillan, 1929.

of religion to develop as a proper field of theological study. Much in the early work was of searchlight quality. But it was analytic, rather than synthetic, in character. As conceived by the pioneers, the psychology of religion could be the analytic study. Synthesis could then be made by theology on matters of truth, by ethics on matters of right, and by religious education or pastoral theology on what to do about it. But was this a sound assumption? Suppose that the study of history, which begins with analysis, were to be cut off after the analysis was made; and the function of suggesting the constructive implications were left entirely to philosophy on the theoretical side and to education on the practical side? In that event, few people who accepted such a working definition of history would devote a major part of their time to the field. They, too, would want to become philosophers or educators.

We receive confirmation of this point from the word "of" in the psychology of religion. This suggests mere analysis. So long as the field is conceived to involve analysis alone—hence to imply either reductionism or a rigid separation of the analytical from the constructive functions—so long will it fail to develop as a field of study. This is exactly what has happened.

So we have the paradox that the psychological understanding of religion has developed very considerably, but the centre and original source of the field has remained almost without development. Instead of finding their focus properly in the psychological understanding of religion, the new growths have seen themselves as having different foci, more or less unrelated to one another. We shall consider these new developments in turn, beginning with the philosophical stream or context, which has had by far the greatest number of voices.

In the philosophical group we see first the psychologists who have attempted to apply psychology to the understanding of religion and who, in the process, have decided that the really important question to be answered is: Does psychology demonstrate the truth or falsity of this or that about religion?

The earliest work of this kind was on the negative side, with J. H. Leuba leading the lists.²⁵ To him religion might be a necessary stage in social evolution, but mature people would certainly get over it if they had the inside psychological dope, especially if they got a whiff of its psychogenesis. Sigmund Freud held a similar view, best expressed in *The Future of an Illusion*.²⁶ He considered religion to be a form of obsessional neurosis, generalizing from the undoubted fact that it was so in some of the persons he saw. In a personal communication to John G. Greene in this country, in

²⁵ See his *Belief in God and Immortality and Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion*, both Open Court Pub. Co., n.d.

²⁶ Sigmund Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, (translation), Liveright, 1928.

reply to a question whether he knew that religion here was often different from what Freud himself considered religion to be, Freud wrote that it saddened him to see many able Americans using time and energy on religion when otherwise they might be engaged in important service for social betterment. Freud professed himself to be antiphilosophical in general, but his views on religion are philosophical in character.²⁷

It is not without interest that, for a number of years, the University of Iowa group in psychology was perhaps the most obviously reductionist group of psychological students of religion in a university centre. Under the guise of natural science method, narrowly interpreted and mechanically applied, they gave vent to anti-Bible-belt feelings in a way which probably guaranteed a maximum of safety. It is further notable that Edwin D. Starbuck, who had started the whole thing off, was associated with this group. He must have been unhappy at the shading off of his natural science study by others into philosophical channels. If so, his group took a most unpsychological and most unfruitful way to get it back into what they felt was mainstream.

The antireligionists were at least balanced, however, by the proreligionists. Oskar R. Pfister, one of Freud's earliest followers and a psychoanalytic practitioner, was a Swiss minister. It is something of a mystery why Pfister has been so little known in America. Had he written more stridently, doubtless he would have been translated earlier. His works which have found their way into English appeared so late that their circulation has been handicapped. While not strikingly original, they deserve more serious attention than they have yet received.²⁸

The record shows, however, that few persons who could be called psychologists by any reasonable stretch of the imagination turned their attention to religion in a sympathetic manner before the 1920's. After the first world war, especially in view of the prestige which psychology gained during the war, more attacks were made on religion from the psychological point of view; and these were followed by psychological defenses.

William McDougall can probably be considered such an apologist though most of his works touching on religion have appeared in comparatively recent years.²⁹ So, in a neutral kind of way, may we class Adolf Meyer.³⁰ Despite McDougall's expansive and impressive theorizing, his work leaves the impression of a discursive essayist rather than that of a sys-

²⁷ Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, (translation), Ballou, 1930, is a good illustration. Reducing religion was one of the chief preoccupations of the German magazine *Imago*, a Freudian journal founded about 1912.

²⁸ Oskar R. Pfister's translated works include *Psycho-analysis in the Service of Education*, Dodd, n.d.; *Some Applications of Psychoanalysis*, Dodd, 1933; *Spiritual Direction*, Morehouse, 1928; and *Parson's Dilemmas*, Morehouse, 1930.

²⁹ The books most obviously bearing on religion are: *Body and Mind*, Macmillan, 1938 (reprint); *Character and the Conduct of Life*, Putnam, 1927; *Religion and the Sciences of Life*, Duke, 1934; *Riddle of Life*, Methuen, 1938.

³⁰ Despite his acknowledged leadership of the so-called American school of psychiatry for nearly forty years, Adolf Meyer has written no books, only occasional articles.

tematic observer, basic thinker, or constructive philosopher. Adolf Meyer and his multitude of followers, who called themselves "psychobiologists," have performed an extremely important function in psychiatric history by breaking down much prejudice against seeing psychological factors as being as real as physiological factors. But in their desire to be inclusive, they lost sharpness of definition. As one psychiatrist has said, they failed to see the trees for the forest. Yet in a day when many psychological thinkers were against religion as such, the Meyer school had at least the virtue of not attacking it every time it appeared in a patient or an idea. They accepted it as a fact of life. And yet, because they failed to develop an adequate constructive theoretical point of view, their views on a study of religion have not been fruitful. A recent book by H. J. Simpson, a clergyman, written entirely from the Meyer point of view, demonstrates this clearly.³¹

With the 1920's there came a rash of works to defend Christianity against the onslaughts of psychology, such as that of F. R. Barry.³² Harrison S. Elliott offered a defense, but pointed out at the same time that Christianity could not ignore the findings of psychology.³³ J. T. Hadfield, writing with a deceptive simplicity, was popular especially at a period when many religionists were inclined to regard religion as "morality touched with emotion."³⁴ Sir William Brown and several other British psychologists or psychiatrists took up the cudgels against Ernest Jones and other psychoanalytic philosophers.³⁵ The best of these works was by J. G. McKenzie, the Scottish social scientist.³⁶ These works were of various degrees of quality, but they were all apologetic. If religion had not been under attack from some psychological quarters, one wonders how many of them would have written psychology at all.

In the 1930's several religious psychologists also turned apologists. Henry Nelson Wieman and Regina Westcott Wieman presented a psychological buttress to their philosophy of theistic naturalism.³⁷ J. D. Hollington attempted to reassure moralistic religionists that psychology would not cut off their heads.³⁸ Karl R. Stolz published several books whose major theme was apologetic, and which urged religious people to use the insights of psychology for religious purposes; unfortunately both the psychology and theology involved lacked depth.³⁹

³¹ Henry J. Simpson, *Pastoral Care of Nervous People*, Morehouse-Gorham, 1945.

³² F. R. Barry, *Christianity and Psychology*, Doran, 1923, and *St. Paul and Social Psychology*, Oxford, 1923.

³³ Harrison S. Elliott, *The Bearing of Psychology on Religion*, Association Press, 1927.

³⁴ J. A. Hadfield, *Psychology and Morals*, McBride, 1925.

³⁵ William Brown, *Science and Personality*, Yale Univ., 1929.

³⁶ J. G. McKenzie, *Souls in the Making*, Macmillan, 1929.

³⁷ H. N. and R. W. Wieman, *Normative Psychology of Religion*, Crowell, 1935.

³⁸ J. D. Hollington, *Psychology Serving Religion*, Abingdon, 1938.

³⁹ Karl R. Stolz, *Evolution and Genesis*, Badger, 1927; *Pastoral Psychology*, Cokesbury, 1932; *Psychology of Religious Living*, Cokesbury, 1937; *Tricks Our Minds Play on Us*, Cokesbury, 1939; *The Church and Psychotherapy*, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1943.

It is possible that therapeutic psychologists like Carl G. Jung and Fritz Kunkel should be considered as philosophers. Our discussion will, however, consider them in a later section.

Thus far we have considered the persons whose primary orientation was psychological, who turned their psychological knowledge on religion not for the purpose of understanding how it operates but to attack or defend it in a theological sense. We may now look at the attempts by theologians and religious philosophers to pay special attention to the impact of the psychological understanding of religion upon our general understanding of religion. Few theologians in recent years have failed to make some reference to psychology, but the reference here is to those who have given the subject serious study.

At least two of W. E. Hocking's major works, though essentially philosophical in character, bore the marks of discriminating acquaintance with psychology.⁴⁰ Harald Höffding's work defining religion in terms of valuation made good use of such psychology as was available at the time of its publication.⁴¹ W. R. Inge, in an attempt to demonstrate the primary character of religion, rooted it in a "deep-seated religious instinct or impulse."⁴² This point has by now gone out the front door—though one has a suspicion that it has been brought in again through the back door by Jung and Kunkel. L. W. Grensted was another British preacher and theologian who defended religion against psychology.⁴³

Walter M. Horton's interesting excursion into the psychological field came in the early thirties.⁴⁴ He was chiefly concerned to demonstrate that no empirical psychology could make the basic experiencing of religion irrelevant, and he chose worship around which to centre his discussion, attempting to prove the objective character of worship even after all the factors mentioned by psychologists were taken into account.

Several volumes by a British professor, T. Hywell Hughes, belong in the philosophical category although the subject matter is largely psychological.⁴⁵ The general idea is that psychology which considers religion untrue or irrelevant because of its genesis is wrong. The idea is good but the books are undistinguished.

Several other religious philosophers and theologians have given major attention to psychological facts and points of view, such as Stewart Wood-

⁴⁰ W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, Yale Univ., 1912; *Human Nature and its Remaking*, Yale Univ., 1923.

⁴¹ H. Höffding, *Philosophy of Religion*, (translation), Macmillan, 1906.

⁴² W. R. Inge, *Faith and its Psychology*, London, 1909.

⁴³ L. W. Grensted, *Psychology and God*, Longmans, 1930.

⁴⁴ W. M. Horton, *A Psychological Approach to Theology*, Harper, 1931.

⁴⁵ T. H. Hughes, *The New Psychology and Religious Experience*, London, 1933; *Psychology and Religious Origins*, Scribner, 1937; *Philosophic Basis of Mysticism*, Scribner, 1937; *Psychology and Religious Truth*, Macmillan, 1942; *Psychology of Preaching and Pastoral Work*, Macmillan, 1941.

burne and Edwin E. Aubrey.⁴⁶ A recent extended article by Paul Tillich examines the underlying bases in theology and in dynamic psychology and compares them.⁴⁷ The writings of such other theologians as Edgar S. Brightman, Reinhold Niebuhr, H. Richard Niebuhr, William Temple, Robert L. Calhoun, Nicholas Berdyaev, and others, have devoted attention to certain aspects of psychology in relation to religion, though not always with equal insight or helpfulness. The recent interest in Soren Kierkegaard has called attention to such matters as the meaning of anxiety, in large part a psychological question whether so recognized by the theologians or not. It remains true at present, however, that most theologians are inclined to regard psychology more as an enemy than a friend if they consider it relevant at all, and to interpret their function in relation to it as establishing reality or objectivity in contrast to the subjectivizing tendencies they feel are inherent in psychology. Indeed, it is not uncommon to find theologians who use the terms "psychology" and "subjective" almost interchangeably.

It is clear that a Christian apologetic is needed against psychology or anything else which professes to attack one or more of the roots of Christianity. Hence, there is an important theological and philosophical function to be performed against the psychologizing of religion out of existence or to a place of irrelevance. But this cannot be effective or enduring if done by people of limited competence, or if done by those who, despite competence in philosophy, do not take the trouble to be competent also in psychology. Only a small proportion of our leading religious philosophers today have a sufficient acquaintance with psychology to defend psychologically what needs and deserves defense in Christianity.

It is troubling to find that most theologians seem interested to defend Christianity at any particular time only against that which secularists feel threatens it. Twenty years ago secularists felt Christianity was seriously threatened by psychology; so the theologians took up the battle. Today the main apologetic battle ground is in the arena of politics (and of the politics of economics). This is truly of first importance, but should not imply no attention to psychology. Too many theologians are content to pay but passing attention to psychology, under the illusion that the issues are already settled or that psychology is of no importance. Lacking psychological knowledge, they face the temptation of accepting a psychology whose author says he agrees with their Christian assumptions, whether the psychological facts involved are true or not. More than one theologian accepts the psychology of Fritz Kunkel because he has avowedly Christian assumptions, and of Carl G. Jung because he does not deny Christian assumptions—without any apparatus for judging the psychology itself which

⁴⁶ A. S. Woodburn, *The Religious Attitude*, Macmillan, 1927; and Edwin E. Aubrey, *Man's Search for Himself*, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1940.

⁴⁷ Paul Tillich, "Religion and Health," in *Review of Religion*, X, 4, (May, 1946).

is professedly based on these assumptions. This situation can be a great danger to theology. Serious study of the psychological understanding of religion by theologians would be an asset to theology.

The Normative Stream

Beginning with the study of the psychology of religion, we have discussed two of the streams which are its lineal descendants—the ever smaller and less significant main stream repeating the pattern of the pioneers, and the philosophical stream. The third is the educational or normative stream.

At the turn of the century those trends emerged in the field of secular education of which John Dewey was the acknowledged prophet. They were psychological trends in the sense that they were interested in what happened within the child or person who was experiencing the educative process. In the early years of the century Dewey was “psychologically wise.” Recently, however, in an article tracing the development of Dewey’s psychological thinking, Gordon Allport pointed out that Dewey had permitted this to remain relatively static, and suggested that his philosophy and educational theory would have been greatly strengthened if he had taken new findings and viewpoints in psychology into account.⁴⁸ Dewey acknowledged that this was correct, that he had permitted his psychology to remain less examined than any other aspect of his thinking.⁴⁹ And yet Dewey had kept himself on familiar terms with much that was appearing in the psychological field.

Something similar seems to have occurred in the field of Christian education. Despite all the misunderstandings and cleavages which have been caused by having a good part of the modern religious education movement develop outside and out of sympathy with the churches, the reasons for this development are understandable. For it must be remembered that, against a background of Biblicism and revivalism and airy idealism and even obscurantism, men like King and Coe in the early years of the century represented the kind of intelligence which would have rebelled against these at any time. They were quick to look favorably upon the trends in educational theory which Dewey was stimulating, at the same time maintaining the Christian perspective which Dewey renounced. More than one church leader at this time was talking euphorically of saving the world in one generation. George A. Coe must have been more than a little skeptical of such optimism, and even more of the kind of methodology by which such desirable results were to be achieved. People like Coe wanted to reach large numbers of people, just as the others did; but were convinced that this was not possible

⁴⁸ A. Schilp (editor), *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, Northwestern Univ., 1939.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

unless they were recognized as individuals. So it was natural for them to conclude that the only approach which really had a chance of getting to large numbers was an educational one, based on Christian truth but containing in its method the genius of the Dewey approach—that people learn in proportion as they recognize their interests to be touched.

The religious educators of the early part of the century were not blind optimists. They did not know how far they could get in applying the new methods. But what they saw too often was a large ecclesiastical institution going through evangelistic and educational motions uncritically, using methods which could not possibly succeed in doing what the institution wanted to have done. Small wonder that they went to work on their own instead of waiting for orders from the theologians or church leaders.

The religious education movement, feeling more kinship with secular progressive education than with much of the then-current theological and ecclesiastical thinking, outdid itself in trying to achieve independence—in much the same way an adolescent tries to become independent of his parents. It was then promptly put on the spot, and the net effect was to make most of the professional religious educators into philosophers of a sort—exponents of a philosophy of development. Most of the movement's leaders became so drawn into such philosophy that they failed to do the work on procedures of application even of their own philosophy which would have been necessary to qualify them as practical experts. For a time they thought religious education was going to become a large profession independent of the ministry; and there it would find its professional constituency and the strength wherewith it could challenge what it felt to be the authoritarian assumptions of the theologians and ecclesiastics.

Now the religious education situation has changed radically. One may welcome the reintegration of religious education with theology, and its remarriage as a movement with the churches. But it is distressing to view the losses which have gone hand in hand with these gains, such as the fact that hardly anywhere in this country are people being trained for work in religious education above the level required to direct a local church program.

These general words about religious education have been necessary as a preliminary to what follows, how the development of religious education has been related to the psychological understanding of religion. It now seems clear that religious education treated psychology in about the same way John Dewey did, accepting and using its findings at the beginning of the century but later failing to pay serious attention to new findings. For example, the early work on the religious conversion of adolescents suggested that sudden conversions were not necessarily a desirable phenomenon, from which the implication could be drawn that different patterns

of religious education could achieve improved results with fewer pains. But when psychology later discovered some things which tended to qualify that conclusion, it was natural for religious educators to pay lip service to the new finding but to stick to the old. Acceptance of a new truth is not proof against dogmatism; it merely alters the possibilities of what a dogmatism can contain. When the antimoralism that was contained in therapeutic psychology came into the picture, bringing with it a threat to views on character education, religious educators made a bow to it, acknowledged that the insights were important, but generally continued to treat religious education as if it were equivalent to moral education.

And yet the professional religious educators did pay attention to the understanding of religion through psychological means long before the theologians had interest in this. It was they who first brought psychology into the theological curriculum.

It is no exaggeration to suggest that the swing by George A. Coe from work in the psychology of religion to work in religious education is the most important single datum to be considered under this section. His move was a great loss to the cause of the psychological understanding of religion. Barring his lack of knowledge of dynamic psychology, most of which developed after he left the field of religious psychology, he had all the equipment necessary to make a definitive contribution in this field. His move has been beneficial to religious education; but it is possible that he could have done even religious education more good by majoring in religious psychology.

Harrison S. Elliott deserves special mention. More than any other among the religious educators, he has kept reminding his colleagues that they must ground their work more solidly in the growing knowledge of psychological understanding of religion. He has also pioneered in the application of the insights of therapeutic psychology.⁵⁰

Most of the leaders in religious education accepted what might be called the initial insights of the psychology of religion, and thought they were accepting later insights as these emerged. As a matter of fact, a real acceptance of some of the later ones would have made it essential to qualify earlier ones. To be vital and to renew vitality, religious education must drink at two springs, those of theology and of psychology. Its failure to drink deeply at either spring until recently has made it dry. At present the water from the theological spring is being dumped on it as from a barrel, with the one unfortunate and unnecessary result that it is rapidly approaching contemporary theology in its lack of interest in psychology. Perhaps it was good for religious education to lose its life as a thing apart.

⁵⁰ See H. S. and G. L. Elliott, *Solving Personal Problems*, Holt, 1936. For the importance of psychology and mental hygiene to religious education, see *Can Religious Education Be Christian?* Macmillan, 1941.

But as the defender and interpreter, for thirty years, of psychology to the theologians, it helped to injure psychology as well as weaken itself by failing to pay more than lip service to changing approaches in religious psychology.

The Natural Science Stream

After its liberation from the chains of rationalistic philosophy and its experimental flutters with empirical method, general psychology discovered there was gold in the hills of natural science. As demonstrated in the early work of Starbuck, even narrowly interpreted natural science could have significance in fostering psychological understanding of religion. If scientific method was conceived too narrowly, if statistics and questionnaires and quantities were sometimes mistakenly equated with science, this does not prove that such methods are not potentially fruitful even though their potential significance is far from all-embracing.

The work of Hugh Hartshorne is perhaps the best illustration of the kind of results which are possible in the application of natural science methods to the psychological understanding of religion.⁵¹ It is not without significance that most of Hartshorne's findings on character, for example, seemed to have negative connotations, *i.e.*, they proved that certain illusions needed to be discarded. Such knowledge is of great value, but those who produce it are not often rewarded.

Ernest J. Chave is another who has applied natural science methods to the psychological understanding of religion.⁵² The significance of his findings has not, however, been properly assessed because he has attached an empiricist philosophy to his empirical findings.

Ernest M. Ligon is another who has attempted to use natural science methods in understanding religion psychologically.⁵³ His first volume attempted to apply psychology to understanding the teachings of Jesus, without much knowledge of New Testament times and with a psychology which had only small traces of dynamic elements. This second book on religion reports his experience as psychological consultant to a local church school, where the paraphernalia of tests and records are used. Whatever the objective value of the tests and records, they bring the prestige of science to the church school, and seem to be an unparalleled way of getting parents interested in their children.

If one looks further for concrete material along natural science lines, he will find a welter of B.D. and A.M. dissertations, an occasional doctor's thesis, but rarely any study using natural science methods that makes a significant contribution to the psychological understanding of religion. And

⁵¹ See especially Hugh Hartshorne, *Character in Human Relations*, Scribner, 1933.

⁵² Ernest J. Chave, *Measure Religion: 52 Experimental Forms*, Univ. Chicago, 1939; *Personality Development in Children*, Univ. Chicago, 1937.

⁵³ Ernest M. Ligon, *The Psychology of Christian Personality*, Macmillan, 1935; *Their Future Is Now*, Macmillan, 1940.

we find this in the United States where we are accused of overdoing this type of study.

In studying articles over a number of years in the *Journal of Religion* as a representative scholarly magazine of religion, Anton T. Boisen found that only a small proportion of the articles referred in any significant way to empirical material, and an infinitesimal number reported results of the natural science approach. It is time, therefore, that this particular ghost is laid. One does not have to be an empiricist to believe that empirical investigation can be fruitful; and one does not have to believe that natural science methods must be applied to psychological investigation without change in order to be convinced that such methods, properly adapted, have important though limited possibilities in our attempt to gain a psychological understanding of religion. Why have not even the empiricists produced much, good or bad, which comes from empirical investigation?

The obvious reason is that people who operate as professionals in the field of religion have to produce the goods whereby people can live, and it requires more than a little perspective and discipline to be both a scientist and a helper or educator at the same time. Many aspire but few seem to make the grade.

Another reason has been the narrow perfectionism about what scientific method is, to which students of religion have not been immune. One may become so preoccupied with method, put his methodological standards so high, or set them up so rigidly, that the conditions which would be required to meet them make any concrete study practically impossible. A few of the most promising students have allowed this to happen to them.

Actually, scientific method in this field must do one of two things. On the one hand, it can make its area of investigation extremely narrow, and then proceed like other investigations in the social or psychological sciences. In that case the findings will be definite but will cover only a narrow area; hence most theologians will pay little attention to them. On the other hand, it can cut a wider swathe, using scientific method for some aspects of the study, but adapting it as practical questions arise. If this is done, then the methodists of natural science will deny that the work is scientific, but the theologians may pay attention to it. A variant of this is to use scientific method for part of the study, and then frankly move on to other aspects of the question to which similar data are not available or relevant. But so long as the perfectionistic spirit prevails, we are not likely to witness many helpful contributions to the psychological understanding of religion from natural science methods.

Projective tests developed by clinical psychology in recent years offer considerable promise in helping to answer some of the obscure questions in the psychological understanding of religion, notably typological questions.

What is involved in that type of personality structure, for example, which feels almost equally drawn to Quakerism and Anglo-Catholicism? Or, does the kill-or-cure type of disturbing religious experience tend to occur with certain patterns of personality, or is its precipitation more dependent upon types of social situation? These are important questions which the proper use of projective tests can help answer, though little seems to have been done as yet.

The ultimate findings from the natural science approach, if conceived narrowly, will probably not be far-reaching, but collectively they may be important. And if, in connection with the use of natural science method, there is translation of its meaning and not merely transliteration, the significance of the findings may be much greater.

The Therapeutic or Dynamic Stream

Dynamic psychology originated in the therapist's office, not in the classroom or the laboratory. The persistent questions which gave rise to it were not theoretical but practical, not philosophical but clinical, not normative but therapeutic. The interest which lay behind its initiation, therefore, was like that of the pastor in contrast to that of the scholar or theologian. Whatever the importance theoretically of the questions involved, something new was needed to help people who wanted to be helped. In the process of finding what would give practical help, new veins of theoretical ore were struck.

In discussing Freud, one always runs the danger of accepting important discoveries without acknowledgment, or even without knowing how original they were when promulgated, and spending most of one's time criticizing Freud for the things one does not like. So far as can be seen now, however, the three major and permanent contributions of Freud are those enunciated by Karen Horney.⁶⁴ There is first the point "that psychic processes are strictly determined." As intended here, it means that any particular act of behavior has antecedents and is largely traceable, and that no act of behavior is merely capricious. The second point is "that actions and feelings may be determined by unconscious motivations," that is, that forces properly to be viewed as psychological in nature, outside the field where they have capacity for entrance into consciousness by ordinary means, nevertheless influence the total activity and conscious awareness and sensitized perceptions of the individual involved. Third, "that the motivations driving us are emotional forces," that is, that the driving forces of human life can be understood only in a context of struggle and conflict, of needs and frustrations, of feelings rather than ideas except insofar as ideas represent needs or aspects of conflicts. Freud attached certain theoretical contents to these points which are not necessary accompaniments. But they

⁶⁴ Karen Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, Norton, 1939.

are the cardinal principles upon which all dynamic psychologies rest, and they stem from Freud.

Reference has already been made to Freud's philosophical attitude to religion, which was clearly reductionist. The significance of the three points named above, however, is quite different for the psychological understanding of religion. To believe securely that behavior, including religious behavior, has antecedents can free us from the tyranny of capriciousness in attempting to interpret the way in which religion operates. It can give us the key, for example, to understanding the depth of the experience of many alcoholics as their lives are changed through joining Alcoholics Anonymous. It can enable us, on psychological grounds, to challenge the assertion of the superficial psychiatrists that the experience does not reach deep because it does not start with genetic insights. As another example, it can give us the base from which we can discover what the connection is between the drawing power of Anglo-Catholicism and Quakerism—rather than merely considering it a matter of taste that some persons are attracted to both.

Similarly, the reality of unconscious motivations opens up new fields for understanding religion psychologically. Why is it that the Southern Baptists and the Roman Catholics are in a neck-and-neck race in a certain southern town, with only a hair's breadth seeming to decide whether certain people join one church or the other? How is it that so many people who have a penchant for the more abstract forms of religious philosophy are also interested in music? How is it that so many people who try desperately hard to express love are unable to do so until they first confront their own hatred? The questions are endless, and Freud has supplied a base upon which answers may be secured.

That the driving forces of human life are emotional in nature is of great significance for religion. Life is not an easy march up a slight hill, with harmony and lack of conflict the marks of a successful climb. Life itself is dynamic. Even the most exalted philosopher does not altogether chart his own course. One may be a captain of one's soul, perhaps, but one is still in an army with five-star generals. The question then becomes not whether one will "adjust" but to what in the universe and in himself he will "adjust." This point has kinship with Schleiermacher's "absolute dependence," though it is not the same. Another way to put it is that man and men must come to something in their nature as human beings, and this must be seen on a human and psychological as well as on a biological level.

This is not to suggest that these are the implications Freud intended us to draw. But the fact is that his contributions provide a base from which these implications may be drawn, and the latter are profoundly important for the psychological understanding of religion.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ The most accessible Freud to American readers is *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, a Modern Library Giant, 1938.

It is even more difficult to discuss Jung than Freud. Jung is an emotional subject. Either he is considered to be the great white father of a new way of thinking and feeling which comes close to being a religion, or else he is a seducer of men's souls. From the point of view of the psychological understanding of religion, however, there are at least two major permanent contributions which belong to Jung. First, he has demonstrated that the contents of the unconscious are not necessarily bad or harmful, but may be more constructive and creative than the conscious side of the personality. There is something in persons which demands to be let out, however great the obstacles which bind it, and it cannot be understood except in human terms. Thus Jung can see repression as "a sort of half-conscious and half-hearted letting go of things, a dropping of hot cakes or a reviling of grapes which hang too high."⁵⁶ This is significant for the psychological understanding of religion; for stoicism is not then required in order to be willing to explore the contents of the unconscious. The theistic naturalist would say that this gives the Holy Spirit a place in nature. The supernaturalist would say it demonstrates the process whereby Divine Grace enters human life.

Jung's second major contribution is this: psychic ill-health can best be understood from the point of view of bias or one-sidedness. Jung never lets up on the intellectual who refuses to act except through the dictates of his head. It might be called the all-your-eggs-in-one-basket theory of neurosis. In contrast to illness, Jung sees psychic health in people who are in communication with a considerable part of the totality of themselves and not merely with a limited and overspecialized segment. This, too, is of importance for the psychological understanding of religion, especially in understanding resistances to religion. This gives us a sounder clue than Freud gave, for example, to the nature and meaning of obsessive rituals in intellectuals who have renounced religion. It also enables us to face up to the necessity of taking people's introspections and dreams and other projections seriously as phenomena which may possess religious significance.

With all of this Jung has included some speculations which, while always interesting, are not invariably helpful, and we shall charitably refrain from mentioning them. But Jung is in no sense naïve philosophically as Freud was. He wrote, for instance: "The thing that cures a neurosis must be as convincing as the neurosis; and since the latter is only too real, the helpful experience must be of equal reality. It must be a very real illusion, if you want to put it pessimistically. But what is the difference between a real illusion and a healing religious experience?"⁵⁷ We can reply

⁵⁶ Carl G. Jung, *Psychology and Religion*, Yale Univ., 1938. His other major works with implications for religion are *Psychology of the Unconscious*, Dodd, 1916; *Psychological Types*, Harcourt, 1923; *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, Harcourt, 1928; *Integration of the Personality*, Farrar and Rinehart, 1939; and *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, Harcourt, 1933. All are translations.

⁵⁷ Jung, *Psychology and Religion*, p. 114.

that there is a difference to the philosopher and theologian; but as a psychological student of religion Jung is perfectly correct in assuming the right to take a position of metaphysical agnosticism.

The irritating thing about Jung is those among his devoted followers who have generalized on the psychology involved in their own healing experience, and who have sometimes created a metaphysical system out of what Jung seems to have intended to be only a psychology. Jung is also misleading because he apparently refuses to take sociology and cultural anthropology seriously. But none of these things should prevent us from seeing and using his permanent contributions.

Fritz Kunkel, who was not originally but who has now become a Jungian, may be considered next.⁵⁸ Unlike Jung, he is personally and publicly committed to Christianity. He is an inveterate user of paradoxes, is invariably interesting and usually penetrating. He is a Christian Jung, minus the more abstruse mythology. But his gift for paradox and concept gets such a tight hold on him that at times he becomes addicted to gross generalizations and exaggerations which may obscure rather than clarify what psychology has to contribute to the understanding of religion.

While it is difficult to assess the total contribution of Otto Rank because of his obscure style, one point of special significance to the psychological understanding of religion can be easily stated. It involves Rank's effort to restate the meaning of "will."⁵⁹ As used in the old faculty psychology, the concept became meaningless when the foundations of psychology became empirical and then dynamic. Those who came before Rank were content to denounce will in the old framework, apparently feeling that the whole problem might then be dropped. Rank recognized that acceptance of the three Freudian and two Jungian points mentioned here made it imperative to find some way of discussing inner conative strivings—and he rightly felt that this was akin to "will," even though the implications of the term in its new setting were quite different from those of the old setting, symbolized in the phrase "will-power." Will in Rank's sense was not distinguished by conscious purpose, but by personality movement; it might or might not get into consciousness. This point has importance for understanding religion; for it provides a base for understanding purpose in human and individual life as something deeper and broader than consciousness. Thus, for example, no later treatise professing to deal with psychological understanding of religion can call itself *Religious Consciousness*.

⁵⁸ Fritz Kunkel's most Jungian book is his last, *In Search of Maturity*, Scribner, 1943. Some of his others are *Conquer Yourself*, Washburn, 1936; *Character, Growth, Education*, Lippincott, 1938; *How Character Develops* (with R. E. Dickerson), Scribner, 1940.

⁵⁹ See especially Otto Rank, *Will Therapy*, Knopf, 1936. See also *Modern Education*, Knopf, 1932; *Truth and Reality*, Knopf, 1936; and *Art and Artist*, Knopf, 1932. *Trauma of Birth*, Harcourt, 1929, is of questionable permanent value.

Rank's theory of will is also important in terms of actually helping people. It is he, more than any other modern psychotherapist, who has been able, without any depreciation of the strength of the obstacles and negative forces in the psyche, to assert the capacity of the personality to take initiative in finding its own way if given half a chance. Thus, Rank's theoretical work may be considered, for example, to be the chief prerequisite for Carl R. Rogers' methods in psychotherapy.⁶⁰

The later Freudians and neo-Freudians have also made some contributions of permanent value to the psychological understanding of religion. Franz Alexander has contributed a clearer elaboration from the empirical point of view of the nature of the self, with particular reference to the way in which aspects of the self may be used as objects by other aspects of the self. The understanding of what is involved in self-punishment is vital to religious psychology.⁶¹ Karl A. Menninger has followed through on this, more clearly and understandably than Alexander, but without the latter's philosophical equipment.⁶² Menninger deserves further mention not so much because of originality of theory as because of his wide influence as the best known exponent of modified Freudianism. More than any other current psychological writer, he has driven home to preachers and the general intellectual public the reality and power of the darker aspects of psychic life, "the kingdom of evils," to use the term of Menninger's teacher Southard.⁶³ Menninger's mechanism and instinctualism make him an unsafe guide in matters of theory, but he has an extraordinary capacity for clarifying complex psychological matters.

The controversy still rages as to whether Karen Horney's ideas are hers, or whether she merely was the first to put in print things which many in the Freudian tradition had been thinking.⁶⁴ At any rate she was the first to put these things before the public. The major contribution involves the relation of personality patterns to cultural pressures.⁶⁵ To treat psychic ill-health as if it were a mere sport due to individual idiosyncrasies was clearly inadequate from the point of view of the social origin of personality. True, the social psychologists (and George Herbert Mead) had said this before, but not on the basis of an intimate knowledge of individual psychological dynamics. This point is of obvious importance to the psychological

⁶⁰ Carl R. Rogers, *Counseling and Psychotherapy*, Houghton Mifflin, 1942; *Counseling with Returned Servicemen* (with J. L. Wallen), McGraw-Hill, 1946; and *Clinical Treatment of the Problem Child*, Houghton Mifflin, 1939.

⁶¹ Franz Alexander, *Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality*, Nervous and Mental Diseases Pub. Co., 1930; see also his *Psychoanalytic Therapy* (with T. M. French), Ronald, 1946.

⁶² Karl A. Menninger, *Man against Himself*, Harcourt, 1938. See also his *The Human Mind*, (rev. ed.), Knopf, 1937; and *Love against Hate*, Harcourt, 1942.

⁶³ E. E. Southard, *The Kingdom of Evils*, Macmillan, 1922.

⁶⁴ Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, Norton, 1937; *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, Norton, 1939; *Self-Analysis*, Norton, 1942; and *Our Inner Conflicts*, Norton, 1945.

⁶⁵ Another valuable contribution to the same point was published about the same time, James S. Plant, *Personality and the Cultural Pattern*, Commonwealth Fund, 1938.

understanding of religion. To be able to understand inner psychic conflicts as the resultants of conflicting pressures within the culture—as these are adopted as aspects of the self—is to make comprehensible the production of psychic conflicts without being tempted to biological reductionism. There remains the danger of sociological reductionism, but that bubble is more easily burst.

In her more recent works, Horney has further clarified the nature and genesis of the forces at work in inner conflicts. Here the contribution to the psychological understanding of religion is not so much theoretical as it is related to specific psychic contents, for example, aiding in the psychological analysis of love and the obstacles to it. Without minimizing Horney's contribution, one regrets that she has thus far limited her implications to specific analytical statements and has not also suggested the constructive and creative implications of her work and point of view.

Harry Stack Sullivan, like Rank, has obscured his contribution to general knowledge by an abstruse and complex style.⁶⁶ Similar to Horney in his thinking, he is more impressed with the importance of studying the particular points at which aspects of culture are mediated to the individual than with the more abstracted analysis of the culture itself. Thus he speaks of "the psychology and biology of interpersonal relationships." Considered by some to be the most brilliant psychiatric thinker in America, it may be hoped that he will publish the essentials of his point of view some day in book form.

Erich Fromm occupies a position closely similar to that of Horney and Sullivan, but his special concern is with the relation of dynamic psychology to ethics and philosophy.⁶⁷ Rank's point that there is something within personality which has a striving and purposive quality is accepted by Fromm, but more careful analysis of its nature is felt to be required. Fromm may be said to be interested in the development of what might be called a "metaphysics of the psyche," drawn from empirical sources, as contrasted either with thoughtless empiricism on the one hand or "objective metaphysics" on the other. His contribution to the psychological understanding of religion is showing that there is what I, not he, have called a "metaphysics of the psyche," which psychologists must take into account, whether they are interested in metaphysics in the ordinary sense or not.

For a considerable time the only psychologists who paid adequate attention to the dynamic and individuating elements in personality were the therapists, and nearly all of these were medical men. Within the past ten

⁶⁶Harry Stack Sullivan's writings may be found throughout the publication history of *Psychiatry: Journal of the Biology and Psychology of Interpersonal Relationships*, issued by the William Alanson White Foundation, of which Sullivan has been the directing head.

⁶⁷Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*, Farrar and Rinehart, 1942, is so far the only work available in English apart from articles in journals.

years personality psychology has become a respectable subject for non-medical psychologists as seen especially in the outstanding work of Gordon Allport,⁶⁸ and in that of such men as Henry A. Murray,⁶⁹ Ross Stagner,⁷⁰ P. M. Symonds,⁷¹ Kurt Lewin,⁷² and many others. Most of them have adopted what have been noted herein as the most basic points brought out by the therapeutic psychologists; and there seems to be a close connection between the importance they attach to these points and the degree to which they have a therapeutic as well as a scientific truth interest.

The movement in nonmedical psychology leading to an interest in personality psychology has been helped along considerably by the Gestalt or configurationist movement in general psychology led by Kurt Koffka,⁷³ Wolfgang Kohler,⁷⁴ and Kurt Lewin.⁷⁵ The Gestalt movement rebelled against geneticism in all its forms, pointed out that the whole is a great deal more than the sum of its parts, and pointed out that functionally a man's eye had a closer relationship to his own nose than it had to the eye of someone else. In essence, it was a new viewpoint on perception. Its essential message has been incorporated into general psychology, and has been especially fruitful when linked with dynamic and therapeutic psychology. It has made an important contribution to the bases upon which religious psychology can rest, by disclosing the fallacies involved in geneticist and reductionist types of psychological thinking and perceiving.

Carl R. Rogers was the first of the nonmedical psychologists to challenge effectively the domination of the field of therapeutic psychology by the medical group. In the process he had to construct a psychology of therapy based on minimum essentials in contrast to all the previous theories of therapy, which were based on maximum goals.⁷⁶ At first Rogers seemed to suggest that a knowledge of dynamic psychology was no help, and might be a handicap, in the therapeutic process.⁷⁷ But since he is no 'obscurantist, he has recently modified what seemed to be his earlier position.⁷⁸ His major contribution is in the field of procedures not theory; but

⁶⁸ Gordon W. Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation*, Holt, 1937. See also his pamphlet, "The Roots of Religion," National Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church, 1944.

⁶⁹ Henry A. Murray, *Explorations in Personality*, Oxford, 1938, and *Contemporary Psycho-pathology* (with S. S. Tomkins), Harvard Univ., 1943.

⁷⁰ Ross Stagner, *Psychology of Personality*, McGraw-Hill, 1937.

⁷¹ P. M. Symonds, *Diagnosing Personality and Conduct*, Century, 1931; *Psychology of Parent-Child Relationships*, Appleton-Century, 1939.

⁷² Kurt Lewin, *Dynamic Theory of Personality*, (translation), McGraw-Hill, 1935; *Principles of Topological Psychology*, (translation), McGraw-Hill, 1936; *Conceptual Representation and the Measurement of Psychological Forces*, Duke Univ., 1938; *Studies in Topological and Vector Psychology*, Univ. Iowa, 1944.

⁷³ Kurt Koffka, *Growth of the Mind*, (translation), Harcourt, 1924; *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*, Harcourt, 1935.

⁷⁴ Wolfgang Kohler, *Gestalt Psychology*, (translation), Liveright, 1929; *Dynamics in Psychology*, Faber, 1942.

⁷⁵ See note 72.

⁷⁶ See note 60.

⁷⁷ *Counseling and Psychotherapy*, see note 60.

⁷⁸ *Counseling with Returned Servicemen*, see note 60.

in his demonstration of the implications of Rank's point—what it really means to trust the movement of the inward constructive forces of the personality—he has confounded many who accepted this point in general but failed to follow it in practice.⁷⁹ Thus he has put methodological meat on Rank's theoretical bones. From the point of view of the psychological understanding of religion, Rogers has made available new and learnable procedures for studying the inner forces that, with a bit of help from the therapist, make for integration and reintegration of the personality.

Thus far our discussion has concerned the leaders in the field of therapeutic psychology and the new bases which their work has made possible in the field of the psychological understanding of religion. We now turn to some of the leaders in the religious field who have attempted to apply the insights of therapeutic or dynamic psychology to the actual understanding of religion. Under the section on philosophy we have already pointed out how many of the persons who set out to do this landed in the philosophical field instead. This is not said in disparagement of the philosophical task, but to make clear that there is a different field which also requires exploration, namely, what dynamic psychology demonstrates about the actual functioning of religion.

In Great Britain nearly all the material has moved in a philosophical direction, as demonstrated notably in the publications of the Guild of Pastoral Psychology.⁸⁰ Jung is much more widely followed in Britain than in America, and he is near to being the patron saint of the Guild. On the Continent there has been no published work in this field for some years, the reasons being too obvious to require mention. One must admit that a modicum of detachment is necessary in order to pursue study of the psychological understanding of religion.

Perhaps the most unique work in this field in America has been done by Anton T. Boisen.⁸¹ While Boisen has not entirely resisted the temptation to become a philosopher, his main work remains in the psychological field. He has made empirical studies of the crisis type of psychological experience both in the mental hospital and among the holy-roller types of religious groups. He concludes that intellectual insight is not the major factor in determining whether the outcome of a disturbance will be a higher (religious) adjustment or a descent into psychopathological vegetation. In a still unpublished work Boisen has attempted to integrate the findings of his psychological and sociological studies of the dynamics of crisis experience with certain other observations on customs, *mores*, and loyalties.⁸²

⁷⁹ Cf. the very considerable alteration in the conception of psychotherapy from the psychoanalytic point of view represented in Alexander's *Psychoanalytic Therapy*, see note 61.

⁸⁰ The Guild of Pastoral Psychology is an English association of individuals, which holds meetings and publishes papers in pamphlet form.

⁸¹ Anton T. Boisen, *The Exploration of the Inner World*, Willett Clark, 1936.

⁸² Anton T. Boisen, *Religion in Crisis and Custom*, (manuscript).

Because of Boisen's own psychotic experience and certain preoccupations in his thinking, he has never received the attention his work deserves. In his study of religious experience in psychotics, as well as in his dynamic study of eruptive forms of group religious experience, he has broken entirely new ground, and eventually his findings will have to be taken seriously.

Carroll A. Wise has made a commendable effort to synthesize the essential findings of dynamic psychology as they are relevant to the understanding of religion.⁸³ His summary of dynamic psychology, psychosomatic medicine, and related scientific subjects is especially competent. Concerning religion, he feels that the most fruitful approach to understanding it psychologically is through the medium of analysis of symbols in terms of their meaning in the life of individuals. He has carried this analysis through to a point where it becomes convincing, at least as one method of study of the psychological understanding of religion. Unfortunately he has not yet documented his work with the concrete material which could clarify the importance of his approach. He has further handicapped himself by not making clear enough his acquaintance with current trends in theological thinking, and as a result some theologians have mistakenly concluded that he is an empiricist, which he is not.

Ernest Hilgard's article on "Christianity and Contemporary Psychology" shows that he has an important potential contribution to make to this field.⁸⁴ He has taken dynamic psychology seriously into account, and he is not preoccupied entirely with philosophical questions. Thus far, however, he has given only an introduction to the subject.

J. G. McKenzie, the Scottish social scientist, has recently tried a new tack.⁸⁵ He starts with the assumption that previous attempts to understand religion psychologically have been abortive because they have failed to distinguish between major types of religious experience. He then sets out to define the evangelical type, and to apply psychology to understanding that particular type of experience. In the process, he not only admits that he considers the evangelical to be superior to other types of religious experience, but asserts that it is this fact which makes it possible for him to have psychological understanding of evangelical religious experience. While interesting, his work is general and on the abstract side, and to some extent falls into the category of apologetics.

J. A. C. Murray, another Scotsman but a pastor not a professor, has attempted to make the point that the outcome of psychotherapy is almost entirely dependent upon the assumptions of the therapist, and that Christianity can work with psychotherapy only if it develops therapists with clear

⁸³ Carroll A. Wise, *Religion in Illness and Health*, Harper, 1942.

⁸⁴ In *The Vitality of the Christian Tradition*, edited by G. F. Thomas, Harper, 1944.

⁸⁵ J. G. McKenzie, *Psychology, Psychotherapy and Evangelicalism*, Macmillan, 1940.

Christian assumptions.⁸⁶ There is much to be said for Murray's main point. Unfortunately, however, he has only a very general notion of dynamic or therapeutic psychology, and persistently confuses psychology and philosophy. While his concern arises from therapeutic psychology, its application is not to the psychological understanding of religion nor even to therapy itself, but to theological conversion of psychotherapists.

In a recent volume Lewis J. Sherrill has attempted to assess and compare the findings and convictions of therapeutic psychology and of Christian theology in relation to the understanding of religious processes, with special reference to guilt and its cure.⁸⁷ While the volume makes a definite theological point in line with the rediscovered orthodoxy of the American school, its major intent is to show that knowledge of both dynamic psychology (for understanding guilt) and Christian theology (for understanding redemption) is necessary to understanding and action in relation to the whole process.

There are comparatively few other religious writers who have attempted to apply the insights of therapeutic psychology to the understanding of religion in a nonpolemic or nonapologetic fashion. Harry Bone and Arthur Cushman McGiffert, Jr., did so briefly.⁸⁸ Most of the persons writing from the religious point of view about therapeutic psychology have rather naturally concentrated on the therapeutic and pastoral aspects. Thus Charles T. Holman,⁸⁹ John Sutherland Bonnell,⁹⁰ Leslie D. Weatherhead,⁹¹ T. W. Pym,⁹² Dewar and Hudson,⁹³ Russell L. Dicks,⁹⁴ and even Rollo May⁹⁵ have centred their thought upon the implications of therapeutic or dynamic psychology for the practical work of the pastor. Certainly much more work along this line, and not less, is needed.

So far Rollo May, with the exception of Paul E. Johnson, previously mentioned, is the only one of the pastoral group who has also felt it important to discuss the implications of therapeutic psychology for the understanding of religious processes. He has made some imaginative suggestions which are, however, not systematically organized, and the clarity

⁸⁶ J. A. C. Murray, *An Introduction to a Christian Psychotherapy*, Scribner, 1938.

⁸⁷ Lewis J. Sherrill, *Guilt and Redemption*, John Knox, 1945.

⁸⁸ *In Christianity and Mental Hygiene*, edited by Seward Hiltner, Federal Council of Churches, 1939.

⁸⁹ Charles T. Holman, *The Cure of Souls*, Univ. Chicago, 1932; *Getting Down to Cases*, Macmillan, 1942.

⁹⁰ John Sutherland Bonnell, *Pastoral Psychiatry*, Harper, 1938.

⁹¹ See, e.g., Leslie D. Weatherhead, *Psychology and Life*, Abingdon, 1935.

⁹² T. W. Pym, *Psychology and the Christian Life*, Doran, 1922; *More Psychology and the Christian Life*, Doran, 1925; *Spiritual Direction*, Morehouse, 1928; *A Parson's Dilemmas*, Morehouse, 1930.

⁹³ Lindsay Dewar and Cyril E. Hudson, *Psychology for Religious Workers*, Harper, 1934.

⁹⁴ Russell L. Dicks, *Pastoral Work and Personal Counseling*, Macmillan, 1945; *The Art of Ministering to the Sick* (with Richard C. Cabot), Macmillan, 1936.

⁹⁵ Rollo May, *The Art of Counseling*, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1939; *Springs of Creative Living*, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1940.

of which is marred because he has tried to fulfill several different purposes in a single piece of writing.

It is clear that the major findings of therapeutic psychology have meaning for religion in more than one way. As Rollo May has clearly seen, they are important first for what they can teach concerning pastoral care and personal counseling. They are also important to theology and philosophy of religion; and the work done from this point on in that field, discussed briefly in the section above on philosophy, must take them more significantly into account than it has done in the past. They are important, thirdly, for the preacher, *i.e.*, for the man who has to present spiritual food to people who need it. All of these have a "natural market" for writings drawing implications from dynamic psychology.

The market for material involving the psychological understanding of religion in a basic sense, however, is still a problem. Undoubtedly this fact is holding back work at the present time. If those groups mentioned above—the pastors, theologians, and preachers—should recognize that the psychological understanding of religion is one of the bases on which they work, and that they need to study the fundamental implications for it of dynamic psychology and not merely in relation to their pragmatic interests—then a market might well develop which would lead to new and more significant work in the field.

Roman Catholic and Jewish Study

There is no doubt that the psychological understanding of religion, as discussed here, is a Protestant affair. Both because of their authoritarianism in general and their specific dependence upon Thomism in particular, Roman Catholics have continued to treat modern psychological studies, especially dynamic types, with grave suspicion. It is difficult for Roman Catholic psychologists to make their work dynamic except in a purely methodological sense.

Rudolf Allers has taken up the cudgels against Freud, holding that because of Freud's theory and assumptions nothing about him could be accepted.⁹⁶ Thomas Verner Moore, a priest and a psychiatrist, has written several works from the Roman Catholic point of view having some reference to dynamic psychology. His volume *Dynamic Psychology* was suggestive, but none of his later writings have gone as far in recognizing the value and importance of this point of view.⁹⁷

Sante de Sanctis' work on conversion is one I have never had opportunity to examine. It is reported to be an attempt to fit conversion phenomena into an acceptable Thomistic pattern.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Rudolf Allers, *The Successful Error*, Sheed and Ward, 1940; see also his *Psychology of Character*, Sheed and Ward, 1930; and *New Psychologies*, Sheed and Ward, 1933.

⁹⁷ T. V. Moore, *Dynamic Psychology*, Lippincott, 1926; *Nature and Treatment of Mental Disorders*, Grune, 1943; *Personal Mental Hygiene*, Grune, 1944.

⁹⁸ Sante de Sanctis, *Religious Conversion*, Harcourt, 1927.

It is not without significance that the Roman Catholics have been as slow to apply the findings of therapeutic psychology to pastoral theology as they have to the psychological understanding of religion itself. Catholic social workers have applied the insights much more readily than have priests. Apologists will no doubt discover in a few years how to utilize some of the modern insights by pointing out that they were all implicit in historical teaching anyhow.

To the best of my knowledge, there are no Jewish religious books on the psychological understanding of religion written by experts in the religious field, unless one can so consider Liebman's work.⁹⁹ Nor has this field been taught and cultivated in the Jewish theological schools, with the exception of Hebrew Union College where a psychiatrist-rabbi teaches it chiefly from the psychiatric point of view. The reasons for this are obscure. The Jewish group apparently feels that, where psychology is concerned, one should go to the professional psychologist; and this excludes rabbis since they are religionists. This is probably associated with the very different social rôle of the rabbi in the Jewish community as compared to that of either the Protestant minister or the Roman priest.

The Future

We live in a day when theology is being rediscovered, at least by the theologians, and we may hope that the discovery does not stop there. Collectively, we professional religionists seem to find it difficult to hold more than one interest at a time. When we are in the process of rediscovering Christian theology, then we seem unable to cast our attention to other jobs that also need doing. This despite the fact that when we see a similar trend in other professionals we get out the whip and give them a thrashing. Because medicine, for instance, is preoccupied with the enormously useful new pharmaceutical and mechanical discoveries, we sometimes tend to castigate the majority of doctors for being blind to what seem to us the equally important new discoveries in psychosomatic medicine. The patients need both; why must the doctors eschew one to be interested in the other? Let us put the shoe on our own foot—it fits.

Study of the psychological understanding of religion started in the period when natural science was assuming a commanding and even revolutionary place in the daily activities of men, at least so far as the use of its products was concerned. It reached its peak of interest at the time when uncritical optimism concerning the possibilities of natural science was at its height, and when concern about the whole range of theological reality was at its lowest modern point. Recently there has been more general agreement that science itself is neutral with regard to human welfare, and also a

⁹⁹ J. L. Liebman, *Peace of Mind*, Simon and Shuster, 1946.

broadening of the range of theological concern. It is understandable that the original thrust in the direction of the psychological understanding of religion has nearly disappeared. But it will be tragic if something new and broader does not take its place; for now is the time when new tools and new insights give an enlarged study of the psychological understanding of religion far more potentialities than it ever had before.

We need to study the meaning and processes of religion from the psychological point of view for three basic reasons. The first is that people cannot be helped to discover and accept the resources of religion unless we understand what these actually mean in human life, which includes knowledge of what tends to block their acceptance. Second, we cannot have either an accurate or a meaningful theology if the psychological aspects of it are either uncriticized or are in naïve conflict with the best that is known in psychology. Third, we need to see the relation of processes involving religion to all psychological processes; so that psychology itself is recognized to be incomplete without an understanding of religion from the psychological point of view.

It is time, then, that at least three groups began to take seriously their obligation to study religion from the psychological point of view: the pastoral and educational group, the theological group, and the general psychological group. The first or practical group tends to be preoccupied with pragmatic results, and falsely relegates really basic material in this field entirely to the theologians. The theological group has considered psychological questions to be far down the list in importance, and yet it discusses many psychological questions without an adequate knowledge of psychology. The general psychology group is still so fearful of departing from the pure methods of natural science that it will not seriously ask the necessary questions.

At the present time the chief interest in the psychological understanding of religion is coming from the practical group. This is both sound and understandable. Throughout Christian history it has usually been the leaders who had to produce the goods to help the people who have been most progressive and alert in their thinking, rather than those whose positions enabled them to be detached. Most of the practical leaders have been unable to put their insights into the systematic form requisite for posterity.

Today there are indications that this is happening again. The practical group is beginning to reach deeper than the pragmatic levels, to recognize that its field has a content as well as a method—and that this content is to be found in the insights of psychology and sociology used alongside the truth and resources of theology, and integrated with them. It is of no little interest that this concern is growing out of the therapeutic rather than the normative aspect of the practical field. The normative approach,

as represented in religious education, had somehow been under the illusion that it could get along without either of the roots essential to it, psychology and sociology on the one hand, and theology on the other. It is now beginning to stage a recovery, but still seems so intent on keeping the wheels running that it has not yet taken time to reach beneath the surface.

Those who have had to help people in need, however, and who could not in conscience deny the obligation through applying labels like "abnormality" have begun to probe more deeply. Another way to put it is that clinical experience which is honest in its observations is bound to make people ask continually deeper questions—unless a premature preoccupation with ideological factors arbitrarily delimits the area in which the questions are asked. This fact is something more than incidental. It means that the most fruitful way of approaching the psychological understanding of religion is through the practical field, and through that therapeutic side of it which we are accustomed to call "pastoral" since its intent is shepherding.

If accepted generally, this would have several immediate practical implications. First, the initial study of the psychological understanding of religion on the part of students would be done in connection with clinical, or at least pastoral, studies—rather than merely as an aspect of study of theology and philosophy of religion. This is in contrast to the practice of many seminaries. Second, there would be a new recognition that the practical field has a content, not in contrast to the theological content but complementary to it. The practical field is not just a dealing with skills. Third, while commending the interest of theologians in the psychological understanding of religion, any attempts on their part to confine it merely to formal categories and systematic philosophies would be pointed to as biased.

At the same time, the psychological understanding of religion is of great importance for theology and the philosophy of religion. If the study of theology consists of God, man, sin, and salvation—then the kind of psychological understanding which is now becoming possible is related to all four fields. In other words, there is a sense in which psychological knowledge is an aspect of all theological knowledge. This is not to say, however, that the new creative insights of psychology can come about through merger with theology. For every time psychology has been taken as nothing but a part of theology, it has ceased to become creative. On the other hand, when psychological study has been divorced from theological study, it has taken refuge in resort to less consequential questions. Somehow psychology must be free to be creative and yet have its proper place as an aspect of theological study. The first can be achieved by recognizing the chief source of creative insights to be in the clinical and pastoral procedures and reflections therefrom. The second can come from a study of theology which is willing to admit that its roots lie both in experience and in revelation, and which is

sufficiently concerned with the experimental as well as the revelatory roots to study them concretely and not merely abstractly.

When we come to consider the types of concrete questions to which answers are most needed, and to the answering of which psychology can make the largest contribution, we may be struck anew by their breadth and importance. How do faith and doubt operate in the human psyche? Or love? Or conscience and the sense of guilt? What are the major typological factors involved in the experiencing of religion? Questions like these impinge upon every aspect of theological study. And the chief new creative insights which may help to answer them come potentially from the clinical or pastoral or therapeutic aspects of the practical field, rather than from philosophy or religious education or history or even from the sociological study of religion.

A further comment is required, however, on the sociology of religion or the sociological understanding of religion. This has never been a watertight compartment affair as has the psychology of religion. Its insights have been more freely merged with history, philosophy, and other approaches to understanding religion. It is now clear that lack of understanding of dynamics, which has characterized most of the work in the sociology of religion, must be remedied if it is to fulfill its promise. But if the dynamics are to be given their proper place, what is involved is a social psychology of religion, or a social psychological understanding of religion. Hence its future is more intimately tied up with that of the psychological understanding of religion than it has ever been in the past.

THE SCIENTIFIC APPROACH

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IN THIS GOLDEN age of science, nearly everyone is trying to be scientific. The physician, the historian, the economist, the theologian, the artist, and the philosopher are using what they believe to be the *scientific approach*. The net effect is unfortunate because of fallacious ideas about what the scientific approach really is.

True scientists are not to blame. But those on the fringes of science have created a grotesque caricature of the scientist as a coldly skeptical man swayed by reason rather than by emotion, by facts rather than by fancies. His mind is a precision tool without any fuzzy edges. There is no nonsense about him. To him a breath of fresh air is a physiological phenomenon; a sunset is an assortment of wave lengths; an unsupported opinion is a bore; and he doesn't believe in witchcraft. This is the sterile ideal which other men have sought to emulate.

As a matter of fact, the scientist is not that way at all. He is an emotional creature with an abnormal love of beauty. He has his share of temperamental weakness. He uses his imagination to the limit, and he keeps doing the oddest things. He is unpredictable, characteristically irrational, and addicted to visions. In short, he is a human being.

First, consider this point of rationality. In politics he is likely to be either reactionary or leftist. He is either a devout religionist or an atheist. His interpretations of economics runs the whole gamut. He is usually an earnest advocate of this, that, or the other. He is no more judicial than the fellow next door. But, you say, these things have nothing to do with his work. They are extracurricular. Let him get down to business, and his heat will be dissipated by the frigid logic of his calling. Not so!

Professor James H. Taylor, of the George Washington University, has pointed out that there is no reason to assume that because a mathematician uses logical tools he is a logical man. In fact, to the extent that he uses his logical tools in an obviously logical manner, the mathematician is not a scientist. He is merely performing a mechanical act like threading a needle or mowing a lawn. It is only when he discovers or invents a new mathematical relationship or generality, or applies mathematics in an unexpected way, that he functions as a scientist, and then he departs from conventional reasoning. Things "come to him." Sometimes he is introspective and likes to speculate about the way he gets his answers.

Jacques Hadamard, in his *Psychology of Invention in the Realm of Mathematics*, takes issue with those who believe that invention is pure

chance, but he believes it is partly so. He is inclined to invoke the aid of psychological processes that, to say the least, are elusive. He tells of interesting cases in which mathematicians have found solutions to problems which could not have been solved by logical processes except by the use of techniques discovered years or even centuries later. There is no rational explanation for such phenomena. Galois, for example, was a mathematical prodigy. In his twentieth year he was called upon to fight a duel in which he was killed. During the night before the duel he wrote out notes on his mathematical discoveries, among them a theorem which had no meaning until about twenty-five years later when new mathematical inventions had been made.

The famous *last theorem* of Fermat has been puzzling mathematicians for several centuries and has not yet been solved. The technique is not even yet available, but Fermat solved it intuitively. He had only the margin of a printed page on which to write, and there was insufficient space for explanation if, indeed, he had any to offer.

The greatest mathematical scientists have believed that invention is not wholly a conscious process. Einstein, for example, (who proposed the fundamental equation for atomic fission) claims that "conventional words or other signs have to be sought for laboriously only in a secondary stage" after the problem has been solved by the use of what he calls "psychical entities which seem to serve as elements in thought" Gauss had tried unsuccessfully for years to solve a problem. He claims to have finally succeeded "not on account of my painful efforts, but by the grace of God. Like a sudden flash of lightning, the riddle happened to be solved." Referring to a mathematical problem, Poincaré said that at a certain moment "the idea came to me, without anything in my former thoughts seeming to have paved the way for it." Later on he, like Einstein, verified the result at his leisure. There are these and many other ways to describe the phenomenon of inspiration.

Bertrand Russell, who is the apostle of rationality, has said: "So far, no method has been found which would make it possible to invent hypotheses by rule. Usually some hypothesis is a necessary preliminary to the collection of facts, since the selection of facts demands some way of determining relevance. Without something of this kind, the mere multiplicity of facts is baffling." Professor Hans Reichenbach, of the University of California, claims that the way towards the construction of rules for quantum mechanics "could not be found by logical reasoning." The way of the scientific method is to guess at the answer in order to know what facts to accumulate. If the guess is bad, the accumulated facts are irrelevant and nothing can be done with them. If the guess is good, it is possible successfully to apply to the facts what Schrödinger calls a "series of inferences

which are deeply veiled by the darkness of instinctive guessing." Professor G. Polya, of Stanford University, puts it very simply: The rules for inventing hypotheses are, first, "to have brains and good luck" and, second, "to sit tight and wait till you get a bright idea."

Many scientists are not introspective and are uninterested in the mechanism of invention. They are as inarticulate about themselves as the industrial magnate who tells how he emerged from an office boy by proceeding in logical sequence, step by step, until he was an assistant salesman. Then there is a period of hiatus about which there is apparently nothing to say, and at the beginning of the next chapter he finds himself on the dizzy pinnacle. The scientist sometimes tells his success story in precisely the same way. Newton said that he solved his problems merely by thinking about them.

No scientist will deny the liberal use of postrationalization. In modern times more and more of this form of intellectual entertainment goes into an attempt to bring some sort of order out of chaos. Of all men, the scientist is the least self-conscious about his nomenclature. He does not mind calling numbers *irrational*, or *imaginary*, or even *transcendental*. He does not cringe before the *uncertainty functions* which are so essential to modern science. He sees no reason to reject any conceptions that can be used to create. It is the modern philosopher rather than the creative scientist who worries about rationality, and who writes long scholarly books to show that merely because we can select an experiment to disprove *any* theory about the nature of light, there is no reason to suppose that *all* theories may not be true. The technique is interesting. Whenever things look bad for the argument, the difficulty is dignified by inventing a principle—for example, the *principle of anomaly*. And when it looks as though we might just as well give up for good, we have the *principle of indeterminacy*. These principles of futility are developed by the use of such forbidding tools as "three way" symbolic logic and the calculus, and the net result is a complicated way of saying "we do not understand."

Light, by the way, is one of the most mysterious things in the world. The scientist understands no better than the politician why the enormity of the atomic bomb explosion should be tied up with the velocity of light, but he has more faith in the idea. If a poet should tell a story about a man who could ride on a beam of light into the sky to touch a distant star and then return to earth, the poet might hesitate at this point to consider how the story should end. One way would be to have this man find, on his return, that while the earth had aged a thousand years during his wanderings, *he* had not aged at all. The poet (especially if he were modern) would probably find this conception too romantic for his taste, and yet the modern scientist does not. For he believes that time would stand still if you could

move with the velocity of light. The idea is incomprehensible to the scientist, but he is accustomed to it, and he does not find it melodramatic.

What of the scientist's skepticism? People indulgently call it "healthy." But the scientist is not a skeptic. No man is more ardent than he is in his belief, without proof, that a thing isn't so (a ghost, for example). A skeptic would ask for proof, but the scientist does not even ask for evidence. On the other hand, no man is more ardent that he in his belief that certain things *are* so, when he knows that they cannot be proven. The scientist knows that Newtonian dynamics are used by engineers not because they are correct, but because they are nearly so and are convenient and easily applied. He also knows that for two hundred years his predecessors had as much faith in Newtonian dynamics as a priest in his God—until the system was shown to be defective by the astrophysicist. And the scientist now has a shining faith in the dynamics of Einstein. The scientist is not a skeptical man.

What makes the scientist work so hard? Many philosophers have come to the conclusion that it is the urge to create a structure of scientific beauty, and it seems that this must be so. The famous dictum of Bertrand Russell, that the mathematician never knows what he is talking about, refers, of course, to the fact that he is concerned with symbols that may mean almost anything. This gives the worker in pure mathematics an opportunity to be completely impartial. He would seem to have no reason to prefer one answer to another. He should be just as happy with x^2 as with x . And yet he is not. One answer (the correct one) brings joy to his soul, while all others leave him depressed. Now this is not because the answer is what it is, for the answer is meaningless in itself, and only an idiot can enjoy a thing without meaning. Rather it is because the correct answer completes a structure of beauty, while a wrong one is discordant. You may not wish to call this *beauty*, but many others have. It is not exactly the kind of beauty as that of music, but neither is music like poetry or painting.

In selecting her wardrobe, a woman has decided upon everything except the hat. If she is fortunate, she will have many to choose from, and she will like them all. Accordingly, she is quite indifferent about the matter *except* that it must complement the rest of her ensemble. When it does that, she feels wonderful.

A businessman has organized a new company from the ground up. All the departments are fitted together harmoniously except the sales department, which is a mistake. When sales has been properly reorganized, he gets a real thrill out of it—not because he likes his new sales department any better than the old, but because of his æsthetic appreciation of an approach to organizational perfection. Profits go along with this approach to

perfection, but there is no evidence that the businessman enjoys money any more than the scientist. He merely *has* more.

When mathematics is applied, the mathematician begins to know what he is talking about, but he is still neutral in an absolute sense. He doesn't care whether the correct answer is one apple or five apples, because he is not likely to get hold of any to eat. To him, an apple might just as well be a book or a battleship.

The worker in applied chemistry sometimes hopes that the calculated thermodynamics of a proposed reaction will show it to be possible instead of impossible, but in making such a calculation he is not functioning as a scientist, any more than the man who measures a table to see if it can be carried through a door. He is merely using a tool in the practice of his profession. He functions as a scientist when he builds a structure of scientific beauty, and the thing that urges him on is an emotional desire for æsthetic satisfaction. When he has succeeded, he experiences that same sense of exaltation felt by the creators of art or business. Poincaré said, "A scientist worthy of the name, above all a mathematician, experiences in his work the same impression as an artist; his pleasure is as great and of the same nature." Nuclear physicists are unhappy today because they consider that their science is still in an "unholy mess."

A common characteristic of the scientist, the artist, and the businessman is the love of all three for what they call *freedom*. They define this freedom in different ways, but what all of them mean is that they do not wish to be forced to spoil the elegance of the things they create—to encourage incompetence, to put false notes in a song, or to search for the answer to the wrong problem. The scientist reserves the right to be as fantastic as he pleases, but he does not want anyone to compel him to be. He wants to do it in his own way and for his own reasons.

The scientist can be very profitable, but he does not like to be called practical. After all, a practical cook is one whose food you can eat but without enthusiasm. A practical nurse is one you are happy to have if a trained nurse is not procurable. The less said about a practical politician, the better. Chemicals are labeled "practical grade" when they are not sufficiently pure to be used even as raw products for manufacture. The list could be extended indefinitely. A college president recently made an address in which he extolled the work of the physicists on the atomic bomb. But then, to show that he was a man of the world, he said, "We need not only the man of vision and ideals, but also the practical man." In other words, he inferred, perhaps unconsciously, that the practical man is deficient in ideals and vision.

The scientist's picture of a practical man is one who is slightly illiterate, moderately profane, and comfortably ignorant. The practical man is an

inveterate theorist. He has the most peculiar ideas about what is going on. His hypotheses suffer from lack of basic knowledge, but, unlike the scientist, he fails to recognize the irrelevance of facts. He is not disturbed by anomalies and has little curiosity about them.

One of the greatest faults of the scientist is that his imagination is likely to carry him a little too far into the future. He may lose interest in a technical process, for example, because he properly evaluates it as obsolescent; but before it becomes obsolete there may be many years of good in it. For this reason, much of the important work of mankind (even in scientific research) is done by those without the handicap of prescience—by those who are capable of becoming intensely interested in things that fail to arouse the imagination. Such unreasoning men are more useful than those who reason without inspiration.

People have tried in various ways to characterize the scientist. For example, he is said to have a "passion for understanding." But this would describe the philosopher and even your poor little dachshund. It is said that the scientist deals only with material things. This is a better description of the hod carrier. Some people say that the scientist is chiefly concerned with nature, but so is the poet. It is true that he strives to organize knowledge, but so does the statistician. The work of the scientist is a fascinating adventure—a perpetual series of expeditions to the unknown. The "coldly skeptical" man could never go through with it. He would doubt the very existence of the unknown, and he would lack the emotional drive to achievement. Unless he were swayed by fancies, he would stay with his facts and would never make the trips. Only the most human of men would have the imagination to conceive of the unknown places, the naïveté to believe in their existence, the daring to start into the wilderness, and the stubborn determination to stay there until he could depart with some of its riches.

WHAT MAKES WAR ATTRACTIVE?

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PACIFISTS have been laboring under the delusion for all too long that men do not like war. To some pacifists war is an irrational excrescence on the moral life of individuals and nations. They have taken the viewpoint that war is forced by external and essentially uncontrollable circumstances which the essentially good individual and group are unable to shake off. Or, they have thought of war as something which the unreasoning man finds attractive, which the man of knowledge looks upon with disdain. Passing off the demonic character of war as a social or educational problem, they have failed, perhaps, to probe deeply enough to see that war has its attractions, and that until men find greater satisfactions in the ways of peace, they will practice the ways of war.

What, then, are the attractions of war? How does it come about that war can apparently fulfill many of the basic needs of men? How can one account for the dialectical nature of war: it is both destructive and creative at the same time? What motivates men in wartime to unheard of achievements of personal sacrifice and heroism? Admittedly the problem is too great for any one statement of it. Yet, some of the lines of attraction can be pointed out with accuracy.

War appeals to our need for adventure. One thing that war surely does is to upset us all. On the face of it one might assume that war would be distasteful. Yet the opposite is largely true. War unsettles us. But it also presents us with immense possibilities for action which seem dwarfed by peacetime activities. Usually the very posing of the situation of war involves the individual in a situation of uncertainty. Will his side win? Having a stake in the problem of winning, the individual may seek to place his balance of decision on the side of probable victory and to use his influence to cause his decision a successful fruition.

More concretely, war calls for adventure by presenting the individual with certain "thrilling" possibilities. He may see himself as a hero, fighting up some foreign shore to combat singlehanded whole corps of enemy troops, gaining the plaudits of the crowd, and having for years to come a source of satisfaction which is incomparably superior to the achievements of a similarly motivated individual in peacetime business, agrarian, or professional life. He does not see that those who are heroes are few compared to those who are dead by war's bony hand. He is intrigued with the possibilities of the unforeseen.

In this connection war also demands the fullest use of powers and

abilities which a peacetime life may never stir. Biologically the warrior must be primed for his task; one slip, and he is done. In terms of courage and fortitude, what peacetime situations elicit the overwhelming strain which war knows? In war, then, men are presented with challenges—challenges both to their imaginative capacity and to their ability to outdo themselves in exalted activity.

There may be a sense, too, in which the element of risk is appealing. Some people seemingly seek out those situations which deny "safety first." Perhaps in this they are seeking a means of facing personal punishment for guilt which has been stored internally too long and too frustratingly.

War appeals to our need for social unity. War brings men together as does no other means. We may like to think that religion can provide needed social solidarity, but this is somewhat of the nature of wishful thinking. No experience in our society can effectively compete with war as an instrument of creating social cohesion.

In war the individual identifies himself with the group. He must do this usually for survival. Any choice in our society which violates this premise generally assumes others who are so motivated and who enable the few the luxury of noncommittal. This identification with the group or nation, moreover, enables the individual to place himself in a broader perspective in his actions than peacetime usually permits. He is able to lose himself in the drama of the whole. He seizes on the richness of his national or ideological tradition and feels that on him is placed the cause of security, righteousness, and progress. Few peacetime pursuits can compare with this type of appeal. The office, factory, and farm are prone to be considered as entirely mundane and discrete.

The need for social unity in wartime also substitutes coöperative tendencies for competitive tendencies in the lives of most people. Instead of combating those nearest, war calls for joint action. Teamwork is termed the basic social component of modern warfare. Thus, J. B. Priestley in one of his broadcasts in 1940 told the story of a young English soldier who was struck by the appeal to coöperation in wartime to such an extent that he vowed he would never willingly adjust to a postwar competitive society, because, as he put it, he would be competing against those who in wartime he had been dependent upon even for his life.

In line with the idea of social unity is the hoary but tremendously vital appeal of being needed. Probably nothing motivates us like our "need to be needed." It has been said that if one wishes to establish firm relations with another, nothing succeeds like the granting of responsibility. For many people, in our impersonal society, the first and most vivid time of their apparent usefulness to society occurs in a time of war. In a time of war these are called upon to "do their bit."

War also increases social unity by limiting personal worries and concerns. The individual who has personal problems may quickly lose them or push them to the background in a time of war. War makes our personal troubles seem insignificant. It provides a kind of demonic nirvana into which all with problems may escape. That this is so does not violate the idea that war also creates many personal problems. Only peacetime sees the expression of these in large measure. War covers them up. This is evident from one example. Many before the war and at the present time were vitally concerned about their employment. The armed services for a time solved that problem both in its recruitment and in its demand for "second-front" fighters in factories and on farms. The problem of economic survival is very generally mitigated by war.

War also may help alleviate many people's problems (those who actually have no significant problems) by providing a genuine, suprapersonal cause to which individuals may positively identify themselves.

War appeals to our need for aggression. While it must be quickly admitted that social scientists know very little of a definite nature about aggressiveness it may be concluded from present evidence that there is no impulse which assures us that our aggressive motivations must be channeled in the experience of war. The time for arguing that war is a necessary fact grounded in human nature is past. War is a culturally learned, complex phenomenon. But to say this, does not say that war does not satisfy aggressive impulses. It does. War enables the lowest levels of ethical activity to find sanction in the general community. Actions which never would be tolerated for a moment in peacetime are openly advocated and trained for in wartime or in preparation for war. How can the advocates of military conscription say that it is possible to accomplish their true ends without doing active and positive violence to the accepted peacetime standards of social interaction?

Many of the activities of which human nature is capable are repressed by an ethicized society. Yet they may lie dormant, as potential ideas capable of fulfillment under proper and sympathetic conditions. War is a sympathetic condition. Criminal and delinquent situations are also sympathetic. War, then, is a moralized, antisocial situation. It enables the individual to give vent to his "negative impulses" with the fullest sanction of the "civilized" community.

War also provides the individual (and groups) with a means of escaping the dilemma of its own inadequacies and sins by placing the burden of guilt on enemies. This is the "scapegoat theory" once more. We cannot fully face our own misdoings in regard to the Negro and the Jew, but we can all unite in opposing an enemy which discriminates against a minority group. We can face such an enemy not alone with the righteous motives that spring

from a pure heart, but with motives which are doubly fretful and revengeful, for they represent our own hatred of the object evil in the enemy and the covert evil in our own lives. Thus, war is cathartic in its function. It seeks to solve two problems at the same time. The necessary totalitarian advance which evil men must make on evil solves, too, for a time the necessary steps which they might take toward the solving of their own problems.

It probably can be assumed as a social truism that we will never be able to achieve permanent peace until we make peace more attractive than war. We need not only those "moral equivalents" for war about which another generation spoke so intelligently but so fruitlessly, but we need those psychological displacements without which morality will never have a chance to survive or to flourish. Part of the answer to the problem of achieving permanent peace lies in the substitution of ethical and peace goals and satisfactions for those areas of attraction which war now offers us.

INTERPRETING THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT

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ALMOST at the beginning of his gospel, Mark makes the generalization that the people in the synagogue at Capernaum were astonished at Jesus' teaching, "for he taught them as one who had authority, and not as the scribes" (1: 22). When Matthew revised and expanded the earlier account of Jesus' ministry for a new edition, he felt that this bald statement needed to be supported. He therefore inserted into Mark's framework that rich collection of teaching that we have come to call "The Sermon on the Mount." At the conclusion of the three short chapters he reproduces the assertion they were intended to illustrate. The first half of it is now adequately documented. No wonder the people were astonished! But what of the second half? In what way did Jesus' authority differ from that of the Scribes?

Matthew represents Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount as a second and greater Moses. His authority was legislative. His sayings were purified and radicalized imperatives. Though they did not abolish the law and the prophets, they added to them in a way that must have been startling to the rabbinical mind. The Scribes had no authority apart from the law they were interpreting. Their tradition was derivative. They were engaged in the meticulous explication of an inherited body of legislation. Jesus had nothing to do with such lucubrations and applications. He superimposed a new law on the old, and did so with an authority that transcended even that of Moses.

Matthew meant the Sermon on the Mount to be a new code of law for the individual and social control of Christian behavior. Jesus was Moses' successor, so far as Christians were concerned, and was legislating for the church. Whatever may have been Jesus' original intention, and whatever we may make of his teaching today, there is no sound reason for denying that in the Sermon on the Mount he utters literal commandments that are to be literally obeyed.

If one of the earliest of Christian anthologists understood Jesus' teaching to have been a binding code of law, then Tolstoy and his predecessors and successors among perfectionists are in good company. The Sermon on the Mount sounds like ethical and religious legislation. It reads like a collection of laws that were meant to govern the lives of the faithful. It is clear that Matthew so regarded it. Those Quakers and Methodists and Baptists who insist that Jesus' words have to be "done" as well as "heard" may be dismissed as utopian and fanatical, but there are no exegetical or

historical grounds for disputing their interpretation of Matthew's Sermon on the Mount. They have correctly understood it.

The interpreter of the Sermon on the Mount has three distinct duties. In the first place, he must try to do justice to his source. How did Matthew understand his material? How did Matthew's first readers understand it? In the second place, he must try to get back of Matthew's version of Jesus' teaching to the most primitive form of it that is recoverable. What was Jesus' original meaning? To what extent has his teaching been reinterpreted in oral and literary transmission? In the third place, if he has the theological qualifications for the task, he must attempt to relate his source material to our present situation. What meaning, what relevance, what authority have the words of Jesus for present-day Christians as individuals, as members of the church of Christ, and as part of the larger secular community?

As I read the literature of interpretation, there seems to be general agreement that Matthew's Jesus was moral and religious legislator *par excellence*. The Sermon on the Mount, such passages as Romans 12 to 15, parts of the Pastorals, and the Epistle of James are all examples of early Christian *parænesis*. But that is about as far as the "agreement" extends. Did Matthew misunderstand Jesus? What is the authority of the Sermon on the Mount for our time? To such questions there are the most diverse and contradictory answers.

If we leave contemporary perfectionists out of consideration, there is perhaps one further proposition that most interpreters would endorse. Almost everyone seems to hold that it is impossible to fulfill all Jesus' sayings literally. Even if we were able to do so, the result would be social and political anarchy. If we were always to love our enemies, we should have sometimes to neglect our responsibilities to our neighbors. If we were never to be anxious about tomorrow in our complex social order, we should all soon starve. If we were to give the plaintiff our cloak as well as the coat he asked for, we should have to go nude. If we were to expect every prayer to be answered, we should quickly be disillusioned. If we were not to lay up treasure for ourselves on earth, we could not own an insurance policy or make payments on a mortgage. If we were to refuse to take an oath under any circumstances, we should ultimately wreck our legal system. If we were to lend to every person who wants to borrow from us, we should end up on the dole, to say nothing of what our largess might do to undermine responsibility on the part of its recipients. In these and still other parts of it, most interpreters think that Matthew's Sermon on the Mount needs qualification. The "simple" gospel has its complexities.

In recent years there have been several ways in which the radicalism

of Jesus' ethics has been explained. It will be useful to refer briefly to a few representative points of view.

1. For some theologically minded Christians, the answer to the impossibility of Jesus' ethical imperatives has been found in the eschatological framework of his thought. With many of his contemporaries, Jesus expected the present age to give way in a matter of days or months to the new age of God's rule. The sands of time were running out. Soon a cosmic catastrophe would inaugurate the kingdom of God. When that kingdom should come, God would be all in all. There would then be no distinctions of poverty and wealth, no vestigial selfishness, no necessity for legislation. The Sermon on the Mount is "interim" ethics, a series of regulations designed to govern the lives of those who wished to make ready for the kingdom, during the few weeks or months that would intervene before its advent. Jesus' imperatives were meant to be taken literally and fulfilled literally. Matthew has correctly represented his teaching. But both Jesus and Matthew were conditioned in their thinking by a foreshortened view of history. Since we do not reckon any longer on the imminent end of this age, we must take Jesus seriously, but we cannot take him literally as he meant himself to be taken. The genius of his ethics lies in its stimulus and inspiration rather than in its literal wording.

The school of "consistent eschatology" was founded in Germany by Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer, and early in this century gained adherents in Great Britain and America. Although it has had but little vogue in lay circles, its point of view continues to exercise a profound influence on theological writing in English as well as in German. Dr. J. Warschauer's *The Historical Life of Christ*¹ may be cited as a representative product of it.

2. Most handbooks on the teaching of Jesus that have been published during the past fifty years or so would illustrate what has been called the "liberal" approach to the ethics of Jesus. The foremost expositor of this kind of interpretation was Wilhelm Herrmann, professor of Christian ethics at Marburg at the turn of the last century. Many of his ideas are still dominant in theological literature, and most of us who have studied in liberal seminaries have been exposed to them. They are attractively and cogently presented in E. F. Scott's little book, *The Ethical Teaching of Jesus*.²

Herrmann and his followers have maintained that Matthew misrepresented the Jesus of history in portraying him as a legislator. Jesus never meant his ethical teachings to be taken as a new law. It is a serious mistake to regard his utterances as commands that require literal obedience.

¹ New York, 1927. See especially Chapter XI: "Jesus as a Teacher," pp. 167-183.

² New York, 1924.

If Jesus had intended his words to be general rules, he would have been more legalistic than those Jewish legalists among his contemporaries whom he opposed. But Jesus was not a legalist. He wished to free men from the tyranny of the law, not to substitute a more tyrannous one. The truth is that Jesus taught *ethos* rather than *ethics*. He proclaimed a few ethical principles and then laid upon each of his followers the obligation of applying these directions of the will to specific instances and occasions. He taught a new spirit, or disposition, rather than a new body of legislation. His ethical teachings were concerned with illustrating generally valid motives rather than giving generally valid regulations. The Sermon on the Mount illustrates how a new attitude toward God and man may work out in specific instances, but these illustrations are not to be interpreted legalistically as rules of conduct.

3. A theological school in Germany that took its rise in the period between the wars has been variously known as "dialectical theology" or the "theology of crisis," but in its British and American manifestation seems to prefer the title "neoöorthodoxy." Its exponents have also had to wrestle with the problem of the Sermon on the Mount. They take their departure from the theological presuppositions of the seventh chapter of Romans. Man by himself may wish to fulfill the will of God, but he cannot. He is the helpless victim of sinful impulses within himself. Sin entered the world by the transgression of Adam, and man is born into a state of sin. As unregenerate man, he is incapable of any real ethical activity. He needs a redeemer, and the Christian has such a redeemer in Christ.

Starting with these Pauline ideas, it is possible to interpret the Sermon on the Mount much as St. Paul interpreted the law of Moses. The ethical teachings of Jesus are a revelation of the absolute and unqualified will of God. They are a series of unconditioned and divine imperatives that demand complete and utter obedience, and that are oriented only to God's kingdom and God's righteousness. No man by himself can possibly fulfill them. If he is honest with himself, he is driven to confess with St. Paul: "For the good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do." A great and impassable gulf is fixed between God's demands and our compliance. Because we are sinners, and because this historical existence is a sinful existence, Jesus' ethic is not only impractical; it is impossible!¹³ Our tragic dilemma is resolved only by the cross. The Mediator fulfilled God's will once and for all in his redemptive life and death. None of us is saved by his own righteousness; he is saved only by appropriating the free grace of God in Christ.

Most Protestant interpretations of the Sermon on the Mount fall into

¹³ Emil Brunner, *The Mediator*, tr. Olive Wyon (London, 1934), p. 419. Brunner's "impossible" becomes Reinhold Niebuhr's "impossible possibility." See his *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics* (New York, 1935).

one or other of the categories enumerated above. It is impracticable because it is interim ethics; or because it has been mistakenly represented by Matthew as legislation; or because we are sinners and can only be saved by the grace of God. It is still relevant because it is a stimulus and an inspiration to men of every generation; or because Jesus taught attitudes and principles that are eternally valid; or because it is an absolute criterion by which our relative choices in any situation and in any age must be judged.

In 1928 Dr. Hans Windisch, at that time professor at the University of Leiden, published a book entitled *The Meaning of the Sermon on the Mount*. After the author's death in 1935 it was reissued in a revised and enlarged edition.⁴ It subjects the Sermon to a careful historical analysis, assesses the strength and weaknesses of the various interpretations of it that have been put forward, and makes a variety of suggestions for its theological exegesis. Since the study has not been widely known in Britain or America, some account of its contribution to a proper understanding and employment of Jesus' ethical teaching may serve a useful purpose.

Windisch insists that a proper distinction must be drawn between "historical" and "theological" exegesis. The task of historical exegesis is to determine the original meaning of a text to the rigid exclusion of the interpreter's personal, apologetic or polemical interests. Its related discipline is the history of biblical religion. The task of theological exegesis, on the other hand, is to relate the original content of a biblical passage, as careful historical exegesis has determined it, to the religious needs of our time in the light of the faith, the history, and the experience of the church. Its related discipline is biblical theology.

Both historical and theological exegesis are legitimate and complementary activities, but too frequently their separate functions are confused or overlooked. Occasionally the historian regards everything but his findings with suspicion. Biblical studies are held to be an exercise in archæology. Occasionally the theologian reinterprets and recasts his source material so as to force it into the service of the theological or philosophical position he represents. *Exegesis* is replaced by *eisegesis*.

Surely it is possible to avoid both perils: to pursue objective historical research with scientific detachment, and to relate the historical content of biblical religion to later situations without thrusting an interpretation on it that is foreign to its genius. It should also be possible to admit that all the ideas we hold to be true are not necessarily biblical, and conversely, that biblical ideas do not always have to be our ideas.

The neoorthodox reinterpretation of eschatology is one example of

⁴*Der Sinn der Bergpredigt* (Leipzig, 1937). The University of Chicago Press will shortly publish it in an English translation by the author of this article.

theological exegesis that has lost contact with historical discipline. Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer held that its assumption of the imminent end of this age makes Jesus' ethic largely irrelevant to any other philosophy of history. The new theology maintains that it is the "eschatology" of Jesus' teaching that makes it permanently relevant. We are not, however, to think in terms of "mathematical" or "chronological" time. We must not think of watches or calendars. The "crisis" that Jesus spoke about is not a point in the time series but a state in which man is placed and compelled to make a decision. This may be good theology, but it is demonstrably bad exegesis. Brunner and his followers may have abandoned "chronological" time as part of eschatological thinking, but it is clear that apocalyptists of New Testament times did not do so.

The Sermon on the Mount as a whole is related by Matthew to the coming of the kingdom of God and the Day of Judgment. The evangelist certainly shared such eschatological beliefs as Jesus may have held, and there are indications that he occasionally heightened them. But it is clear that the radicalism of the Sermon on the Mount is not due wholly, or even primarily, to belief in the imminence of the end. "Interim ethic" is a most inadequate description of it. The Sermon contains much material that is completely unrelated to eschatology, other material in which the eschatological motive has been superimposed on originally noneschatological sayings, and still other material in which eschatology is a purely secondary factor. Much of Jesus' teaching in the Sermon on the Mount must be classified as religious "wisdom" rather than religious "eschatology." It proclaims the will of a jealous God who demands utter and absolute obedience, and is not in any way "exceptional" legislation that is dependent for its validity on an imminent cosmic catastrophe.

Windisch subjects both the "liberal" and the "neoorthodox" interpretations of the Sermon on the Mount to critical examination in terms of the text. In my judgment he has demonstrated that both have been guilty of impregnating the tradition with later philosophical and theological ideas. They have been reinterpreting and "modernizing" the Sermon. Herrmann and those who have followed his lead have taken their departure from Kant and modern ethical idealism. The school of dialectical theology has made St. Paul and Martin Luther normative. Both have tried to show that Jesus shared and pioneered the particular point of view that they have adopted or inherited.

Did Jesus substitute principle for precept in ethical behavior? Did he teach attitude rather than proclaim legislation? Did he stress "ethos" rather than "ethics," a "set of the will" rather than a "new commandment"? Such assertions have been confidently put forward by a generation of handbooks, comforting the reader with the thought that Jesus anticipated the

Kantian dictum: "There is nothing in the world, or out of it for that matter, that can be regarded as good, except only a good will."

It is quite true that there are general principles enunciated in the Sermon. Two striking instances are 5:48: "You, therefore, must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect," and 7:12: "Whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them." There are similar inclusive principles also in the Pentateuch, notably the *shema*. But most of the Sermon is made up of individual and specific precepts. The antitheses in the fifth chapter are often cited as typical of Jesus' emphasis on principle rather than on precept. He goes back of the act to the attitude. The real sin is not the actual murder of a man but the spirit of anger that prompts it. The real sin is not the act of adultery but the lustful desires that occasion it. This insight is a true one, but it stops short of recognizing that Jesus substitutes new commandments for what had been "said to the men of old." His teaching continues to move in the sphere of legislation. Anger and insulting language and lustful looks are prohibited. The new law is more rigorous and far-reaching than the old. Modern ethical idealists deny that you can legislate for attitudes and thoughts and desires, but this is a nice distinction that never occurred to Jesus, and we are modernizing him when we make him responsible for Kant's "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morality."

Neoorthodoxy is often ready to admit that Jesus meant what he said in the Sermon on the Mount, but it is even more insistent than liberalism in asserting that it is an impossible ethic for any individual or order of civilization. It lays bare man's ethical bankruptcy and postulates the cross as his only way of salvation. It demonstrates that man needs a mediator and redeemer. This is good Paulinism and good Reformation theology, but there is no evidence that it has anything whatever to do with the Sermon on the Mount. The Christology of the Sermon represents Jesus as legislator, wisdom teacher, prophet, and messianic emissary with divine authority, but never as saviour. Soteriological sayings are absent from it altogether, and it makes no place for the redeeming work of Christ on the cross. In this sense it is distinctly pre-Pauline, and only violent *eisegesis* can equate its message with that of the first chapter of Colossians.

It would be safe to say that parallels can be discovered to every saying in the Sermon on the Mount if one searches the Old Testament, the Jewish wisdom literature, and the Talmud for them.⁵ Jesus and his teachings are a product of Judaism. But that is not to say that Jesus and the Pharisees were in fundamental agreement. For one thing, while parallels to individual sayings can easily be discovered, nowhere is there any counterpart

⁵ Cf. the writings of Billerbeck, Kittel, Montefiore, Abrahams, Herford, Riddle, and G. F. Moore.

to the Sermon as a whole. More important, however, is the fact that Jesus belongs in the main to the ethical and religious tradition represented in the Old Testament by the prophets, while rabbinism was an outgrowth of the ceremonial tendencies articulated in the Torah. The opposition between them is by no means absolute. There were prophetic values and emphases in rabbinism, and Jesus by no means repudiated the authority of the Pentateuch. But he did reject the oral tradition, subordinate the cultic and nationalistic elements in the written law to its moral and religious content, and appeal from some of its regulations to new commands that he himself had formulated. The Pharisees found such a sovereign authority intolerable and repudiated its claimant. But it is not correct to say that either Jesus or the Pharisees broke with their religious heritage. The complex character of Old Testament tradition makes it possible to regard both the Mishnah and the Sermon on the Mount as legitimate offspring.

Much of the Sermon on the Mount may seem impossible to us, but that does not justify the conclusion that Jesus intended it to be regarded in that light. It has already been noted that all its radicalisms can be paralleled in some part of Hebrew-Jewish literature. And in the Sermon itself, while Jesus assumes that most men will find it impossible to do his words, he postulates a minority that will enter in by the narrow gate and that can be compared to a wise man who built his house upon the rock. The literalists are good exegetes of the Sermon when they insist that Jesus meant what he said. He did not anticipate St. Paul or Kant, Luther or Herrmann, Brunner or E. F. Scott. He was neither a modern dialectical theologian nor a modern ethical idealist.

If it is modernization of Jesus to make his teaching approximate Kantian ethics or to regard it as prolegomena to Pauline soteriology, how can true theological exegesis proceed? The perfectionists have certainly the most consistent position, and to criticize them as utopian and fanatical is to criticize Matthew and Jesus also. If we cannot follow Tolstoy and like-minded Christians, we must be prepared to recognize that our ethics, however "rational," or "realistic," or "theological," or even "Christian," is not always Jesus' ethics. And we shall have to take factors into account that Jesus did not, and make qualifications and applications and combinations of his sayings that never occurred either to Jesus or to the evangelist.

1. In the first place, theological exegesis will emphasize the fact that a good part of the Sermon on the Mount is purified "wisdom," distilled and transparent truth that is not dependent for its validation on any theology any more than it is on any eschatology. Even a religious humanism can find some points of contact with the Sermon.

2. In the second place, theological exegesis can legitimately employ the Sermon on the Mount in conjunction with other parts of Scripture, both in

the Old Testament and in the New. Revelation has a wider base than Matthew 5 to 7. Consider, for instance, the matter of petitionary prayer. In the Sermon Jesus assumes that every prayer will be answered. "Ask, and it will be given you; seek, and you will find; knock, and it will be opened to you." The only hint of a qualification is in the phrases, "good gifts" and "good things." If one has come by reflection or as the result of bitter experience to believe that faith in petitionary prayer requires some reservation, he cannot find any justification in the Sermon on the Mount for making it. But he can do so if he turns to the Synoptic account of Jesus' prayer in Gethsemane. There he finds the necessary correction of the passage in the Sermon on the Mount. The petitioner must acquiesce in the overriding purposes of God. "Not what I will, but what thou wilt." True petitionary prayer is an act of exploration. It seeks to discover God's will and to submit to it. It becomes a prayer of obedience to the divine purpose. There is scarcely a suggestion of this in Matt. 7: 7-11, but we find sanction for the necessary revision of that passage elsewhere, in this instance in Jesus' own example.

3. In the third place, theological exegesis can supplement the imperatives of the Sermon on the Mount with faith in the divine help that is given through the gracious inworking of the Holy Spirit, and with confident trust in the mercy and forgiveness of God. Christian faith knows that the God who requires perfection and who passes judgment on every imperfection, is also the God who is ever ready to renew that fellowship with himself that is broken by our sin. There is little about the forgiveness of God in the Sermon, and nothing at all about the Spirit. Honest theological exegesis will not try to maintain anything else. But it will gladly point out that the God of the Sermon on the Mount is also the God of the parables of the lost sheep and the lost son. And it will make its own that petition that one famous Greek text prefixes to Luke's version of the Lord's Prayer: "May Thy holy spirit come upon us and cleanse us!"

4. In the fourth place, theological exegesis will not try to maintain that dogmatical and philosophical positions require validation at every point before they can call themselves "Christian." Neoorthodoxy may be justified in its emphasis on the redemptive significance of Christ's death even if in the light of historical exegesis it cannot hold that this found any place in Jesus' own message. The ethical idealist may be justified in asserting the primacy of principle and attitude even if he must honestly admit that this is a modern insight for which there is no more than a suggestion in Jesus' teaching. A modern as well as an ancient ethic must stand or fall by its own inherent truth. To quote in translation from the author whose argument I have been summarizing:

It is we who do not regard Jesus' sayings as rules and regulations that require literal fulfilment. It is we who interpret them as general principles and as illustrations of the way these principles work themselves out in concrete historical situations. It is we who hold that as illustrations they are not mandatory upon us. It is we who, from suggestions in individual sayings, have put together the portrait of a child of God, of a disciple of Jesus, of a man who longs for God's kingdom and his righteousness, sins, and still remains the object of God's grace. It is we who see in the Sermon on the Mount an *ethos* that is never static and that cannot possibly be defined as the sum of separate commandments.^a

At a time when historical studies are sometimes pressed uncritically into the service of dogma, and when some theologians are anxious to support their understanding of the Christian faith even if it has to be done at the expense of scientific objectivity, Windisch has much to say to us that we need to heed. Theological exegesis is an imperative function of biblical scholarship, but it must build upon the foundation of careful historical exegesis and be subject at all times to its criticism and correction.

^a Pp. 170 f. of the second German edition.

DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN PROTESTANT WORSHIP

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TWO ASPECTS of the title may call for preliminary explanation. One is the use of a political and social concept with regard to religious worship. Though it may be something of a mixed metaphor that results, "democratic" seems to be the best available term to designate many of the values of a free religious fellowship which issues in a worship that emphasizes the essential equality of all concerned and calls for their full participation.

The other aspect which requires explanation is the assumption that "Protestant worship" represents a distinctive entity, or an entity at all for that matter. Empirical observation would seem to rule against such a supposition. For instance, who could find many common denominators, so far as form goes, between a High Episcopal service and a Pentecostal revival meeting? Who can guarantee what sort of worship he will find in any given Presbyterian, Methodist, or Baptist church simply because it wears that given denominational label? And there *are* those services of worship so "free" that not even those who conduct them know more than fifteen minutes in advance what course they intend to follow.

Notwithstanding this bewildering variety of usage, there are certain ruling convictions underlying Protestant church life that are formative of its worship and which justify the use of the term "Protestant worship" as having some coherent meaning. Such worship is best typified by that of the middle-of-the-road churches which form the bulk of Protestantism, and the use of the term here will in the main apply to such.

The basic conception which rules Protestant worship—apart from particular historical events or influences which have resulted in the distinctive variations of individual denominations—is the conviction that the church is a free, democratic fellowship of believers who have the right to choose their religious leaders and their own forms of worship. Rules of expediency and inherited usages have modified the full exercise of these powers by the individual congregation even in the most independent of Protestant churches. Yet that conviction, in one form or another, underlies all Protestant church organization.

The very flexibility and variety of Protestant worship, which is sometimes so dismaying even to well-wishers, is both evidence and result of this democratic conception of the church. Form of worship represents one of the major battlefields in the struggles between enthroned hierarchies of established churches and new Protestant forms of spiritual life which at various times in the past, and even at present, seek expression. A set form

of worship imposed upon church practice by act of uniformity, or usages viewed as sacrosanct in particulars and as integral parts of a "without-the-church-no-salvation" context, are considered by the Protestant to be inimical to vital religious faith and practice.

This should not blind us to the fact that set forms of worship do have their points. A Catholic acquaintance once said to me: "I like the Catholic service because the Mass is the same everywhere. I feel at home in any church I enter. I am not at the mercy of the vagaries of individual ministers and congregations as you Protestants are, when I worship." Or we may recall that the Bishop remarked to Father Smith that it was only courteous to think about what you were going to say to God before you said it. He goes on to say: "It seems to me that even the hardest sinner cannot utter the sheer poetry of the Church's prayers without having his soul ennobled in some way by their lovely sound."¹ It is perfectly true that the extemporary quality of many Protestant services is cheap and trivial beside the majesty and dignity of ancient ritual, and that the Protestant service of worship is often a victim of a degenerate uniformity of mediocrity and haste in the midst of its vaunted freedom—that it frequently seems to be without spiritual power enough to create appropriate forms.

Yet we should neither forget the inherent weaknesses of static ritual, as evidenced in history and human experience, nor neglect the positive values of our freedom of worship. The innate depravity of the set ritual is its tendency to beget an idolatry of word and symbol, in their elevation to a quasi-magical status, in place of a vigorous moral enthusiasm. As such, it becomes an apt device for a socially static church seeking to maintain the *status quo* or a ready tool for a power-hungry ecclesiasticism. Mediæval Catholicism was full of both ritual and unrighteousness. And hand in hand with this tendency, though surely a sin of lesser breed, goes the almost inevitable propensity on the part of the officiating clergy to a rapid and mechanical intonation of the majestic ritual. All of which results, the Bishop notwithstanding, in much less actual thought being given, individually and on the spur of the moment at least, to what one is going to say to God than in the most extemporary sort of prayer. And who does not know as a layman the mind's amazing power to think the most worldly of thoughts while the lips repeat the most holy, and the most familiar, of words? Delicacy forbids our suppositions with regard to the inmost thoughts of clergymen while exercising their well-worn holy offices!

The positive values of the Protestant freedom lie in the community of worship which it creates. By community of worship I mean a democratic and participating spiritual life and worship. As the expression of that life, Protestant worship is geared throughout to individual participation. The worshiper is never a mere spectator at a holy show, one who mechanically

¹ Bruce Marshall, *The World, The Flesh, and Father Smith* (Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1945), p. 26.

murmurs response to another's deeds of worship for him, but may find full opportunity for individual and direct expression. The service as such cannot successfully proceed without his taking part in it in heartfelt fashion.

Another facet of the same quality is that in the best Protestant worship, *withness* rather than *atness* characterizes those who lead in worship. Whatever minister, choir, organist, deacons, or others do in their capacity of conducting worship, be it in leading the singing, prayer, ritual, or observation of silence, it is done with the full sense that they are not theatrical performers at whom the public is invited to look, but representatives of the congregation. The total congregation, unable to participate in all the exercises of public worship individually because of the ensuing confusion, empowers these its fellow members, persons of character and abilities suitable for such tasks, to speak and act for it in such instances. It is implicit in most Protestant theories of ministerial ordination that the minister is not different in kind by virtue of the ordination, but chosen by his brethren to perform the public offices of religion because of his preëminent calling and gifts. He is therefore rather a leader of his people in worship than a priest performing a sacred ritual for them.

Let him continually remember this, for it is very easy in a service which emphasizes individual participation and which is extremely flexible, for exhibitionism to creep in under cover of exercising one's talents for the Lord. The difference between a choir and minister who sing and pray *at* the congregation and those who seek to sing and pray *with* them as their leaders in praise and prayer is often very subtle, not specifically attributable to any given action or word, yet unmistakable in final effect.

Those parts of Protestant worship most obviously designed for direct participation are of course the prayers, confessions or creeds, and hymns. The practice of extemporary prayer from the congregation during public worship has disappeared from many churches, representing a distinct loss in the degree of participation by the laity. Where such is the case, the leader of prayer must be especially cognizant of the fact that he *is* a leader of prayer, seeking to bring the worshipers into the mood of prayer and expressing in his own words or choice of prayers their needs and aspirations. The same sensitivity is needed in the use of the more ritualistic parts of the service, that is, creeds and confessions. In nonliturgical churches to the extreme left, the individual testimonies of worshipers are the creedal equivalent and represent full, spontaneous participation, though at the cost of beauty and order in the service. The formalized expression of religious conviction, therefore, must be chosen to voice most effectively the faith of the worshiper and possibly be changed from time to time if it is to retain its democratic character.

It is the practice of hymn singing, however, which embodies most fully and essentially the spirit of Protestant worship of participation. Hymn

singing is a fully democratic practice—except perhaps for those who cannot sing—and its value as a binding and inspiring force is witnessed to by its continuing use throughout evangelical Protestantism as a major feature of its worship. Its words are in the native tongue of the worshiper and easily understood. The moods of the hymns strike the major chords of human emotion. The tunes are often the popular tunes of yestergeneration and as such appropriate for unrehearsed mass singing—though sometimes one wonders what manner of people they were who decided that *some* of our hymns were singable, even by experts. All in all, however, there is no other part of the service of which the worshiper feels himself so fully a part as that devoted to the singing of the hymns of his faith.

Even that bugbear of modern Protestantism, the sermon, is essentially democratic in its exercise and place in worship, if rightly construed. It is, I am convinced, essential to a vital Protestant worship and church—I emphasize this because of a strong current of opinion in church circles which would largely discount the sermon as a vestigial remnant of primitive, unenlightened Protestantism.

The sermon is essentially democratic and necessary to vital worship because it balances the mystical and the sacramental. Mystery and sacrament, with their corollary, the sacerdotal, are aristocratic both in nature and practice. Fundamentally esoteric, their inner essence is hidden from the masses. This essence is difficult if not impossible of expression save through shadowy symbols. Only the chosen few, *i.e.*, the ordained or initiated, can mediate the inner grace of the mystery to the worshiper. And a halo of sanctity clings to the vessels, the symbols, and the persons who mediate the mystery, setting them apart from the common. No vital religious faith can be without some deep sense of mystery at its heart and expressed in its worship. And it is the mystical and sacramental which give religious loyalty much of its emotional drive. But mystery needs to be balanced, for it is the mystical also which tends to neglect or blunt the moral sense, to strengthen unduly the power of priestcraft, and which produces strange extravagances and burning fanaticisms.

The sermon, as the exposition of Scripture, represents the democratic and rational counterbalance for mystery and sacramentalism. The Scripture is read from the open Bible. (In an older Protestantism every member of the congregation had his Bible too, and read with the minister. No strange heretical words should he insert or key word leave out!) The sermon which follows is an attempt to interpret the meaning of the Scripture and represents an earnest effort of the preacher to engage the minds of his hearers in serious thought on religious truth. He is the moral voice of religion harnessing the emotional force of worship to practical duty and giving the inarticulate mysteries of the altar voice and meaning for daily relationships. Public manners forbid any interruption of the preacher in his discourse, and

sometimes its democratic character of open interpretation of Scripture and the mind of the church is lost amid the rumbling of dogmatic thunders. So also the substance of the message may remain a mystery comparable in murky obscurity to any mystery of the altar. Nevertheless it is a democratic antidote to the sacramental and sacerdotal, and its decline in public esteem represents fully as much a disinclination on the part of the Protestant congregation to consider religion as a serious intellectual matter as a witness to the sermon's degeneration.

Like all forms of democratic life, a democratic worship puts a substantial burden upon the participant. It is much easier to follow the prescribed duties of a sacramental faith which demands only obedience than it is to worship in a manner which depends so heavily upon what the individual worshiper brings of his own to that worship. The quality and degree of individual participation make the Protestant service what it is. For what is hymn singing unless it is done fullheartedly and full-throatedly? Or what is prayer and confession in a Protestant church unless one makes them his own? Or the sermon unless there is an answering spark of intellectual seriousness over religion in the congregation? Or for that matter, what is flatter than a Protestant service in which the lukewarm majority come to see and hear, not personally to worship?

Valuable as the returning emphasis upon the ritualistic and sacramental is to our needlessly barren Protestant worship, its warm welcome is also something of a witness to the ebbing of the tide of individual religious living and of a growing uncertainty at its heart. Protestants no longer know their Bibles well enough to be able to follow the preacher, should he accidentally refer to it in the course of his remarks. They have almost universally dropped the practice of family prayers. And but few of them are able to coin words of prayer for themselves; instead they rely increasingly upon their public functionaries to pray for them. This means that the spiritual life of Protestants on the whole lacks the power to sustain itself by its chosen instruments—the open Bible as guide to the spiritual life, and the capacity of individual religious conviction to clothe the dry bones of formal worship with living power.

I do not urge here a return to primitive unformed worship or the setting of ritual in contrast to spontaneity. There is room and need for both in our worship. But I do suggest that we need to keep and more fully exploit the democratic character of our worship in which the congregation participates. We need to realize that it is the epitome of our Protestantism and that the issue between Catholic and Protestant ways of life will be decided by our answer to this question: Do religious people prefer to have their religion thought and done *for* them by a priesthood and elaborate sacramental system, or are they capable of sufficient strength of conviction and intelligence to exercise their privileges and fulfill their responsibilities as God's freemen?

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

ONE OF the most perplexing problems for the student of the New Testament is the form in which quotations from the Old Testament appear in the pages of the New. That there are many cases where, without formal or exact quotation, reminiscences in diction and outlook occur is not surprising. The Old Testament was the Bible for early Christians, and its influence was great. Nor is it surprising to find literal and exact quotations.

Between these two extremes lie other cases which are not so easy to explain. Not infrequently the later writer seems consciously quoting, often introducing his quotation by such a phrase as "for it is written" or "as it is written." In such cases we might reasonably expect an exact quotation. For those who hold mechanical views of inspiration—verbal, plenary, and the like—any discrepancies, however small, ought, it would seem, to cause not merely surprise but consternation. And not infrequently the discrepancies are not small. At times the quotation is inscribed incorrectly: "Then was fulfilled that which was spoken through Jeremiah the prophet (Matt. 27:29) can refer to nothing else than Zechariah 11:12 f. Again, surely it was not the "prophet" but the "psalmist" (Psalm 78:2) who is the source of the quotation in Matt. 13:34 f. Such slips as these, and with them may be included accidental alterations of words or phrases, may well cause no especial problems to any save the literalists. Copies of the Old Testament were costly and not in the possession of the ordinary man. Again, ancient scrolls were awkward to handle—to find a verse in Isaiah would require unrolling fifteen feet of manuscript—while the fact that the letters were not spaced as separate words but were written solidly and, of course, without indication of chapters and verses put an additional premium on quotation from memory. And despite what is often said about the marvels of oriental memories, they were not infallible.

There are other cases of a somewhat different nature. Not infrequently there are changes not easily explained as due to oversight or faulty memory, but seeming to indicate that the later writer had a text different from ours. At times this, too, would seem to have a perfectly natural explanation. Long before the Christian beginnings the Old Testament had been translated into Greek for the use of Greek-speaking Jews, primarily those in Alexandria. This version, commonly known as the Septuagint, due to the late and baseless legend that it had been translated by seventy Jewish scholars, was widely used by Christians, especially gentile Christians to whom Hebrew was largely unknown. Actually the Septuagint came to be regarded by Christians as their especial property, much to the pain of orthodox Jews, who found themselves attacked by quotations from what they believed was *their* sacred scripture. To meet that impossible situation subsequent translations into Greek were made, nominally to provide a more accurate version, practically to have one that they might feel was their own. No less than three such were produced in the second century.

No translation, as every student who has essayed to learn another language knows all too well, can ever be strictly accurate, not to mention literal. Alterations, even errors, are bound to occur. Thus it is no surprise to find the Septuagint, while on the whole a faithful rendering, at times different—sometimes widely different—from the Hebrew text known to us. Theological students who have suffered the mishandling which far too many ordination councils provide in lieu of the right hand of fellowship know the results which the translation of one small word can entail—when that word is the Hebrew *almah* (young woman) for which some nameless translator felt *parthenos* (virgin) a happy rendering, with consequences, it is safe to say, far beyond his most perfervid imagination.

Thus it may not infrequently happen that when a New Testament writer makes what seems to the modern reader of the English (or Hebrew) Old Testament a strange misquotation he is quoting faithfully from his Greek text. Many of these are of little consequence—save for the defenders of a verbal inerrancy of the ancient text. Some of them, however, are far from inconsequential but have had far-reaching effects. Some of these latter are well worth considering and may provide material for subsequent discussions in this column.

For the moment, one other form of quotation may be mentioned. This is the sort where the later writer quotes it apart from its context and apparently finds in it something very different from what the earlier writer intended. Only recently I heard Ezek. 18:4 quoted with zeal, if not with insight. The word was: "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." For the speaker, as his stress on the word *die* made very clear, the inescapable penalty of sin was the point of issue. His description of the precise way a soul (as distinguished from a body) took its demise was vivid, but need not detain us. The point is, was this the meaning of Ezekiel? Surely not. The prophet is here agreeing with Jeremiah. It is the man who eats sour grapes—not another, even his father—whose teeth are set on edge. Not *die* but *it* must get the emphasis. And had the speaker looked up the passage in the *American Translation*, not to mention consulting any respectable commentary, he would have lost all the rest of his thunder, for the passage has nothing to do with the death of a soul in contrast to a body, but is the straightforward Hebrew equivalent of Dr. Gordon's equally straightforward English: "the person who sins shall die."

But this preacher was no more guilty than hosts of his fellows in every generation, who, feeling the Bible is peculiarly and magically fitted to be a convenient storehouse of ready-made answers to all of life's problems and the unfailing arsenal providing proofs for every contention which may occur to a spokesman for the Most High, cannot be troubled to find out what the original writer meant to express, but unconcerned with context read out what they first read in. And on occasion no less a one than Paul did precisely the same thing to the subsequent perplexity of his devoted modern disciples. In fact it was to discuss one of his quotations that I started to write this editorial; like Felix, I must wait for a convenient season.

From Off the Campus and On

ONCE AGAIN the CROZER QUARTERLY extends cordial greetings and good wishes to its friends, old and new, for the coming year. During the past year a good number of you joined our fellowship. You are heartily welcome. But even better, our mortality rate is low—extraordinarily low if the wails of other editors and business managers are to be relied upon. New friends are always welcome; those who have been with us through the years have their own place—and an assured one—in our affection. Your letters are always welcome; when you can find grounds for praise or appreciation, naturally it is pleasant to hear them; if you feel you have grounds for criticism or complaint, don't bother your friends about it—they don't care—tell us, for we do, and, who knows, perhaps it might do some good—to us as well as to you. From all indications there will be no dearth of good material in 1947, for the editorial files are comfortably filled and writers are still at work. Books are coming off the presses in lively fashion, and some of their authors seem to have something to say. As yet we have refused to join the stampede for higher prices. That should in itself give pause to any who might rashly say that we are unduly modern. All in all, the future looks bright. To all of you, Happy New Year!

Seward Hiltner needs no introduction to our readers. He is a frequent and valued contributor to our pages. His current study should prove of wide interest, for it attempts a task hitherto not done, and no one is more fitted. A graduate of Lafayette College and Union Theological Seminary, he spent several years in graduate study at Chicago, leaving in 1935 to become executive secretary of the Council for Clinical Training. Three years later he joined the staff of the Federal Council. He is the author of several books and many technical articles. And still he has time—or takes it—to serve as a lecturer at both Yale and Union.

Mr. Ayres will be remembered by our readers as the author of a provocative article, "The Teaching of Talent," which appeared in October, 1945. Those of you who have that copy of the CROZER QUARTERLY at hand will find listed there some of his many scientific achievements. It may be added that he is a musician of distinction and the executive head of a corps of hard-boiled scientists. His essay will reveal that he is no friend of bunk and that he knows how to write in a language understood of the people.

Dr. Stroup, too, has appeared frequently in our pages as a contributor of articles and book reviews. His present essay will repay reading—that is easy—and some realistic thinking—that is a bit harder. A graduate of Muskingum College, Union Theological Seminary, and The New School for Social Research, he is member of the faculty of Brooklyn College in the department of sociology and anthropology.

Dr. Gilmour is a newcomer to these pages. He is a graduate of the University of Manitoba and of Union Theological Seminary and a Ph. D. from Chicago. Since 1931 he has been on the faculty of Queen's Theological College, Kingston, Ontario, in the department of New Testament. His essay is the outgrowth of his translation of Hans Windisch's *Der Sinn der Bergpredigt*, which it is expected will soon appear from the press of the University of Chicago.

Dr. King is an old friend of CROZER QUARTERLY readers. Articles from his pen appeared in July, 1942 ("The Significance of Adventism") and April, 1944 ("The Ultimate Dependence"). After graduation from Asbury College and Andover Newton Theological School he took graduate work at Harvard in history and the philosophy of religion, leading to a Ph. D. in 1940. For twenty-one months he was overseas as an army chaplain of an engineer combat group. Since November, 1945, he has been minister of the First Congregational Church, Waterville, Maine.

Of the twenty-eight who contribute reviews and notices in this issue nine are newcomers to our pages. To new and old alike we express the sincere thanks of both readers and editor. Dr. Adams is minister of the First Baptist Church of Richmond, Va. Dr. Aubrey is president of Crozer. Mr. Ayres has already been introduced. Professor Bond is head of the department of religion at Bucknell. Dr. Braden is professor of the history and literature of religions at Northwestern. Dr. Brightman is professor of philosophy at Boston University. Professor Brush has the chair of church history at Andover Newton. Dr. Cranston is professor of religion at Dartmouth. Dr. Enslin is professor of New Testament at Crozer. Dr. Grey is minister of the First Congregational Church, Woburn, Mass. Dr. Harkness is professor of church history at Crozer. Mr. Hiltner needs no further introduction in this issue. Dr. Holcomb is professor of the philosophy of religion at Colgate-Rochester. Professor Hudson is a member of the department of church history at Chicago. Professor Keighton has the chair of homiletics at Crozer. Dr. Kevin is professor of Old Testament in Virginia Theological Seminary. Dr. Matthews is professor *emeritus* of Old Testament at Crozer. Dr. McDonald has been for several months director of public relations at Crozer. Dr. Moehlman is professor *emeritus* of church history at Colgate-Rochester. Professor Moore is on the faculty at Swarthmore in the department of philosophy and religion. Dr. Neisser is director *emeritus* of the extension department at Crozer. Dr. Parsons is professor *emeritus* of New Testament at Colgate-Rochester. Dr. Pritchard has the chair of Old Testament at Crozer. Dr. Schloerb is minister of the Hyde Park Baptist Church, Chicago. Professor Thomas has the chair of practical theology at Crozer. Mr. Westphal is minister of the Lansdowne (Pa.) Baptist Church. Dr. Wright is professor of philosophy at Dartmouth. Dr. Young is dean of students at Duke University.

BOOK REVIEWS

Religion in America, by Willard L. Sperry, New York, Macmillan, 1946, pp. xi, 318, \$2.50.

The dean of the Harvard Divinity School has addressed this thought-provoking little volume primarily to the reading public of Great Britain, whose interest in American life presumably has increased during the war years. It is an excellent example of popularization on a high level, and one can only hope that it will be successful in reaching a wide audience, both at home and abroad. Though it comes from an American writer, the book has a somewhat English flavor. Dr. Sperry seeks to make it intelligible to English readers by using the characteristic device of understatement and by making many references to English writers such as Father Tyrell and Dean Inge. Perhaps he lays too much stress on the alleged cultural lag between America and Europe; the acceptance of such a deterministic hypothesis does not allow for as much distinctiveness in American life as many European observers see in it.

The picture of American religious life which Dr. Sperry presents is accurate and well-balanced on the whole. It is less a history than a descriptive account of the varieties of religious expression in the United States. The three most distinctive marks of American religion are said to be the separation of church and state, the tendency toward extreme individualism, and the persistent optimism of the American religious outlook. The first is particularly difficult for a European to understand, since it is not an expression of anticlericalism or hostility to religion. All religious bodies are placed on an equality before the law, but are accorded tax exemptions and other favors. The separation of church and state in America springs partly from the circumstance that no single church body was in a dominant position at the close of the Revolution, partly from a growing belief in the principle of religious freedom. It was reinforced by the prevailing distinction between natural and revealed religion and the somewhat deistic view that while the state may properly acknowledge the former, it should leave the latter to private judgment. The principle has long been firmly established and its permanence is guaranteed by the number and variety of our denominations. Dr. Sperry's own point of view is admirably detached and objective. On the one hand he can skillfully explain the meaninglessness of terms like *dissent* and *nonconformity* in this country, while on the other he is quick to point out that the formal separation of church and state leaves unsolved such basic issues as the place of religion in education and the bearing of religious principles upon social and political problems.

The writer tries to do justice both to the larger churches and the smaller sects in America. He points out the variety of our denominations and also the underlying cultural unity which imposes upon all of them a distinctively American pattern. Despite their varied forms of polity, all religious bodies in America have taken on a certain tinge of democratic individualism. From a European point of view, all our churches have many of the characteristics of the sect; yet it is also true that our sects take on the marks of the church as they attain maturity and prosperity. Much the greater part of Dr. Sperry's book is devoted to the various types of Protestantism, and there is a good chapter on American Catholicism; but one misses a comparably adequate account of Judaism in the United States.

In the field of theology Dr. Sperry claims little originality for us, and he echoes the common complaint that we do not care for the contemplative life. His selection of Jonathan Edwards and William James as the best representatives of the earlier and

later periods of American religious thought is persuasive and illuminating. Edwards was our ablest and most influential Calvinist, and Calvinism was the dominant note of our earlier religion; James expressed the optimism and moralism of the more recent American outlook, which is itself a social and cultural heritage from Calvinism. At the end of his book Dr. Sperry points to the conflict between the pessimism of the orthodox doctrine and the optimism of our prevailing social thought as the focal point for our chief theological problem, the nature of man. Many will set a higher value than he does upon the so-called neoorthodox trend in American theology precisely because it is grappling with this problem.

JOHN M. MOORE

The Rape of Palestine, by William B. Ziff, New York, Argus Books, 1946, pp. 118, \$1.

The title is the weather vane that indicates the direction of the gusty winds of the book. It is definitely belligerent, blindly pro-Zionist, and peevishly anti-British. The British officials in Palestine, even the Jew, Sir Herbert Samuel, the high commissioner from 1921 to 1925, have usually been stuffed shirts, the willing cat's-paws of a malignant, designing regime. The members of Royal Commissions have been aged and incompetent imperialists, and the policy of the government is held to have been a long-continued plot of despoilation directed against the Jews, even a determined effort to crush Zionism (foreword and pp. 9-35).

Concessions, it is stated, have ever been granted the ignorant, sluggish Arab, while the hard-working, intelligent Jew has ever been frustrated. Arab outlaws and assassins have been protected or punished lightly, while the accused Jews, without even a trial, have been thrust into the concentration camp. While Jewish publications have been suppressed, an incendiary Arab press has been encouraged; even pro-Arab propaganda in the United States has been organized and implemented by British sources, and in one way or another is financed from official Britain (foreword and p. 102). No real effort is made to prevent the Arab entering Palestine, but the Jew has been excluded from Trans-Jordan, is pestered with visa requirements for his "Homeland," and of late the doors of Palestine have been closed against newcomers. "Illegal entry" (which by the author's interpretation of the Mandate is a British fiction for "If the beneficiaries of that document are not the entire Jewish people, whose immigration to the Holy Land is to be facilitated by every means possible, then the Mandate has no reason for existence" (p. 52)) has given rise to a major game in which Jews are hunted throughout the land, and a virtual reign of terror is in progress (p. 52). "British justice" is characterized as corrupt in every department; and "everything connected with either the police or the courts is for sale," while "not even the concentration camps of Germany can surpass in pure horror prison life in Palestine" (pp. 74 f.). So ghastly is the resultant suffering "that there are few chapters in civilized history that can match for sheer inhumanity and outrage the records of the British government in Palestine" (p. 25). Indeed "the belief is deeply imbedded in the minds of the Hebrew resistance in Palestine that a gigantic and decisive blood-bath is being prepared" (p. 114).

This indictment is supported by proof-text quotations and illustrations excerpted from the hearsay of the street, the accusations of propagandists and partisans, charges of aspiring politicians, sources of "reliable information," and official documents of societies and states. The reviewer is reminded of tales he has heard in Palestine in which the storyteller because of personal interest magnified the incidents out of all recognition. The author has suffered greatly. His people have been overwhelmed in a catastrophe at least as appalling as that in A.D. 66-73, and again in A.D. 132-135. He knows the doors of hope are closing on some two million more of his faith.

Palestine or death for the Jewish people, especially the two million wanderers in Europe, is his slogan. He is unaware that in our modern, complex world there are some things that Britain cannot do, and that some things of which he accuses Britain she has never done. Within recent weeks a well-known scholar who has lived in Palestine and Syria for more than fifty years, speaking of these reports, said, "I have personally investigated many of them, and beyond such incidents as may occur any place under such conditions they are all rubbish."

The basic claim of the author, from which he launches all his attacks, is that Palestine and Trans-Jordan, both belong to the Jews by inalienable right, and hence must be recognized as a Jewish state. The Balfour Declaration as first published is not acceptable to him. The clause, "it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country," he asserts, was inserted to meet the objections of Sir Philip Magnus, Mr. Claude Montefiore, and other powerful non-Zionist Jews (p. 7). Nor do any of the official interpretations of the Mandate, or any of the reports of the Royal Commissions line up with his judgments. The Churchill-Samuel interpretation of Jewish National Home of June 3, 1922, is anathema (p. 22). The findings of the Hope-Simpson Commission in 1930, that limited the Jewish purchase of Palestinian land, and responded to the demand of the native Arab for protection against the persistent Jewish pressure, organized and financed from outside, is considered more "cruel and unfair" than any scheme in Czarist Russia (pp. 30 f.). The separation of Trans-Jordan from Palestine in 1922, under pressure of what was held to be the inalienable rights of the native tribes, and its formation into an independent state (emirate), which was soon followed by the prohibition of all Jewish immigration, was nothing less than a steal from the Jewish pocketbook, stuffed into the pockets of Great Britain (pp. 79-83). Not only is the author furious that Britain should consider that the wandering Arab should have any rights, but he looks askance even at Chaim Weizmann, the long-time honored president of the Zionist organization. He comes as near as he dares to calling Weizmann the villain in the picture, who adroitly has sold the Jews down the river (pp. 7, 14, 17, 28, 35, 102-108). This is going too far. Weizmann is a lover of the Jews and is honored everywhere for consistency and sincerity. A phrase he used in his address to the Royal Commission on November 25, 1936, referring to the independent status of Trans-Jordan, "no Jew in his sense would now demand any alteration in it," is indisputable evidence of his realism. Still later the suggestion of the threefold division of Palestine in 1937, and again in 1946, as a climax to the trend of recent history, caused the author of this brochure to conclude that Jehovah had abdicated to Downing Street (pp. 96-109).

No doubt the Jews in not a few places have made the desert to blossom as the rose. They have built villages, established a city of 160,000 at Tel Aviv, poured millions of dollars, chiefly from America and Britain, into the land, added 500,000 to the population; some 42,000 are settled in agriculture, while they are represented by seventy-two per cent of the Jerusalem population. They have built up the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, with its staff of experts in agronomy, animal husbandry, medicine, and the sciences, a boon not only to Palestine, but to the whole Near East. They have been industrious and intelligent, and have struggled and suffered. High hopes have been frustrated, and not 100,000 but 2,000,000 homeless Jews in Europe look toward Palestine and Palestine alone as their home (p. 113). The conclusion, "The Jews will not lay down their arms . . . they will die to the last man, woman and child, first" (p. 114), sounds like the *sicarii* and Masada.

No doubt, at times during the last thirty years the British have made mistakes. Individuals have sometimes abused their office; some politicians may have followed shortsighted or selfish national policies; even high commissioners at times may have been unwise. But even the most purblind Jew is aware he has nowhere else to go. Russia? Poland? Germany? The United States? Our Jewish residents are generous with their money, and our politicians are free to tell others what they should do. But to take the Mandate, or to share it with England, or to open up our vast unsettled areas as a haven to those who might come—that is another question.

These are perilous times. This book is calculated to stir up the hatred of the unthinking mob, to implant in the minds of many a fixed idea that is unworkable in this world of affairs, and thus to aid in bringing about a still greater tragedy to world Jewry. Far wiser, though less clamorous, has been the quiet council of many Jews in Britain and America. But recently A. H. Sulzberger, publisher of the *New York Times*, has sounded a warning. Speaking in Chattanooga, on October 26th, he asserted that the clamor for statehood introduced insoluble elements—social, economic, and political—into the problem, and endangered the lives of the suffering Jewish population in Europe.

I. G. MATTHEWS

The Rebirth of the German Church, by Stewart W. Herman, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. xix, 297, \$2.50.

During the current year, three valuable studies of religion in Germany have appeared.

The well-documented research of Max Weinreich entitled *Hitler's Professors* was reviewed in a recent number (October, 1946) of this *QUARTERLY*.

Franklin L. Ford based his "The Twentieth of July in the History of the German Resistance" (*American Historical Review*, July, 1946) upon very original documents and enumerated ten groups of Germans who supported Goerdeler and Beck in that abortive conspiracy against Hitler; namely, army men, retired civil servants, dissidents within the foreign office, military and civil officials of the intelligence division, industrialists, representatives of great landed houses, socialists, renegade Nazis, *scattered clergymen both Protestant and Catholic*, and intellectuals. Ford's conclusions regarding ecclesiastical opposition to Nazism were: "The churches as such were certainly not committed to resistance. The Protestant leaders were for the most part passive, while the Catholic hierarchy distributed itself over the entire span separating Vienna's Cardinal Innitzer from the courageous bishop of Berlin, now Cardinal von Preysing." Among the few opponents mentioned by name were Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Hans Asmussen (Protestants), and Delp, Roesch, and Koenig (Catholics). Ford then raises the question: "What then were the factors which distinguished those priests and ministers, many of them sincere pacifists in every respect, whose repudiation of Nazism led them to sanction even assassination as a political expedient?"

The answer may be found in the third book, *The Rebirth of the German Church*. Herman defines his objectives thus: "strictly speaking this is not a book about Germany at all, but about that part of Germany which professes to be Christian" and "it attempts to relate what happened in the last two or three years and especially since the Nazi collapse." In the preface, the author asks, "How large is that part of Germany which professes to be Christian?" and answers, "7,000 men."

Discussing the occupation, he remarks: "Military occupation promises to leave as many scars upon the body of the German Church as did the Nazi regime. The Potsdam Policy, in its way, seems to be no less detrimental to the Christian cause than Hitler's Nuremberg decrees" (p. 93).

A map adorns the covers showing the distribution of Protestants in five zones: Russian, 38.1%; Polish, 11%; British, 24.3%; United States, 16.9%; French, 9.6%. But this map was out of date before publication, because Poland had already deported over one million Germans from its administrative district.

The subjects discussed in this volume are legion, making it necessary to select only a few for particular comment.

Did members of the Christian churches actually participate in the uprising of July 20, 1944? Did they really approve of the assassination of *Der Fuehrer*? Dr. Goerdeler, a prominent churchman, "led the last great attempt to overthrow the Nazi regime in wartime" (p. 97). Dietrich Bonhoeffer, "when asked in 1941 what he was praying for, responded, 'If you really want to know, I am praying for the defeat of my country because I believe this is the only way in which my country can pay for all the suffering it has caused in the world'" (p. 85). He and Assessor Perels were executed for participation in the plot. "It is no longer a secret that the church was deeply implicated. . . . Among the thousands of persons arrested in connection with the events of July 20, 1944, were hundreds of pastors and Christian laymen . . ." (p. 98).

Who were the opponents of Hitler? The Jehovah's Witnesses, the Confessional Church, "in actual fact, the Christian Student Movement, the YMCA and many smaller religious groups were duly suppressed . . ." (p. 55). Some of the Catholic hierarchy and numerous laymen also fought against Hitler.

Who supported Hitler? As late as April, 1939, 95% of the population still belonged to the two principal churches; of these 10% were really Christian (pp. 2, 45). The South had virtually ceased opposing Hitler in 1934 (p. 49). The most vicious brand of Nazism was found in the church in Thuringia, where before 1933 over one half were for the Fuehrer. Indeed, the church of Thuringia was both the citadel and arsenal of Nazism (p. 7). "No type of Christianity in Germany remained free of Nazism or guaranteed immunity from it" (p. 50). No one would accuse Herman Sasse, of Erlangen, of overstating the guilt of the German churches. Here is his conclusion: "No, it was not Lutheranism as such, but a sick Lutheranism, that gave National Socialism an open door into the church. . . . No one who with open eyes experienced the revolution of 1933 and its subsequent development will ever forget the spiritual force with which Christians were carried away, Christians of all classes: Catholic bishops and Baptist preachers, Lutherans of all complexions—including those of the Missouri synod, Reformed Church members, members of the Union Church, and especially those who were inclined to pietism and Methodism, both inside and beyond the provincial churches" (p. 51). "We have noble families in which the grandfathers were conservative and confessional Lutherans, the fathers were German Nationalists and members of the Union Church, but the sons joined the SS" (p. 51). The Baptists and the Methodists attributed the war to Satan's activity and lustily cheered Hitler on! Hitler had apparently been chosen by God to inaugurate the messianic kingdom.

Why did German Christianity fall for the Fuehrer? One apologist for the German churches has proposed these reasons: the appeal of bread to the dispossessed; idealism (patriots and radical socialists); the promise of religious liberty in Point 24 of Nazism's platform—Protestants in Catholic strongholds were assured of complete religious freedom, deserving persons were especially invited to join, the fearful immediately did, and in 1937 voluntary-compulsory admission occurred (p. 117). The pious believed that Hitler read his New Testament, particularly before reaching important decisions; and the grand deceiver sometimes closed his public addresses with a word of prayer.

Has Germany repented? Have the German churches repented? They have been accused of shielding the Nazis. They have not coöperated too well with the occupational forces. The old spirit survives that "people of Germanic race need never feel obliged to repent" (p. 128). "Guilt is never unilateral." There have been unfavorable internal reactions to German confessions of sin published in the United States. The German churches are expecting the churches beyond Germany to put on sackcloth and ashes. The first Baptist postwar message was startling in the "total omission of a word of repentance" (p. 138).

What is Germany's religious prospect? The churches seem to be concerned about the inherited creeds and ceremonies and especially the return of the bells. One officer replied, "To ask for the return of your bells, freely given, while so many stolen bells yet remain to be restored, appears to be an act of effrontery of which only a German could be capable" (p. 109). There are instances of local coöperation between Catholics and Protestants, and occasionally a social emphasis appears. EKID (*Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland*) has come to birth. On questions of self-support and self-control, of repudiation of the state-church principle, of public education, and so on there is all the confusion and reaction which characterized the early days of the Weimar republic. One wonders whether the churches will again defeat the democratic trend. Bishop Dibelius rejects democracy as "too colorless and watery." Can Niemöller defeat him? Cardinal von Preysing has admitted that "nonreligious parents are entitled to nonreligious schools" (p. 176). In the Russian zone, the situation is much less muddled. A distinct separation of church and state is practiced in the interests of the church; religious or antireligious instruction is not an affair of the state but of the church; religious instruction is not to be given in the schools but in the churches and church parlors and must be beyond school hours (pp. 175 ff.).

With one statement of the author, many will agree: "As a political force, National Socialism is finished. THANKS TO ITS LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLE IT STOOD TO FALL WITH ITS MOST REPRESENTATIVE MEN." Amen and amen.

CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN

Man and Society in the New Testament, by Ernest F. Scott, New York, Scribner, 1946, pp. viii, 299, \$2.75.

Professor Scott is keenly aware, as are most of his contemporaries, that the present order of society is not ideal. In fact there are such fundamental faults in it that one of the urgent present tasks is that of "rebuilding society on a new basis." He feels that such a constructive effort must rest on "the moral principles which are set forth most clearly and authoritatively in the New Testament." Moreover he is convinced, and rightly so, that the social teaching of the New Testament is frequently "grievously misunderstood." He desires to give a proper exposition of that teaching. Through ten chapters and a conclusion he proceeds to such an attempt. The titles of the chapters will not only give some understanding of the direction of his thought but will show how widely he ranges. They are: "The Twofold Gospel," "The Individual in Ancient Religion," "The Principles of Jesus' Teaching," "Jesus and the Individual," "The Christian Community," "Personality in the New Testament," "Social Obligations in the New Testament," "The Community and the Inward Life," "Liberty," "Progress."

The author's opening sentences set forth part of his problem:

Christianity is at once a personal and social religion. It declares that every man is an individual soul, known to God and precious to him for his own sake. At the same time it affirms that all men are bound together, and that each one must forget himself in the great human brotherhood of which he forms a part, and in union with which he will find his own salvation.

The New Testament appears to waver between these two aspects of the Christian message, and the church has ever since been trying, in various ways, to reconcile them.

Throughout his discussion Mr. Scott assumes and argues the position that the religion of Jesus and of the New Testament is primarily a matter of the individual person. If he were to give a definition of religion, it would be that it is a personal fellowship with God. This is the fundamental element, and when this is lacking, no abiding structure of character and life can be built. Such a religious individual recognizes his fellows as persons, as "members one of another," and his attitude toward them and his action with them are determined by his "inward sense of the will of God." This, and not social judgment, is the touchstone of his conduct both individual and social. Accordingly, the important matter has been, and is in this present world situation, to lead men to be religious in the sense the author assumes. This will lead to a high and proper estimate of human personality, both one's own and that of each one's fellows. From such reverent understanding the solution of "community" problems must find its only lasting and sufficient basis. But let the author speak for himself:

This is the message which is set forth in the New Testament. It is presented from many points of view, but the emphasis is always on the value of every man as a personality. Salvation is by faith, and faith is the individual response to the call of God through Christ. Unless it is personal it can effect nothing, for the man himself must be saved, and his faith is meaningless if it is not his very own. Much is made in the New Testament of the church, and it might appear at times as if nothing were required of the believer but to incorporate himself with this body of Christ. But it is never forgotten that the church is the communion of the separate men and women. It does not exist for its own sake but for the perfecting of its people through fellowship with one another. . . . A man does not lose himself in the church, but rather discovers who he is, and what is the special function which only he can perform. The church, as we see it in the New Testament, was the great school of personality (p. 285).

From this point of view we must understand the social teaching of the New Testament. It is concerned throughout with the relations of men to one another . . . (p. 286).

So the matter is argued in chapter after chapter.

There is so much that is good in this book that it would be pleasant to write nothing but words of commendation. However, a large part of the best thought of the book is found in certain moralizings on personal and social religion that are not too closely connected with the New Testament. With the underlying position that a good society depends on good persons one would have little quarrel. But the goodness of most of us is such a relative matter that the ordering of our social life cannot wait for the idealism of the author's position to find realization. Theoretically much of what he says he finds in the New Testament about man and his social relations may be valid, whether it correctly represents the New Testament or not, but practically we have to deal with persons and situations which are far from ideal. And a large number of relatively good people are doing that with fair measures of effectiveness; and such people were doing it in New Testament times.

The volume is not as easy to read or to review as some are, and the limitations of a review are such that only a few matters can be singled out for attention. The argument is repetitious, the same positions being labored again and again. Condensation of the presentation would have made for clearness and readability. Mr. Scott is at his best in the comparatively few sections where his New Testament scholarship has the same free range that it had when he wrote some of his earlier works. This reviewer dislikes to write it, but the fact is that frequently throughout wide areas of the discussion the author is a churchman and a pleader of a cause at the expense of his scholarship. He states: "Nothing can be more deceptive than exact scholarship, and when we take it as the key to the teaching of Jesus we are apt to miss the very things that matter" (pp. 53 f.). He is wrong; inexact scholarship can be much more

deceptive. With all respect for Dr. Scott's standing and the services he has rendered New Testament scholarship, unfortunately it can be said that many pages of this volume are not free from inexactness. Looseness of terminology, as, for example, in the use of the phrase "kingdom of God" and of such words as "religion," "ethics," "church," "universality," and others, will make this book rather puzzling reading for some. The attempt (pp. 207 ff.) to present the Fourth Gospel as teaching a deep-seated ethic with universal implications comes strangely from the scholarly author of earlier significant works on that gospel. At times he decries the analytical methods of some interpreters of the New Testament, but in this volume we are treated to a heavy overdose of synthesis not always historically based. There is a harmonistic attitude which on occasion ignores statements in the New Testament which weigh against the positions taken and the situations from which the statements used grow. The "both and" argument is constantly followed, often with baffling results for the historical reader. Frequently the interpretive pyramid is stood on its apex, and conclusions of wide import are deduced from single statements whose original meaning was not that suggested and which could be modified or even contradicted by other statements in the New Testament. Throughout the volume there is an idealized interpretation of early Christian religion which too often hides the facts of its difficulties, its problems, its adaptations, and its constant struggle for adequate expression.

It may be objected that these criticisms are generalizations. The reply is that they are against so great a portion of the work that too lengthy a review would be required for specific reference. The careful reader can easily find them if he wishes.

With the general position that an adequate Christian social ethic waits upon the lives and efforts of good people there can be no disagreement. This thesis, frequently presented in the pages of this book with skill and power, does not need a labored and questionable interpretation of the canonical documents of early Christianity as a support. It must be said regretfully that the author is not at his scholarly best in this volume.

ERNEST W. PARSONS

The Re-Discovery of the Old Testament, by H. H. Rowley, Philadelphia, Westminster Press, ©1946, pp. 314, \$3.

Not until I had finished reading this book did I realize that, despite its title, it belongs actually to quite another field and should be reviewed, perhaps, by a specialist in the New Testament. To be sure, the largest share of the material discussed in this volume is literature from the Old Testament: the author deals—and usually quite satisfactorily—with such topics as archæology of the Old Testament, the growth of monotheism, prophecy, Judaism. Yet, it seems to me that the book is not primarily about the Old Testament, but about the New.

The thesis of Professor Rowley is frankly stated early in the book and again at its close. He maintains that Jeremiah, for example, probably did not realize the significance of his message with regard to the new covenant; thus, an inquiry merely into the life and thought of Jeremiah falls short of the mark which Professor Rowley has set for a full understanding of the words of Jeremiah. He has put succinctly his approach to the Old Testament: "Hence, beyond the understanding of Old Testament teaching as its first hearers or readers understood it, we need to understand the meaning it has come to have in its developing life, the unfolding meaning it has yielded down the years, and oft-times the fuller meaning it may have for us in the light of Christ." In his discussion of the songs of the Suffering Servant in Isaiah the author would not go so far as to say that there is a reference to Jesus of Nazareth

written consciously or specifically of him, but he would claim that "It is therefore wholly legitimate to find in Him the fulfilment of the prophecy. . . . And whatever view is taken of the primary reference of the Songs, it is quite inadequate to think of them only in terms of that reference." The author has quite frankly admitted that his work is an attempt at a "Christian understanding of the Old Testament"; for him the full significance of the Old is to be seen only in the light of the developments of the New.

It is certainly not improper to essay the value of ideas in the light of what they later become; but one should emphasize the fact that this judgment belongs to the period in which the old ideas were clothed with new relevance. If Jesus was the fulfillment of hopes of earlier prophets, this is a matter to be reckoned with in a study of the later period when the fulfillment took place. Thus, it would seem to me that the job of appraising the value of ideas in the light of the associations which they later bore belongs to those who are students of the records which remain of the later periods. While Professor Rowley may assert that "the full significance of the Old is only seen in the light of the New," it is conceivable that another may be as emphatic in his claim that the full significance of the Old Testament is to be seen in the *Book of Mormon*. The inquiry into the Christian understanding of the Old Testament should be carefully labeled a discipline which belongs to the area of the history of Christianity and not to the historical study of the Old Testament itself. Certainly there is such a thing as an objective appraisal of the ideas of the Old Testament which is as valid for one group as for another; it is an appraisal in terms of ideas which the writers consciously set forth. When one considers the accretion of later periods, this interpretation is a subject for the student of the later period, not the earlier.

Rowley's treatment of the material of the Old Testament is not unscientific, yet the starting point is the theological assumption that the story is "less the record of man's groping after God than the record of God's progressive revelation of Himself to man." On the whole the author's concern is theological rather than historical; the materials which he chooses to discuss are materials chosen to support his beliefs. It is revealing to note in the index of texts that the largest number are taken from Psalms, Isaiah, and Jeremiah. The book of Ecclesiastes is not mentioned; Proverbs is mentioned but once; but five references in Job are discussed, one of which is Job 19: 25 ff., a passage quoted in his discussion of the idea of resurrection. If one grants the validity of the initial assumption of the author, he must say that he has done his job well. Professor Rowley knows the literature of criticism and has presented it in readable form. The chapter on "The Growth of Monotheism" is of particular interest because of the many contributions which the author has made from time to time in periodicals toward an understanding of some of the problems connected with the exodus and the early history of the Hebrews.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

The New Testament: Its Making and Meaning, by Albert E. Barnett, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1946, pp. 304, \$2.50.

Some eight years ago the late Principal H. Wheeler Robinson in England offered a volume to the public on *The Old Testament, Its Making and Meaning*. The book was not an introduction. It was the publication of a series of lectures on a few broad currents of Hebrew thought and religion as illustrated in the Scriptures. Dr. Barnett's work seems to have been meant by the publishers to be a companion volume to the earlier book. But apart from the similarity of names the comparison ends. For the author of *The New Testament: Its Making and Meaning* has written

a short introduction to the twenty-seven books of the Christian Testament and shaped it to serve as a convenient handbook for students.

In many respects he has done a useful and worth-while piece of work. Every ten years or so there is need for someone to gather up the loose strands of continuing criticism and weave them into a connected whole which, if not too abridged, can be of aid to a large circle of readers. This may be what Dr. Barnett has done for the current generation of students, as Scott's *Literature of the New Testament* was helpful for the decade of the thirties. The picture he draws of the writing, purpose, and place of origin of the several New Testament books is one that is broadly accepted by students today. And he tells the story so simply that no great demands are made upon an acquaintance with earlier research in the field. There is nothing radically new or startling with which a New Testament student who has kept up his reading would be unfamiliar. Such merit as the book has lies in the summary arrangement of material and in the orderly account of its development.

The author is professor of New Testament interpretation in Garrett Biblical Institute. Earlier he served on the theological faculty of the University of Chicago where he had been a student of Dr. Edgar J. Goodspeed. The latter's theory of the publication of a Pauline corpus near the end of the first century, and the prefacing to it of Ephesians as an introduction, is taken over by Dr. Barnett in this book and dealt with as though the theory, plausible though it may be, is an assured fact. It is the key which unlocks the door of understanding to all the later New Testament literature, according to the writer. But to the reader the operation seems overly mechanical. It is as though a locomotive on an upgrade began pushing a line of freight cars and each one bumped its neighbor into activity as the line moved.

Thus the writing of Mark in Rome (A.D. 65-67 according to Barnett) serves in part to prompt the writing of Matthew in Antioch (75-80) and again of Luke-Acts in Ephesus (90-95). Luke-Acts stimulates the publication of the Pauline corpus and Ephesians (95). Hebrews (95), Revelation (95), and I Peter (95-100) are then precipitated. The Johannine epistles as a corpus (110-115) later are similarly affected and the Pastoral Epistles (160-175) finally bring up the train.

All this may be true. But it may also be that Dr. Barnett has oversimplified the problem and pushed Goodspeed's theory farther than the evidence warrants. Some New Testament problems may still remain to be solved by students in generations after ours.

With regard to the Synoptic problem, the author accepts a modified statement of "form criticism" and fits this into the framework of Dr. Frederick C. Grant's multiple source theory of gospel origins. He dismisses the possibility of Aramaic sources; believes the fourfold publication of the gospels took place to secure acceptance of the Gospel according to St. John, a work which had aroused opposition, he says, because of its radical handling of the Synoptic tradition. The onetime runaway slave, Onesimus, who belonged to Archippus rather than to Philemon, was author of Ephesians and editor of the Pauline corpus. The Epistle of James was a "published sermon"; and the author of the Johannine epistles had nothing to do with the writing of the Fourth Gospel.

ROBERT O. KEVIN

Pathways through the Bible, by Mortimer J. Cohen, Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society, 1946, pp. xxv, 549 (illustrated), \$3.

The Hebrew Bible comprises a literature so voluminous, so complex, and so enmeshed in archaic customs, ancient history, and prescientific theory that to most readers large sections, as they now stand, are incomprehensible, incredible, and out-

moded. The aim of this volume is to present the essential features of the Scriptures so as to bring into relief the highways of Israel's religious experiences and thereby arouse a vital interest in the Holy Scriptures among the children of Abraham. It might, rightly, be called a "shorter Bible." The translation of the Jewish Publication Society is basic to the whole book, and the order of the books therein is followed throughout. But words and phrases of this translation, for the sake of clarity, are freely modernized, while, to avoid wearying the reader, paragraphs, chapters, and whole books are epitomized. Much of the law and the wisdom literature, most of the Psalms, practically all of I and II Chronicles and Micah, and all of Habakkuk, Obadiah, and Joel have been omitted. Divergent accounts of the same incident are so handled that contradictions of the original text are smoothed out. Statistics and traditions that provoke skepticism are eliminated. Genealogies that have only a limited interest, and large sections of the Torah that have been nullified by some two thousand years of history have not been included. Tales and regulations that shock the sensibilities of modern western idealists have been discarded. Excellent interpretative notes have been provided for each section, and thus a smoothly running story of Hebrew life and thought has been presented.

On the whole, this shorter Bible is a modernized, westernized, expurgated interpretation of the material found in the Hebrew canon. It is an effort, not to outline that actual struggle and growth within Israel that made her what she was, but by by-passing the difficulties to stimulate the religious zeal of Judaism. A threefold interest is emphasized: a minimum of ritual; an insistence on ethical values; and, above all, Israel's election as the covenant people of the Lord. The omissions, the selections, the reorganization, and the interpretation, all are ordered and massed so that the shining destiny of the Chosen People may appear the all-glorious purpose of the Almighty.

The dedication of the illustrations by Arthur Szyk is a grim commentary on the sorrows of Israel and the vitalities of religion. It reads, in part, "In March 1943 my beloved seventy-year-old mother, was taken from the ghetto of Lodz to the Nazi furnaces of Maidanek. With her, voluntarily went her faithful servant, the good Christian, Josepa, a Polish peasant. Together, hand in hand, they were burned alive. In memory of the two noble martyrs I dedicate my pictures of the Bible as an eternal Kaddish for these great souls."

I. G. MATTHEWS

Ancient Christian Writers: The Epistles of St. Clement of Rome and St. Ignatius of Antioch, translated by James A. Kleist, Westminster (Md.), Newman Bookshop, 1946, pp. ix, 162, \$2.50.

This is the first volume of a series of patristic translations prepared by Roman Catholic scholars under the editorship of Professors Johannes Quasten and J. C. Plümpe, both of the Catholic University, Washington. Other titles announced include, beside a second volume containing the remaining so-called Apostolic Fathers, the "earliest works" of St. Cyprian, the *Commonitory* of St. Vincent of Lerins, the *Ascetical Life* by Maximus the Confessor, Augustine's *Unity of the Church*, and some of the *Homilies* of Gregory the Great. There is a distinct place for these works; several of the titles have never been translated into English. One of the great weaknesses in modern theological education is the shocking ignorance of the patristic literature. Every attempt to remedy this lack is thrice-welcome.

The present volume is distinctly usable and intended for the general reader. Very brief introductions give the principal facts about Clement and Ignatius: then follow

translations of the long *To the Corinthians* of Clement and the seven short epistles commonly ascribed to Ignatius. Father Kleist is a very skillful translator, as those who have used his two volumes devoted to Mark well know. The present translation is racy and definitely readable, but is also an effort actually to translate on the basis of the two essential tools: lexicon and grammar. In addition the volume contains forty-four pages of notes, many of which are distinctly useful.

As I have read through the translation with the Greek text before me, I have found no startling changes. For these two fathers we already have several excellent translations, especially the one by Lake in the *Loeb Classical Library*. Probably non-Catholic readers who are not familiar with the nomenclature of the Vulgate will be a bit surprised at *Pharao*, *Noc*, *Jonas*, *Jesus the son of Nave*, and perhaps even *Elias* and *Eliseus*. Occasionally a rendering may seem to evidence a definite theological point of view, as, for example, "Abraham believed God, and it was credited to him as justice," or "... of David and his attested merit." "Conversion" may seem to some a poor substitute for "repentance" as a rendering of *metanoia*. By and large, however, the translation appears to me accurate and admirably fitted to give the English reader some appreciation of the authors' style as well as ideas. And Father Kleist, a veteran classicist, labors under no delusions about the impossibility of an exact translation. It would be pleasant, could one hope that his restrained word, "It follows . . . that recourse to the Greek original is a goal worthy of any reader's earnest endeavors," might actually bring blushes to occasional clerical cheeks, for though Father Kleist is referring to the Greek of Ignatius, I am sure he would agree to make it far more sweeping in its scope.

Probably many readers will not be convinced that Clement was ordained by Peter and was fourth or third bishop of Rome; may even be a bit skeptical of the assertion that he was "astonishingly familiar with the New Testament." Some of presumably different background may be less favorably impressed than Father Kleist with Ignatius' otherworldliness, which he carried to the "utmost consequence." Again, when in his comment on the phrase, "Catholic Church," which occurs for the first time in a letter of Ignatius, Father Kleist remarks: "To him the term . . . conveyed the same meaning as at the present day," some will be inclined to register an exception. For the most part, however, both translation and comments are historical rather than theological. This distinction should not involve the glaring antitheses which it too frequently does. Like all good commentators he frequently passes by in silence obscure points where a ray of light would be welcome; at other times in places of doubtful text and variant readings his translation is usually unaccompanied by any warning note. Presumably because he accepts Ephesians as a Pauline letter to Ephesus he translates *ad Ephes.* 12:2 "who in an entire epistle remembers you in Christ Jesus." I am sure Father Kleist's Greek soul was worried a bit by Ignatius' Greek at this spot. Unfortunately, however, he was apparently less worried at that than at the thought that the good saint could have made so inaccurate a reference to "every epistle."

The work is carefully done and is remarkably free from mechanical slips. Almost certainly the indefinite article in "a Peter, who through unmerited jealousy . . ." (I Clem. 5:4) is not from the translator's pen but is one of those annoying bits of excess baggage accumulated from a visit to even the best composing room.

The present volume will be welcomed heartily by readers, Catholic and Protestant alike; forthcoming volumes in this useful undertaking will be awaited with anticipation.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

Right Thinking, by Edwin Arthur Burt, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. xi, 764, \$4.

A college student came into my office the other day, and began by telling me that he was a member of a Protestant church, and had long been accustomed to attend church services with reasonable regularity. He added that since taking a course the previous term in elementary logic he found it difficult to listen to sermons with patience, because they consist chiefly of emotional appeals and bald assertions that violate most of the rules of logic. I pointed out to him that a minister, addressing an ordinary church audience consisting of persons of all ages and levels of culture, in a sermon limited to half an hour, could hardly be expected to present the kind of closely reasoned discourse to which a student is accustomed in his college classes. I suggested that if he were to try to think out what he would say if he had to preach a sermon he would realize that the preachers, to whose sermons he had listened with impatience, reasoned as well as could be expected under the circumstances. The student was not convinced, however, and he left me still apparently of the opinion that the ordinary preacher is a sophist.

If any ministers or students in theological seminaries suspect that their preaching would be more convincing if it were more logical, they will find it profitable to study carefully such a book as Professor Burt's *Right Thinking*. This book is not recommended for light summer reading. It contains no eloquent oratory. It is neither mystical nor inspirational in tone. It does not attempt to be edifying. It does, however, present the principles of right thinking in a clearer and more simple and practical manner than any other college text in logic of an equally advanced character with which I am acquainted. Part I—which all should read—explains in a popular manner the processes of right thinking, why wrong thinking often occurs, and how the latter may be avoided. Part II sets forth the principles of formal logic, supplementing the traditional Aristotelian procedure with the recent symbolic methods. Part III, under the caption of “reasoning as describing and explaining facts,” explains the methods of empirical scientific investigation, the determination of causes and functions, the nature of probability, the employment of statistics and methods of correlation, and calls attention to the fallacies that must be avoided. It also contains an interesting outline of the progress in scientific methods during modern times. Some of the contents of Parts II and III are rather technical, and may be omitted by the general reader without serious loss.

The best portion of the book, in my opinion, is Part IV, in which the author deals with methods of selecting right ends and means, and for reasoning about them consistently and effectively. Right thinking leads to correct decisions in problems of valuation about matters of personal conduct as well as in the definition of abstract standards in ethics and aesthetics. Furthermore, right thinking makes it possible to investigate in a rational manner the issues between free enterprise and socialism, democracy and totalitarianism, and the other serious conflicts of our own time. It is encouraging to be assured that all the fundamental questions of valuation on which the world today is sadly divided can be settled by reasoning, provided only that all men will be sufficiently patient, persistent, and open-minded, and willing to engage diligently in enlightened methods of thinking.

WILLIAM KELLEY WRIGHT

The Domain of Reality, by William Gerber, King's Crown, 1946, pp. x, 81, \$1.50.

Given a situation in which one of the five hundred most frequently used words in our language can be legitimately used in a number of different senses, each with a logical opposite difficult to detect, the result will be considerable confusion and misunder-

standing. Given, further, that the term in question is one used to designate areas of thought, action, and belief important to all of us, the confusion and misunderstanding will be most unfortunate. This is the situation with respect to the word *reality*—beloved of philosopher, scientist, politician, and minister—for reality does not, like Cain, bear “on its forehead an unmistakable mark of its own identity.” Dr. Gerber’s thoughtful attempt to arrive at an unambiguous meaning of “reality” which will distinguish merely terminological problems from those of fact, and help toward solving the latter, is one which deserves a careful reading.

Setting rather narrow limits to his inquiry, he dismisses metaphysical and theological questions about the “nature of Ultimate Reality,” and concerns himself with finding a definition of the “real” which will, connotatively, do justice to all of its several senses and their opposites—*e.g.*, the realms of appearance, the illusory, the imaginary, dreams, and the ideal. Any such definition, he holds, must conform to three postulates: 1. practical applicability to cases in question; 2. agreement with current usage; and 3. neutrality in respect to controversial questions. His own definition is as follows: “a thing is real in a particular context insofar as it functions in that context.” Thus, the ideal of democracy is real in the context of the life of citizen A, for it operates strongly in that context, but is unreal in the context of the life of citizen B, for it operates weakly there. Pegasus is real in the context of Greek mythology, being active there, but is not (and never was) real in the context of physical space-time, having no functions there. The figure in a nightmare is undeniably real in that context, but is comparatively unreal in the dreamer’s activities the following day, for it functions there, if at all, to an insignificant extent. The reader will have noticed that both the definition and the illustrations imply that there can be “degrees of reality.” Dr. Gerber avoids the pitfalls which have surrounded this tricky concept by ignoring them; he simply observes that a thing is “more real” in one context than in another “if it functions more actively, or if its function is more important, in the one than in the other.” (As an example of the neutrality of this procedure, note how the definition determines nothing for or against the traditional Christian concept of an *ens realissimum*, a “most real being.”)

With the definition of reality as a basis, meanings for *existence* and *subsistence* are easily reached. A thing “exists” if it functions in a public context. While both existents and realities are what they are by virtue of functioning in their contexts, the kind of context within which an existent functions is restricted. Again, existence is categorical (a thing either is or is not an existent), whereas reality is more inclusive and is a matter of degree. A thing “subsists” if it exists in logical contexts.

The differential features just noted suggest a classification of the known contexts of reality into three groups. 1. A thing is *physically* real insofar as its reality can be recorded by spatial instruments of observation. 2. A thing is *empirically* real insofar as it makes a difference to a living aspect of an animal. The love of St. Francis, Thoreau’s thoughts on civil disobedience, the visions of Joan of Arc, the air breathed by a dog, decisions and volitions, judgments and doubts—all these are empirically real. There is no restriction to conscious experience. 3. A thing is *logically* real insofar as it can enter the context of discourse. This classification of the three general contexts of reality is not held to be exhaustive in any normative sense. Moreover, the contexts are not supposed to be mutually exclusive; a thing may be real in more than one context. These concessions may seem to open the door to every kind of improper hypostatization—*e.g.*, turning a logical entity into an active physical existent—but Dr. Gerber wisely insists upon the following general rule: we must not reason from reality in the second group to reality in the first or from reality in the third to reality in the first or the second.

Dr. Gerber's manner of exposition, while occasionally breezy, escapes the woodenness which afflicts most treatises; but it is to be doubted whether any exposition could stand the strain of the deluge of quotations and footnotes which he pours out upon the reader (205 in sixty-eight small pages). Only strict adherence to the narrow limits of the inquiry saves the principal points from becoming obscured. Dr. Gerber's refusal to discuss many of the important problems suggested by, and usually associated with, his study will exasperate many readers who have had training in philosophy, but his chosen subject is itself important, and strict attention to a specific problem is a technique which has proved its value. It is sufficient compliment to say that anyone who gives this book a serious reading will be armed against the usual confusions attendant upon unreflective dicta concerning reality, and will have a wealth of suggestive material to aid his own further reflections.

H. R. HOLCOMB

The Faith of Man Speaks, edited by Helen Woodbury, New York, Macmillan, 1945, pp. 133, \$1.75.

From the literature of "The Far Past," "The Near Past," "Yesterday," and "Today" Miss Woodbury has compiled comforting thoughts about God, death, and immortality. This is a noble anthology. Lovers' grief is here, and sympathy of friend for friend; pagan resignation, also, and the strong assurances of Christian faith—feelings meet for expression in the presence of the beloved dead. But one will ask in vain for the sentimental verse with which the minister often tries to mask the reality of the funeral service. He who feels that mere Scripture and prayer are an inadequate Godspeed for the soul that has embarked on its last adventure, who must add the grace of poetry, would do well to make the acquaintance of this volume. The serene acceptance of the "bright mystery" which marks all its pages might save him from recourse to those devices by which he and the undertaker, through desire to spare the feelings of the bereaved, make the funeral service a white lie.

Perhaps I am wrong in judging that the last offices for the Protestant dead tend more and more to rob death of its dignity. But what does the substitution of the "Beautiful Isle of Somewhere" for the majestic language of the fifteenth chapter of First Corinthians mean? Or the mat of imitation grass which covers the mound of that clay from which we came and to which we must return? Or the drifting rose petals which now answer for earth, ashes, and dust when the body is committed to the ground and the soul commended to its Maker? The delicacy which prescribes these subterfuges seems to suggest that the Christian soul is no longer robust enough to look on the face of Death.

Yet Death must be looked upon if immortality is to have any substantial form in our thought. Not until we have seen him steadily and unafraid in his rôle as the reaper, can we see that he is also the sower who casts in other and kindlier fields the seed which he harvests here where the soil is too thin and the summer too short to yield the full fruitage of the soul.

Moreover, the life that now is gains much of its breadth and depth from the knowledge that our death is certain. Knowing the the Scriptural span of three score years and ten is more than most men can hope for, creative souls accelerate their labors in competition with remorseless time. For they are spurred by the certainty that at best their finished work will be but an inconsiderable fraction of what they plan and what industry and skill, given time, could complete.

Seen in its proper setting against the background of eternity, life assumes an ampler majesty than it wears while we are bent over the day's task. "I must work the works of him who sent me while it is day; the night cometh when no man can work"

was not a reluctant tribute to the all-devouring power of the grave; rather it affirmed the worth of those years, brief though they be, which afford the soul opportunity to try its mettle against the evil that is in the world and to further whatsoever is to be esteemed for its goodness.

The rapacity of death is a challenge and a spur, also, to love's generosity. Our loved ones take on a new "element of preciousness" when clearly we perceive that they are ours for too short a time to prove the full range of our affection or to enjoy the varied expressions of which our hearts are capable.

Again, the obligation to run even while we read gives a richer value to those scraps of knowledge which we are able to seize in our race against time. Surely the truths which we learn glow with a fuller beauty and speak with a more compelling authority when we know that the brevity of our lives will permit us only to approach, never to explore, the vast storehouse from which they have been spilled.

In these and other ways does life gain a noble urgency while it expects the coming of its last enemy.

Perhaps *The Faith of Man Speaks* can render its greatest service to those whose life expectancy is longest!

ROBERT MUNSON GREY

Two Worlds: A Realistic Approach to the Problem of Keeping the Peace, by William B. Ziff, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. 335, \$3.

Intelligent ministers and laymen should know this book which forces them to face hard realities and to think, first with the author and then for themselves.

Mr. Ziff, a capable and versatile citizen, has proved his competence in such fields as commercial art and business and has written several provocative works on international subjects. The present volume holds that the atomic bomb and other scientific, political, and economic developments compel a rapid and complete revision of attitudes, lest in many realms mankind prove as out of date as the France of the 1940 Maginot Line. Small states are doomed, except as appanages of larger dynamic units. Only the United States, the Soviet Union, and perhaps Brazil and China are capable of surviving this century. Neither the United Nations nor a world state can solve the immediate problem. Admittedly the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are variant. American policy has failed through alternately threatening and appeasing the Soviets and through supporting British imperialism, which has run its course. Unless the United States initiates a drastic change in outlook and action it heads straight toward a third world war.

The author's analysis, more prolonged than need be, particularly in its disparagement of the United Nations, is vivid and often convincing; at other times it is merely a personal evaluation which many will not accept. Subject to question also is his basic proposal, a recognition of two worlds, one centring around the Soviets and the other around the Americas. The latter would run from the British Isles through the islands of the Atlantic and Pacific except those of Japan and Russia. It would probably be divided into an English-speaking section, including the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, New Zealand, and Australia; a Latin-American section; and a Philippine-Indonesian section. Between this western world and the Soviet world, itself a league of nations, marked differences in customs, ideology, and action would continue, but there would be no need for war. The two realms would develop internally in their respective ways, in wholesome rivalry. Little is said about the disposition of peripheries like Africa or Western Europe, or of buffer regions such as the Near East, Japan, China, and India, although it is stated that the last two should never be allowed to fall under the control of a single Eurasian power. For whatever it may be

worth, the publishers have embellished the back jacket of the volume with a series of endorsements by United States Senators, mostly of the middle-of-the-road type whose conversion from isolationism is fairly recent and somewhat uncertain.

One wonders whether Mr. Ziff's proposal might not lead to a restoration or intensification of the system of balance of power and conflict which he rightly deplores as a past and present evil. The success of his plan demands coöperation and confidence; whether these essentials can be as well attained through his two semi-isolated spheres as through a single world entity, either the United Nations or something better, is a question upon which the author may not have said the last word.

In spite of its many merits and wealth of suggestive ideas, the book seems confused on certain moral and intellectual issues. It does not grasp the psychology and potentiality of the non-Slavic Orient, and it appears to underestimate the importance of the African, Mediterranean, and Western European areas. The grammarian and the historian will find slips or inaccuracies, such as a statement that Britain fought five separate wars to prevent Russia from taking control of the Dardanelles. To reach so high a number one must include diplomatic manoeuvres not involving war. Mr. Ziff overlooks, furthermore, the counterbalancing fact that in the secret treaties of World War I, Britain and France promised Constantinople and the Straits to Russia. British and Russian policies were not so uniformly opposed as he assumes. Among his apparent logical inconsistencies is a proper refusal to countenance an aggressive use of outside force to attempt to overthrow the Soviet bureaucracy, but a detailed willingness to encourage the United States to drop bombs on Argentina's government to eliminate Perón and his totalitarian henchmen in the supposed interest of freedom and of hemispheric unity.

Among the best aspects of the book are: its devastating exposure of the futility of assuming that national or world security can now rest upon conscription or universal military training in either peace or war; its emphasis upon the need for greater regional organization; its repeated assertion that if the United States is to influence the world constructively it must solve the problems of its own social order and develop that system with effective enthusiasm; its declaration that ultimate world government must act directly upon individuals and not through the medium of states; and its insistence that marked social and political differences can exist without producing conflict. *Two Worlds* deserves careful examination. If the reader wishes to refute or supplement it, particularly in the realms of moral and religious values and of the present essential oneness of mankind, he may well turn to such a book as Kirby Page's *Now Is the Time to Prevent a Third World War*. There or in personal study and searching one may find some of the answers.

EARL CRANSTON

Eyes of Faith, by Paul S. Minear, Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1946, pp. 307, \$2.

This book, written by the Norris professor of New Testament interpretation at the Andover Newton Theological School, is an interpretation of the religion of the Bible from a particular theological point of view. Those who share this theology will hail the book as a major contribution. Those who have difficulty with the particular point of view will, of course, be discouraged, aroused, or perhaps baffled by the terms used and the convictions presented, often in terms of absolutes. The theological point of view is what the reviewer understands as "neoorthodoxy." No great system of theology can fairly be stated in a few sentences, but, understanding this limitation, it is still possible to summarize the major tenets of the position of neoorthodoxy. Professor E. S. Brightman does this in the current (August, 1946) issue of the *Bible and Religion*, p. 129:

The outstanding feature of this . . . trend is a sense of despair about everything human. Man's original and hereditary sin poisons every human undertaking. Man's will is corrupt and no real goodness is in him. His reason is proud, rebellious against God, unable to find God. Only faith can save man in such a plight, but faith itself is a gift of God and not an act of sinful man. Only revelation can give divine truth, but no human interpretation can grasp the contents of revelation. God is the sovereign of history, but history does not reveal God.

Professor Minear's interpretation stems from the question, What happens when God confronts the prophet and bids him look with the eyes of faith? "Vision" is a key term, and the book is organized in four major parts and an epilogue: "The Angle of Vision," "The Focus of Vision," "The Horizons of Vision," "Revision of Vision," and "To See or Not To See." Using this framework, Professor Minear points out with many arresting statements the evidences in support of the point of view outlined above. It is, in the judgment of the reviewer, a one-sided interpretation. It seems to leave out or gloss over such teachings as Hosea's "Yearning God," Isaiah's "Come everyone that thirsteth," John's "Whosoever will," Paul's emphasis upon reconciliation for all who will be reconciled to God, and the persistent purpose of Jesus' prophetic life.

There is always the difficulty we face as mystics in not being able to state completely or convincingly the truth we apprehend; yet few of us would be willing to deny the mystic way to truth. Professor Minear seems to deny the validity of reason and history and yet himself to use history and reason to present his interpretation of the prophetic experience. Some more inclusive search for truth even at the point of God's confrontation of man is evidently demanded. Faith by which we see the truth will turn out to be not merely that which God arbitrarily does to his prophets, but what any man is willing to do to meet the divine yearning for the love and devotion of his creatures in the glorious work of building the kingdom.

CHARLES M. BOND

The Catholic Apostolic Church, Sometimes called Irvingite, by P. E. Shaw, New York, King's Crown, 1946, pp. 264, \$3.25.

The Catholic Apostolic Church has never appeared in large letters upon the pages of history. In fact, few histories of the Christian church make mention of it, while an encyclopædia may accord it a brief paragraph. Yet it has a very real significance for the student of the history of religions.

The man chiefly responsible for its founding is Edward Irving, born in the little town of Annan in Dumfries, Scotland, August 4, 1792; thus the church's alternative name. Beginning his education at the dame school of Margaret Paine—a distant relative of Thomas Paine—Irving passed through a school of classical learning to enter the University of Edinburgh when thirteen years of age. Upon graduation he was for a time a teacher and pastor in Kirkcaldy, accepting in 1819 an invitation to become the assistant of Dr. Thomas Chalmers at St. John's in Glasgow.

This brief apprenticeship proved determinative. Chalmers, fully engaged as the eloquent preacher, laid upon the young man the duties of the pastor, the visitor of the sick—that is, of the priest. And Irving was well content. From his early years, as he himself confesses, he had chosen as his "venerable companion," Richard Hooker (1553?-1600) author of *Ecclesiastical Polity*, which established the Anglican order in which the priestly office remained central. It is not surprising then to find that in three years (1822) Irving accepted the call to become pastor of the Caledonian church in London, which ministered to the staunch Scottish Presbyterians in that city.

As the popular minister of a fashionable church, the young man felt himself free to follow the desires of his heart. He became dogmatic, his self-defense rooted in

Scriptural authority. Boldly he opposed the new evangelical missionary movement of England, with prophecy for his proof. The startled protest which his teaching raised led Irving to question the Scriptural basis of "the sober Presbyterian ideal of a democratic Church . . . in which the priests were subject to the perpetual criticism of a community too much disposed to argument and individual opinion to yield much veneration to their legitimate leaders." And this conception of the Bible as being chiefly a book of prophecy, together with the "exaltation" of himself, soon convinced him that "speaking in tongues" was God's chosen way of revealing his truth and will to men in all ages.

In 1832 he became associated with a group of kindred spirits in holding religious services of "charismatic faith" in Newman Street, London. In addition to claiming the gift of tongues they waited before the Lord that he might restore the true order of the church of apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, teachers, anointed by the Holy Spirit. And the Lord heard them, the Catholic Apostolic Church becoming a reality in conformity with the primitive ideal of Eph. 4:11-16. Christ's true church being again found upon earth, the kingdom of God was at hand. The Lord would hasten his appearing. That was their joyous hope and their assured expectancy.

The result, so far as Irving was concerned, was that the presbytery of Annan, in which he had been ordained, brought him to trial on March 13, 1833, withdrew his ordination, and expelled him from their body. He became one of the prominent leaders in the newly organized church.

In May, 1834, some missionaries were sent by the "prophets" to Upper Canada (now Ontario), and two years later others arrived. A certain measure of success was enjoyed, especially among the Methodists, and a number of churches were formed. Within the same period missionary labors were begun in the United States, with churches being established throughout New York State especially, impetus being received, undoubtedly, from the progress made across the border.

I have said that the Catholic Apostolic Church had little effect upon the course of Christian history. Its influence was, indeed, but short-lived. Yet it is of significance, not because of any inherent value of its own either in doctrine or organization, but because it reveals most clearly the nature and purpose of all religion.

Why did men turn to this ancient order of the church, convinced that it alone had the saving power for the day? How was it that they could find response on the part of a few thousand people in the old country and in the new? In the answer to those questions is to be found the significance of this movement, now almost extinct—as in the answer to similar questions may be found the meaning of all forms of religion.

This church had its rise among the English people in the thirties of the nineteenth century. The nation still suffered from the shocks of the Napoleonic wars. Democracy, which was viewed on the background of the French Revolution, was feared by many. There were at this very time other revolutions on the Continent. Yet the British Government seemed to favor this trend. The Old Test and Corporation Acts of the seventeenth century—guarding the established religion—were abolished in 1828. In 1829 the Catholic Emancipation Act was passed. The Reform Bill was enacted in 1832. The University of London, which excluded religion from its curriculum, was founded in 1835. The Tractarian movement began in 1833. England was entering the Victorian age, which proved so glorious, but which meant a break with the staid and ancient past. The historical approach to the study of Scripture, then in its infancy in Germany, was dreaded in Britain. The literal authority of the Word of God must be defended, and from many an orthodox pulpit went forth the

fervent entreaty that the Holy Spirit might be poured out upon the peoples to the saving of the rising generation, in universities, colleges, and churches.

At the same time Canada was in the throes of political revolt led by William Lyon MacKenzie, and the Clergy Reserves were the cause of religious agitation for larger freedom. In the United States the great financial panic of 1837 had swept the country into its first great depression, its causes so misunderstood as to give rise to the Millerite prophecy of the end of the world in 1843-1844. The Mormons were disturbing the orthodox social and religious classes of the country, as was many another coöperative and communistic order.

The times demanded steadfastness and a faithful return to the ancient forms of Christianity. The Bible, in its literalness, became the sure foundation and the unfailing defense. The Catholic Apostolic Church spoke with the divine authority of the ages. That always is the purpose and task of religion—to undergird, to make secure, as Paul says, to establish in confidence.

It may seem that thus far I have written a synopsis of the book rather than a review. A word now as to evaluation. Dr. Shaw has evidently been thorough and comprehensive in his research. His work is also well documented. But it must be said that he has not fully accounted for the rise of this church. Many of the explanations given above he failed to note, and others should be recognized. More inexcusable, however, is the author's lack of a chronological order. Incidents are recorded in chapters quite indifferent to their relationship to the period under review. The result is a most disjointed story, with innumerable repetitions, making it exceedingly difficult to follow with intelligent interest.

R. E. E. HARKNESS

The Prophetic Faith of Our Fathers, by LeRoy Edwin Froom, Vol. III, Washington, Review and Herald Publishing Association, 1946, pp. 802, \$4.50.

The Prophetic Faith of Our Fathers is not a discussion of the great prophetic tradition in Christianity which stems from the major prophets of the pre-Christian era. It is, rather, a history of the interpretation of the Jewish-Christian apocalyptic literature. The publishers plan to issue the work in four volumes but, because of "current interest in the field covered," it was decided that Volume III should receive initial publication. An examination of this volume reveals that the work is not history in the strict sense of the term, and an alert librarian will classify it under apologetics.

The purpose of the author, an instructor in the history of prophetic interpretation in the Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary, is to validate the Seventh-day Adventist eschatology, or, as he states it, "the orderly sequence of the major outline and time prophecies of the books of Daniel and Revelation." To this end, he, first of all, finds in history a remarkable "unity of witness upon essentials," which became progressively clearer as the meaning of the prophecies was unfolded by historical events; and, second, he seeks to give added weight to his thesis by showing that the men of "the Historical School of genuine prophetic interpretation" were "neither ignorant nor gullible . . . but were sound, sensible, and stable . . . the intellectual peers of any in their day."

The unity of witness is secured by dismissing as perverse and heretical all post-millennialists, Whitbyans, futurists, continuationists, and preterists; by ignoring serious discrepancies and disagreements among the remnant of the faithful who almost universally dated the second advent within their own generation; by failing to recognize that much of the unity that does exist indicates nothing more than dependence upon a common source; by suggesting that the admitted departures from what was to become

the Seventh-day Adventist party line were unhappy aberrations which made for confusion and uncertainty; and by failing to place upon the witness stand several major interpreters and chiliastic groups who fell within the framework of the "Historical School" of interpretation but whose conclusions were at marked variance with the thesis defended. Several striking omissions of this latter type are to be found in Part I, which purports to be an exhaustive analysis of millennialist thought in the American colonies. The Quakers, for example, constituted one of the major colonial religious bodies; yet their interpretation of the "prophecies" is not mentioned. The same is true of the not insignificant Antinomian party in New England, as well as of the Shakers and other minor groups.

The usefulness of a book, however, is not destroyed simply because, from the point of view of exact history, its conclusions leave much to be desired. Third-rate histories frequently make contributions of first-rate importance. It is naïve, of course, to suppose that a strong presumption as to the validity of certain beliefs is created by virtue of the fact that they were held by scholars, bishops, college presidents, and other men of distinction in earlier generations. On the other hand, in seeking to understand earlier generations, their characteristic beliefs cannot be disregarded. LeRoy Edwin Froom, therefore, has performed a valuable service by reminding us how thoroughly millennialist expectations permeated the thinking of "our fathers." Because this fact has not been generally appreciated, much historical writing—on economic and political as well as on religious subjects—has been wide of the mark. Froom demonstrates that even the "emancipated" minds of such men in early America as Roger Williams, Charles Chauncy, Timothy Dwight, Ezekiel Cheever, and Jonathan Mayhew were strongly conditioned by the prevailing eschatology.

Another important contribution of the volume is its detailed description of the millennialist excitement which agitated England during the 1820's and 1830's. To more stable souls it was a disturbing phenomenon, the more so because of its considerable proportions, as is indicated by the impressive number of societies established, periodicals issued, books published, and conferences held, devoted exclusively to this type of "prophetic" interpretation. The preaching of Edward Irving created a sensation in London, and the general clamor was increased when members of his congregation began to speak in tongues. Not only did the British advent awakening provide the Millerite movement in America with its particular pattern of biblical exposition; it was apparently an important factor in stimulating the development of the Oxford Movement.

The defects of Mr. Froom's work are, by and large, those involved in any work of apologetics posing as history. Opposing points of view are ignored, disparaged, and occasionally misinterpreted. Environmental factors are almost completely neglected. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars are discussed because of their identification as "prophetic" events, but the relationship of this tumultuous period and the subsequent economic distress and social unrest to the development of the nineteenth-century advent awakening is not considered. Exaggerated claims also are made. An illustration is the contention that the modern missionary movement sprang from the advent awakening in England. Irving's sermon at an anniversary meeting of the London Missionary Society, in which he denounced missions and declared missionary societies to be unscriptural, is conveniently forgotten and is not mentioned in the volume. If millennialist thought was a factor in the renewal of missionary activity, it was not that of the "Historical School of genuine prophetic interpretation." Far more likely an influence was the detested Whitbyan theory of world conversion, which at a later date provided the supporting ideology for the Student Volunteer Movement.

Careless errors occur at intervals in the text. Aaron Burr was not president of Yale, Thomas Chalmers' name was not Joseph, and events are sometimes misdated, perhaps by the printer.

WINTHROP S. HUDSON

The Tomb of Jesus, by Sufi Mutiur Rahman Bengalee, Chicago, Moslem Sunrise, ©1946, pp. 55, 60 cents.

Belief in the prophets—all the prophets—is a cardinal feature of the Ahmadiyya Moslem faith. Jesus is, for them, one of the prophets. It has long been their belief that Jesus did not die on the cross and, therefore, of course, that he was not resurrected, but escaped to India, and after a long ministry there, died and was buried. His supposed tomb is at Srinagar, in Kashmir, India, and is the object of pilgrimage every year on the part of many devout Ahmadiyyas. The booklet under review is an attempt by the present head of the Ahmadiyya Movement in America to prove the truth of this rather startling claim. He published a much shorter pamphlet on the subject several years ago. This is a revision and an extension of the earlier brochure, under the same name.

How does he go about proving it? He must of course first prove that Jesus did not die, and this he does to his own satisfaction on the basis of biblical evidence. In so doing he uses the Bible very much as conservative Christians are wont to do. For example, Jesus is said to prophesy in Matt. 12:39-40 that the "sign of Jonah" will be shown in his case. But the sign of Jonah was "that he entered into the whale's belly and came out alive." Jesus must therefore have come from the tomb *alive*. He draws upon the arguments occasionally advanced by western writers to prove that Jesus was not dead when taken down from the cross, adding nothing significant to them. "Credulous imagination built up the theory of the so-called resurrection and physical ascension of Jesus to the sky, which, however, belongs entirely to the realm of fiction," he writes. Again to support his belief he uses mainly western authorities—Renan, Bernard M. Allen, Kirsopp Lake, and others.

If he did not die, where did he go? Here the main argument turns around Jesus' statement, "I am not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel" (Matt. 15:24). Everything hinges upon the location of the lost sheep—or the "lost tribes" of Israel. These he locates in Kashmir, Afghanistan, and the surrounding areas. These peoples are, he asserts the "lost tribes" and Jesus sought them out. He appeals to various sources, historical and anthropological, in support of this thesis. Similarity of names and cast of features, he asserts, make the identification certain.

Then finally, there is the tomb of Jesus with the inscription, *Yus Asaf. Yus*, he says, is clearly "*Yasu*, the Arabic name of Jesus." Buddhist prophecies of a Messiah (*Metteya* = Messiah) who was to come five hundred years after Buddha's death, and further the belief that *Metteya* would be "Bagwa" light of complexion, clinch the matter—for Mr. Bengalee.

This is a well-written and interesting booklet. The author has made skillful use of his sources in setting forth his case. If his initial premises are accepted, it is difficult to avoid going along with him to at least some of his conclusions. Critical scholarship will object, however, rather vigorously to some of the sources he employs; and, of course, liberals will hardly be influenced by his argument from scripture. Their idea of the nature of scripture renders his use of them ineffective in almost every instance.

CHARLES S. BRADEN

BOOK NOTICES

Christian Leadership in a World Society, edited by Justin Wroe Nixon and Winthrop Still Hudson, Rochester, Colgate-Rochester Divinity School, 1945, pp. 273, \$2.00.

The small volume under consideration is a well-merited tribute to an eminent teacher and inspirer of socially-minded ministers. Conrad Henry Moehlman in 1918 succeeded Walter Rauschenbusch in the chair of church history at Rochester. That he has carried the Rauschenbusch torch is evidenced by the topics chosen for the various contributions to this volume in his honor. To mention a few examples, Mordecai Johnson writes on "The Color Line and the Destiny of our Nation"; John S. Everton on "The Struggle for Economic Justice"; Willard L. Johnson on "The Tragedy of the Jew" (a theme which was the title of a book by Dr. Moehlman in 1935); Howard W. Thurman on "The Inner Life and World-Mindedness"; and Mark Rich on "The Farmer's Field is the World." While the volume reveals the influence of Dr. Moehlman's spirit, his versatility, and his social leadership, it cannot be said that the essays are particularly scholarly or forceful. They exhibit more good will and devotion than research or new insight. Nevertheless, the average clergyman who feels his social zeal sagging or his theology tottering Barthward would find it worth his while to read the volume and take heart.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

The Kingdom Relationship, by Isaiah Jefferson Brame, Nampa (Idaho), privately printed, 1946, pp. 141, \$1.75.

During the past few decades numerous scholars have taken the pen to confute what has been called the extreme, eschatological interpretation of the kingdom of God. The present author joins the ranks of these men. In the author's words: "The idea is advanced here that the Kingdom of God, as set forth in the New Testament, can best be understood as a relationship between God and man; and that it cannot exist as an objective reality, or as an institution, except as such expresses the experience and the quality of life of the individuals who have established this relationship with God." The author feels that this particular aspect of the kingdom has been neglected, but one wonders if it is not rather that he has overlooked the flood of books dealing with this subject. One more book treating a familiar problem in an intellectually stimulating and refreshing manner is always welcome. Unfortunately, to one who is even slightly acquainted with this field the book seems repetitious. If, on the other hand, the book is intended merely for the average reader, as the author states, then the involved discussion of "wave motion," "atoms of filiality," and "tidal wave of humanitarianism" in the chapter on "The Foundations of the Kingdom" seems confusing and uncalled for. In spite of this chapter the book might have been commendable for use by "average readers" in Sunday-school classes and other church study groups. However, faulty sentence structure and misspelled words (either because of the printer's errors or a careless author) are so abundant as to discourage this. There are many more readable books covering the same general problems.

FRANKLIN W. YOUNG

Sin and Science, by Dyson Carter, New York, Heck-Cattell, ©1946, pp. 216, \$2.50.

It is difficult to decide whether this volume uses sex, prostitution, and venereal disease as a springboard from which to jump into praise of Russia, or Russia as a

model sounding board from which we may tune up properly on sex, prostitution, and venereal disease. Anyhow, he likes the way Russia has handled these questions. And indeed it is time that the story of how the Soviets have dealt with them is told to the western world. With prostitution in the western sense closer to being eliminated before the war than any other large nation has ever achieved, with the incidence of venereal disease extremely low, and with a constantly lowering divorce rate—facts such as these appear to deserve careful study even though some of the ways in which they have been achieved may seem strange to western thinking. One illustration must suffice to suggest the author's approach to a network of interrelated problems. Soviet Russia inherited a large abortion problem from the czars, with thousands of women dying each year and other thousands being severely injured. The government legalized abortion, gave competent medical care, and provided confidential help. Thus the women came in droves. From the beginning, a large proportion who had decided on abortion were persuaded instead to have their babies. Year by year the abortion rates came down. Finally, when they were very small, abortion was prohibited. This last, says the author, was what the government was aiming at all along; but it had to legalize abortion temporarily in order to get at the old exploitative abortion problem, and to give it time to deal with the underlying social problems which are the impetus for abortions, namely, financial inability to have the child, etc. The case here is oversimplified, but it does provide food for thought. So with prostitution, venereal disease, some aspects of the alcohol question and of juvenile delinquency. Despite the importance of the material with which it deals, and the journalistic style, this book clearly belongs in the propaganda class. This may perhaps be sufficiently suggested in the title, in which sin is equated with sexual immorality, and Soviet methods are supposedly pure science. The subject is of real social significance, and even in this volume it is clear that Russia has made some highly original contributions to the subject. If some or many of them are made at a price which a western democracy cannot pay, that should not deter us from studying those as well as others. What we need, however, is a more objective account than this author can provide.

SEWARD HILTNER

The Control of Atomic Energy, United Nations Department of Public Information (distributed by Columbia University Press), 1946, pp. iii, 42, 25 cents (paper).

This is the first report of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations. The report contains nothing of a technical nature that has not appeared in previous publications, but presents a "clear concise statement of the best thinking of an international group of scientists" on the phases of technology relevant to the problem of control. The question answered by this committee is "whether effective control of atomic energy is possible." The answer is that such control is technologically feasible. "Whether or not it is politically feasible, is not discussed or implied in this report..." The report is of interest because it indicates the area of unanimous agreement among scientists of all nations. It should be of some value to the scientific layman because of the simplicity of its presentation. It is explained that atomic technology, like all others, may be used usefully or destructively. Nuclear energy may be released at a controlled rate as in a reactor, or in a runaway explosion as in a bomb. Everything that applies to peacetime use applies also to wartime use. The political control of one involves the political control of the other—in other words, loss of sovereignty. At the moment, the world apparently prefers the risk of atomic warfare to the loss of sovereignty.

EUGENE AYRES

Towards Christian Democracy, by Stafford Cripps, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1946, pp. 101, \$2.00.

A distinguished British statesman here urges the importance of social application of the Christian faith. He insists that Christians should "endeavor to interest themselves in the wrongs that are being committed, with a view to assisting in putting them right," but he tends to withdraw from any program of direct action. Christianity is to furnish the basis in ideals, and "the moral force and the driving power" for sound social conduct. The volume stands about where the social gospel in America did twenty years ago, enunciating general principles but giving little help for their implementation.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

Men and Hunger, by Harold Steere Guetzkow and Paul Hoover Bowman, Elgin, Brethren Publishing House, ©1946, pp. 72, \$1.

In 1944, at the University of Minnesota, a group of some thirty-six conscientious objectors submitted themselves as subjects for an experiment in human starvation. These "guinea pigs" were fed normal diet for three months; semistarved for six months; and then rehabilitated for three months—all under carefully controlled laboratory conditions. Exact records of the diets and weights of the subjects, their physical and mental output, their psychological reactions at each stage, and other pertinent matters, were kept. A serious, detailed, and probably lengthy scientific report of the experiment will be forthcoming. Meanwhile, it was felt, there was need to present some of the facts learned, in brief form, for workers with starving or undernourished people. This little manual is the result. The authors are well fitted for their task. Mr. Guetzkow is a psychologist who, by means of tests, personal interviews, and group contacts, came to a thorough understanding of the psychological reactions of the subjects. Mr. Bowman has had five years of experience in foreign relief administration with the International Commission for Child Refugees, the American Friends Service Committee, and the Brethren Service Committee. The book is divided into three parts: a section on introduction and evaluation, a section on the psychology of starvation, and one on the application of these psychological observations to the field of practical relief work. Brief, readable, and concise, the volume will be interesting not only to the workers for whom it was intended, but to all who seek to understand human personality and human problems. Its references to the experiment, however fragmentary, and its photographs add to its value not only as a scientific record, but also as a human-interest story, and an appreciative tribute to the men who, in the words of the dedication, "starved voluntarily in the hope that their privation might aid millions who starve involuntarily."

JOHN W. THOMAS

Practical Idealism, by Paul Mallon, Boston, Bruce Humphries, ©1946, pp. 158, \$2.

The title is significant. The practical and the ideal are so frequently divorced that any effort to unite them is praiseworthy. The author, in this case, does a good job in bringing them together. The scope of the discussions is indicated by the section headings of the book: "The Future World," "Dissolving Dollars," "False Prophets," "Marx and God," "Tricks of Politics," and "The Free Young." These important matters are considered in chapters marked by refreshing common sense. "The fundamentals of security" are said to be "not in Government tax reservoirs, but in economic stability which protects employment, wages, prices, leisure, private

insurance." It is insisted that "a nation can survive in this world only if it is strong economically and militarily." Security is not in "walls, navies, planes, and armies. . . . You are never secure. There is no security in the very nature of things. . . . That nation maintains itself longest which is alert, wise, and therefore realistic." The same principle is held to apply to personal security. Since governments are "inefficient in the spending of money," the question is raised, "Why not have people spend their own money?" Christianity and democracy are presented as supplying the ideals for the solution of the various problems presented. Economic slavery is held to be as real as political slavery, and "domination by one religion or by atheism" to be "equally far from any democratic ideology." The present tendency to avoid work is deplored and its dangers pointed out. Political conventions are described as "outmoded devices . . . the formulas of a by-gone era of slow transportation and archaic communications." Race superiority is shown to rest, not upon biological differences, but upon high intellectual standards, energy, and ability. The "incontestable answer" to the problem of juvenile delinquency is given as "discipline," enforced by home, school, and church, but not by "the state, particularly the federal government." It is insisted that the military training needed for national defense should not be provided by "compulsion," but by "democratic methods." The author concludes: "Two worlds each man lives in. One is the World of Christmas. The other is the remaining 364 days of the year. . . . We all have one foot planted in the world of inspiration . . . and the other firmly, inevitably fixed in a shoe on earth." The book is based primarily upon the writer's syndicated newspaper columns, and the various articles bear the dates when they appeared.

RITTENHOUSE NEISSER

The Emerging Revival, by G. Ray Jordan, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1946, pp. 186, \$1.75.

The author introduces his book with a big assumption, "A revival is emerging." This optimistic statement is buttressed by no evidence save the assertion "that thousands of people declare they are aware of it." Mr. Jordan looks for a revival that will at once be biblical and ethical, and spring from a genuine regard for humanity. In a series of brief essays, he attempts to portray what a genuine revival would mean to the church, its members, and the nation. It would greatly change the lives of men so that they "would live in the same spirit in which they engage in Christian worship." It would enable them to see clearly how to build a new world. It would add zest to living as they would seek to give of their very best. They would reproduce the mind and spirit of Christ for the present generation. "The hope of civilization is that we shall be able to produce enough Christ-like men to save it." The ideal evangelist will be a man whose mind is hospitable to truth, who is "divinely daring," and who is "spiritually sensitive." The author is conservative in his statement of truth but broad in his outlook. The book is interestingly written and copiously illustrated; it contains little that is new, but it does put truths, often stated, in new settings. A reading of the essays may well inspire the Christian to live and act in a way that will make the predicted "emerging revival" a reality.

A. M. MC DONALD

New Testament Evangelism, by Arthur C. Archibald, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1946, pp. 149, \$2.

This is not just another book on evangelism, but rather *the* book on evangelism for our present situation. With realistic candor, the author gives his appraisal of

professional evangelism as it relates itself to the well-being of the local church, and discounts the artificially stimulated fervor and the go-getter methods of mass evangelism for the purpose of constructively building the kingdom. Instead of the simulated enthusiasm and brassy fanfare which are calculated to sweep the unregenerate into salvation, Dr. Archibald proposes the quiet procedures of lay evangelism, depending on the personal testimony of humble Christians to convince the uncommitted that they have need of Christ and the fellowship of the church. The first reading of the volume brings to a pastor a keen sense of lost opportunity and convicts him of having temporized in the face of his greatest responsibility. A second reading of the book implements the pastor's resolution to become an evangelist by affording sane procedures and well-calculated plans to achieve his purpose. With this handbook and a score of consecrated lay people any pastor could engineer a spiritual ingathering, the resultant enthusiasm of which would be far more permanent than the tidal wave of emotional fervor whipped up by the processes of mass evangelism.

MILTON C. WESTPHEAL

The Abbé Edgeworth, by M. V. Woodgate, New York, Longmans Green, 1946, pp. xii, 202, \$2.50.

Henry Essex Edgeworth was a descendant of Archbishop Ussher, and a cousin of Maria Edgeworth. He was the son of the Anglican rector of Edgeworthstown in Ireland. When Henry was four, his father became a Roman Catholic, and brought his family at once to Toulouse to settle. Henry's subsequent history belongs to France. Yet his English name and British birth were to help him squeeze out of many very dangerous situations during the French Revolution. And Irish property was to pay him dividends till almost the end of his life. As a devoted Catholic priest, we find him laboring in the Paris slums. An astonishing summons to direct the religious course of the king's sister Elizabeth introduced him into the life of the ill-fated Bourbon court. General history knows him intimately for that one brief moment when he accompanied Louis XVI to the scaffold and gave him spiritual consolation. As a nonjuring priest henceforth he could only live disguised in France, which he did for a time (nominally vicar-general of the diocese of Paris), or in exile. We see him for a time in London and Edinburgh, with the French exiles, who were so generously treated by the English government and people. But ties and pledges of personal loyalty drew him back to the Continent to serve the soi-disant king of France, Louis XVIII, in his sombre and (to our eyes) somewhat ridiculous exile in Prussia, Courland, Warsaw, during the years of Napoleon's rise to vast power. The abbé, never strong, and wasted now from long years of hardships, died from a fever caught while nursing Napoleonic soldiers in the very community of the royal exile. A strikingly handsome figure, a devout priest, without conspicuous gifts, but loyal to his pledged word through years of violence and years of boredom alike, Henry Edgeworth makes a romantic appeal to the reader. Here was a story that begged to be told. The book, sans index or footnotes, is not prepared for the scholar, but the scholarship behind the book seems sound. The author lets him speak largely for himself in his letters. Those letters reveal a man worth knowing, and enable the reader to live over again the days of the Revolution. This two-hundred page biography recounts a story so enthralling that the reader may even wish it had been turned into a four-hundred page novel. Yet the reader remains warmly grateful for this colorful personal history, told so simply, directly, and withal adequately.

JOHN W. BRUSH

More Sermon Trails for Boys and Girls, by Carl S. Weist, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. ix, 148, \$1.50.

Good and usable books of sermons and stories for children are rare and hard to find. Here is one that this reviewer can recommend wholeheartedly. The author, Carl S. Weist, is pastor of the Mt. Vernon Community Church, New York, and this volume is a sequel to his former book, *Fifty-two Sermon Trails for Boys and Girls*. Mr. Weist has a genuine insight into things that will interest children and the happy faculty of telling his story in such a way as to make it both interesting and teach a lesson. He dips into history, science, and current events, for his stories and illustrations and also knows how to use Bible stories with good effect. Every story sermon has a text, a theme, and a purpose, and the busy pastor will find stories to suit nearly every need and occasion. The author frankly takes issue with those who say that it is never necessary to point out lessons in stories, stating that his own experience shows that it is better to know yourself and state clearly for your hearers just what your goal is as you start your sermon. He reminds us that Jesus told the story of the sower, but immediately afterward applied it at some length. On the other hand, Jesus did not always do this and sometimes simply said, after he had finished a pointed story, "Go and do thou likewise." All who have opportunity to tell stories or preach to children will profit from this interesting and helpful volume. This reviewer tried it out on his own eleven-year-old, and the boy was delighted. What better proof could one want?

THEODORE F. ADAMS

Preaching without Notes, by Clarence Edward Macartney, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1946, pp. 186, \$1.75.

The title of this book is a misnomer—only one chapter deals with the subject—unless it be assumed that all preparation of the preacher and the sermon is toward the end of preaching without notes. A glance at the books recommended for the preacher (pp. 81-83) reveals that the twentieth century does not exist for the author except as an apostate generation to be brought back to God by a "Recall to Gospel Preaching." No modern student, no modern reader, would give the list a second glance; it is archaic and parochial. The results of such limited reading and thinking are obvious in the suggestions about "The Preacher and his Illustrations" and "Bible Biographical Preaching." It is to be feared that Miniver Cheevy still seeks ordination.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

A Guide to True Peace, New York, Harper, n. d., pp. xiv, 118, \$1.

This devotional manual was first compiled in 1813 by two Quakers from the writings of three great mystics of a century earlier—Fenelon, Guyon, and Molinos. It is now published in a new edition with an introduction by Howard H. Brinton, of Pendle Hill. These writers affirm that true peace is to be found by cultivating the inner life rather than by controlling nature. Not by feverish activity, but by inward silence and spiritual relaxation does the individual find the resources for true peace.

Within your own soul resides divine aid, and sovereign succour. Retreat within it, and all will be quiet, secure, peaceable, and calm. Thus, by means of mental silence, which can only be attained by divine help, you may look for tranquillity in tumult; solitude in company; light in darkness; forgetfulness in pressures; vigour in despondency; courage in fear; resistance in temptation; peace in war; and quiet in tribulation (p. 47).

This book is written in the stately language of another century, but it sounds a timeless summons to inner integrity and trust in "the power working in us."

ROLLAND W. SCHLOERB

How to Teach Hebrew in the Elementary Grades, by William Chomsky, New York, United Synagogue Commission on Jewish Education, 5706-1946, pp. xiv, 295, \$3.

One objective of religious education in Protestant circles is to give the pupil a knowledge of the Bible in his own, native language. A large group of Jews, however, feel that a knowledge of Hebrew is a prerequisite to an understanding of Jewish living. This linguistic preparation is not an end in itself but a means toward the achievement of other and more basic goals in character and attitudes. To teach Jewish children—children whose linguistic equipment is no better than that of non-Jewish children—Hebrew in the elementary grades is a large task. The author of this book for teachers of the elementary grades has undertaken to outline the methods by which children may be taught to read Hebrew with appreciation. He has drawn upon a wide literature on educational method in writing a book which should be extremely useful to teachers. As one who attempts to teach the language to more mature students, I found of particular interest the chapter on "Vocabulary Studies as a Basis for the Reading Program." Following the example of William R. Harper in making word lists of vocabulary which appears most frequently, Chomsky has given a basic word list of 466 words in an appendix to the volume. This is of considerable value to teachers of Hebrew. On the basis of this and other studies in vocabulary Chomsky has collaborated in publishing a simple version of the stories about Joseph in Gen. 37-50; this I have found useful as a reading book for students of Hebrew in the first year. It is gratifying to learn that an anthology of more biblical material is planned; when this appears, it will fill a need long felt by some teachers of Hebrew.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

Strange Seed, by Kenneth L. Patton, privately printed, [Boston, Beacon], 1946, pp. 71, \$1.50.

It may not be fair to choose a poem and say it is the author's philosophy, but one can say it seems to be so. Therefore, "Let others be captive milch cows in valleys moist and lush; we will be goats on the scraggly hills cropping the underbrush." It may not be just to quote a poem and ask, "Is it?" But, "I am what I am when I am it. I am what I am, God damn it." It is both fair and just to say there are other expressions of thought and other verse forms in this volume of very uneven materials and values; a volume that is in places a sequel to *Spoon River Anthology* and in other places a tardy voice still barking the wares of humanism. Throughout, however, the reader is told that life is a struggle not worth the making, for the end is always negative and unrewarding. Therefore, let us see life clearly and without foolish hopefulness; let us admit it is but a poor experience at best. Then we shall be free and enlightened to whistle gaily at its inherent sterility.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

BOOKS RECEIVED

- **The Genius of the Prophets*, by W. Arthur Faus, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1946, pp. 190, \$1.75.
 - **Whereon to Stand*, by John Gilland Brunini, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. xvii, 302, \$3.
 - **The Gilgamesh Epic and Old Testament Parallels*, by Alexander Heidel, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1946, pp. ix, 269, \$3.50.
 - **Wisdom and Responsibility*, by Walter Fales, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1946, pp. 166, \$2.50.
 - **Journal from My Cell*, by Roland DePury, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. xvi, 140, \$1.50.
 - **Hindu Psychology*, by Swami Akhilananda, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. xviii, 241, \$2.50.
 - **Plutarch und das Neue Testament*, by Helge Almquist, Uppsala (Sweden), Appelbergs Boktryckeri, 1946, pp. 164.
 - **The Disobedient Spirits and Christian Baptism*, by Bo Reicke, Copenhagen, Ejnar Munksgaard, 1946, pp. viii, 275.
 - **The Unity of the Church in the New Testament*, by Stig Hanson, Uppsala (Sweden), Almquist and Wilksell, 1946, pp. xi, 197.
 - **Questions That Trouble Christians*, by W. A. Poovey, Columbus, Wartburg, ©1946, pp. 187, \$1.50.
 - **Toward a United Church*, by William Adams Brown, New York, Scribner, 1946, pp. xvi, 264, \$2.50.
 - **Albert Schweitzer: Christian Revolutionary*, by George Seaver, New York, Harper, ©1944, pp. 130.
 - **The Preaching Ministry Today*, by Rolland W. Schloerb, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. viii, 113, \$1.25.
 - Collectivism Challenges Christianity*, by Verne Paul Kaub, Winona Lake, Light and Life, 1946, pp. xxxv, 249, \$2.
- Marxism, communism, liberal Christianity—these are congenial bedfellows, and there are far too many of them in America. The author, who was "valedictorian of his (Indiana) high school class" and a student of mechanical drafting by correspondence, examines in some detail this sad situation and definitely and vocally disapproves of it.
- **Beyond This Darkness*, by Roger L. Shinn, New York, Association Press, 1946, pp. viii, 86, \$1.
 - **The Mind and Death of a Genius*, by David Abrahamsen, New York, Columbia University Press, 1946, pp. viii, 228, \$3.
 - **Successful Letters for Churches*, by Stewart Harra, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1946, pp. 247, \$2.
 - **A Look at Our Schools*, by Paul R. Mort and William S. Vincent, New York, Cattell, ©1946, pp. x, 115, \$1.50.
 - **The Origins of Christian Supernaturalism*, by Shirley Jackson Case, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1946, pp. vii, 239, \$3.
 - **The History of the Jews of Italy*, by Cecil Roth, Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society, 1946, pp. xiv, 575, \$3.

The Snowden-Douglass Sunday School Lessons, 1947, by Earl L. Douglass, New York, Macmillan, 1946, pp. xv, 408, \$2.

"These lesson expositions follow the subjects suggested by the International Lesson Committee for adults and young people and the intermediate and senior grades. The treatment can be adapted by the teacher to all grades down through the junior and primary"—from the preface.

**The God We Worship*, by Roger Hazelton, New York, Macmillan, 1946, pp. xiii, 160, \$2.

**Last Reprieve*, by Edwin McNeill Poteat, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. 105, \$1.

**Gailhac of Béziers*, by Helene Margaret, New York, Longmans Green, ©1946, pp. 262, \$3.50.

**Problems in Religion and Life*, by Anton T. Boisen, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1946, pp. 159, \$1.50.

**Heralds of God*, by James S. Stuart, New York, Scribner, 1946, pp. 222, \$2.50.

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Material for the Sunday-school teacher who uses The International Bible Lessons.

* To be reviewed.